In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.M. ) No. ED110278 ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Franklin County ) 19AB-JU00315 ) ) Honorable Joseph W. Purschke ) ) Filed: April 18, 2023
OPINION
J.K.M. appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Juvenile
Division (juvenile court) committing him to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On December 9, 2020, the juvenile court entered judgment on the Juvenile Officer of
Franklin County’s (Juvenile Officer) second amended petition against J.K.M. which alleged two
counts of second-degree tampering and one count of fourth-degree assault. The juvenile court
stayed the execution of J.K.M.’s commitment to the Division of Youth Services (DYS) and
ordered him to remain on home detention with certain conditions. On January 30, 2021, the
Juvenile Officer filed a motion to modify the previous order of disposition, alleging additional
violations. On March 30, 2021, the juvenile court issued an order, judgment, and decree, continuing the stay of execution of commitment to DYS and continuing J.K.M.’s home detention
with supervision. He was also placed on electronic monitoring (GPS) and required permission
from his mother (Mother) to leave his residence.
On September 2, 2021, Heather Pendegraft (Pendegraft), a deputy juvenile officer for
Franklin County supervising J.K.M., was alerted via a GPS monitoring application that J.K.M.
was not at home. She contacted Mother at work and J.K.M., both of whom reported he was at
home. Pendegraft placed the GPS monitoring in pursuit mode, and followed its movement. She
discovered J.K.M. driving a white truck she had previously observed parked at Mother’s
residence. J.K.M. returned home and eventually answered the door. When Pendegraft informed
J.K.M. law enforcement had been called, he again left the residence. When Mother returned
home, she received a phone call from J.K.M. who said he felt “ganged up on” so he left.
Sergeant Tracey Suttles (Sergeant Suttles) of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office responded to
the home and also spoke to J.K.M. on the phone. During this conversation, J.K.M., who had
removed his GPS monitor, disclosed its location under a bush nearby.
Thereafter, the Juvenile Officer filed several amendments to the initial motion to modify,
alleging additional violations. Relevant to this appeal, the court held a hearing regarding the
events on September 2, 2021, when the Juvenile Officer alleged J.K.M. violated a court order by
refusing to return home and leaving without permission (Count I), violated a court order by
removing his GPS and leaving without permission (Count II), committed the Class D felony of
tampering with electronic monitoring equipment in violation of Section 575.205 if the offense
was committed by an adult (Count III), and violated a court order for leaving the home without
permission (Count IV). J.K.M. filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or in the
alternative to order the Juvenile Officer to elect between Count II and Count III because Count
2 III was included in Count II, which violated double jeopardy. The juvenile court denied the
motion to dismiss and entered its order, judgment, and decree modifying its previous order of
disposition and placing J.K.M. in the physical custody of DYS. The present appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
In his sole point on appeal, J.K.M. argues the juvenile court erred in finding he
committed the offenses alleged in Count II and III of the second amended second motion to
modify a previous order of disposition. J.K.M. contends Count II was a lesser-included offense
to Count III and double jeopardy prohibits the court from punishing him twice for the same
conduct.
Standard of Review
We review the decision in a juvenile adjudication under the same standard as a court-tried
case. In Int. of S.B.A., 530 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). We will affirm the juvenile
court’s judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. However, whether the right to be free
from double jeopardy has been violated is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v.
Alexander, 505 S.W.3d 384, 397 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).
Analysis
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects defendants from successive
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or conviction. Alexander, 505 S.W.3d at
397. It also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. To satisfy double
jeopardy protection, each charged offense must contain a different, additional element not
contained in the other. State v. Daws, 311 S.W.3d 806, 808 (Mo. banc 2010). This protection
applies in certain juvenile cases as well. S.R.W. v. Juvenile Officer, 647 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Mo.
3 App. W.D. 2022). Specifically, the constitutional protections afforded defendants in criminal
cases are applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
However, status offenses are fundamentally different from a delinquency case where a
juvenile is alleged to have violated a state or municipal ordinance. In re A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d
103, 109 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). A status offense is a charge unique to juveniles. Id. It is an
infraction that allows the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over a child under the age of
seventeen where it is alleged the child is in need of care due to truancy, being beyond parental
control, being absent from home, or because of behavior injurious to his welfare. Id. A status
offense is in the nature of a civil proceeding and is not subject to the same protections as a
delinquency case in which the juvenile may be facing the deprivation of liberty equivalent to a
criminal proceeding. Id. at 110; In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc 2007).
Here, Count II charged J.K.M. with the status offense of violating the court’s order based
on the alert Pendegraft received that “he was not where he was required to be,” which would not
be afforded the constitutional protections of a delinquency offense. See In re A.G.R., 359
S.W.3d at 109, 110 and In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d at 605. Count III charged J.K.M. with a
delinquency offense of tampering with electronic monitoring equipment, which would be a
felony offense if committed by an adult. The only overlap between Count II and Count III is the
reference in Count II to J.K.M.’s removal of his GPS. In fact, at trial counsel for the Juvenile
Officer sought leave to amend Count II by interlineation to redact any reference to the removal
of J.K.M.’s GPS because it was not required to prove Count II. The court did not rule on this
request, but denied the motion to dismiss stating that the allegations in Count II and Count III
were “sufficiently different to allow both counts to stand.” We agree.
4 One of the conditions of J.K.M.’s home detention and supervision was that he could not
leave the residence without Mother’s permission. On September 2, 2021, J.K.M. left the
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.M. ) No. ED110278 ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Franklin County ) 19AB-JU00315 ) ) Honorable Joseph W. Purschke ) ) Filed: April 18, 2023
OPINION
J.K.M. appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Juvenile
Division (juvenile court) committing him to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On December 9, 2020, the juvenile court entered judgment on the Juvenile Officer of
Franklin County’s (Juvenile Officer) second amended petition against J.K.M. which alleged two
counts of second-degree tampering and one count of fourth-degree assault. The juvenile court
stayed the execution of J.K.M.’s commitment to the Division of Youth Services (DYS) and
ordered him to remain on home detention with certain conditions. On January 30, 2021, the
Juvenile Officer filed a motion to modify the previous order of disposition, alleging additional
violations. On March 30, 2021, the juvenile court issued an order, judgment, and decree, continuing the stay of execution of commitment to DYS and continuing J.K.M.’s home detention
with supervision. He was also placed on electronic monitoring (GPS) and required permission
from his mother (Mother) to leave his residence.
On September 2, 2021, Heather Pendegraft (Pendegraft), a deputy juvenile officer for
Franklin County supervising J.K.M., was alerted via a GPS monitoring application that J.K.M.
was not at home. She contacted Mother at work and J.K.M., both of whom reported he was at
home. Pendegraft placed the GPS monitoring in pursuit mode, and followed its movement. She
discovered J.K.M. driving a white truck she had previously observed parked at Mother’s
residence. J.K.M. returned home and eventually answered the door. When Pendegraft informed
J.K.M. law enforcement had been called, he again left the residence. When Mother returned
home, she received a phone call from J.K.M. who said he felt “ganged up on” so he left.
Sergeant Tracey Suttles (Sergeant Suttles) of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office responded to
the home and also spoke to J.K.M. on the phone. During this conversation, J.K.M., who had
removed his GPS monitor, disclosed its location under a bush nearby.
Thereafter, the Juvenile Officer filed several amendments to the initial motion to modify,
alleging additional violations. Relevant to this appeal, the court held a hearing regarding the
events on September 2, 2021, when the Juvenile Officer alleged J.K.M. violated a court order by
refusing to return home and leaving without permission (Count I), violated a court order by
removing his GPS and leaving without permission (Count II), committed the Class D felony of
tampering with electronic monitoring equipment in violation of Section 575.205 if the offense
was committed by an adult (Count III), and violated a court order for leaving the home without
permission (Count IV). J.K.M. filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or in the
alternative to order the Juvenile Officer to elect between Count II and Count III because Count
2 III was included in Count II, which violated double jeopardy. The juvenile court denied the
motion to dismiss and entered its order, judgment, and decree modifying its previous order of
disposition and placing J.K.M. in the physical custody of DYS. The present appeal follows.
DISCUSSION
In his sole point on appeal, J.K.M. argues the juvenile court erred in finding he
committed the offenses alleged in Count II and III of the second amended second motion to
modify a previous order of disposition. J.K.M. contends Count II was a lesser-included offense
to Count III and double jeopardy prohibits the court from punishing him twice for the same
conduct.
Standard of Review
We review the decision in a juvenile adjudication under the same standard as a court-tried
case. In Int. of S.B.A., 530 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). We will affirm the juvenile
court’s judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. However, whether the right to be free
from double jeopardy has been violated is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v.
Alexander, 505 S.W.3d 384, 397 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).
Analysis
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects defendants from successive
prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or conviction. Alexander, 505 S.W.3d at
397. It also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. To satisfy double
jeopardy protection, each charged offense must contain a different, additional element not
contained in the other. State v. Daws, 311 S.W.3d 806, 808 (Mo. banc 2010). This protection
applies in certain juvenile cases as well. S.R.W. v. Juvenile Officer, 647 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Mo.
3 App. W.D. 2022). Specifically, the constitutional protections afforded defendants in criminal
cases are applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
However, status offenses are fundamentally different from a delinquency case where a
juvenile is alleged to have violated a state or municipal ordinance. In re A.G.R., 359 S.W.3d
103, 109 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). A status offense is a charge unique to juveniles. Id. It is an
infraction that allows the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over a child under the age of
seventeen where it is alleged the child is in need of care due to truancy, being beyond parental
control, being absent from home, or because of behavior injurious to his welfare. Id. A status
offense is in the nature of a civil proceeding and is not subject to the same protections as a
delinquency case in which the juvenile may be facing the deprivation of liberty equivalent to a
criminal proceeding. Id. at 110; In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc 2007).
Here, Count II charged J.K.M. with the status offense of violating the court’s order based
on the alert Pendegraft received that “he was not where he was required to be,” which would not
be afforded the constitutional protections of a delinquency offense. See In re A.G.R., 359
S.W.3d at 109, 110 and In re N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d at 605. Count III charged J.K.M. with a
delinquency offense of tampering with electronic monitoring equipment, which would be a
felony offense if committed by an adult. The only overlap between Count II and Count III is the
reference in Count II to J.K.M.’s removal of his GPS. In fact, at trial counsel for the Juvenile
Officer sought leave to amend Count II by interlineation to redact any reference to the removal
of J.K.M.’s GPS because it was not required to prove Count II. The court did not rule on this
request, but denied the motion to dismiss stating that the allegations in Count II and Count III
were “sufficiently different to allow both counts to stand.” We agree.
4 One of the conditions of J.K.M.’s home detention and supervision was that he could not
leave the residence without Mother’s permission. On September 2, 2021, J.K.M. left the
residence when Mother was at work without her permission not just once, but twice. However,
he was only charged with the Count II status offense based upon J.K.M.’s violation of a court
order in doing so. The trial court correctly ruled the status offense is sufficiently different from
the felony of tampering with electronic monitoring equipment charged in Count III delinquency
offense because it is not necessary to prove he removed the GPS to establish the violation of the
court order as charged in Count II. J.K.M. violated a court order by leaving his home without
permission and then later committed an additional delinquency offense of tampering with the
electronic monitoring equipment after leaving without permission a second time. J.K.M.’s
double jeopardy protection was not violated because he committed two separate offenses and
was charged accordingly. Moreover, the status offense charged in Count II is not afforded such
protection. Thus, the juvenile court did not err by finding J.K.M. committed both the status
offense in Count II and the delinquency offense in Count III. J.K.M.’s sole point on appeal is
denied.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
________________________ Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge
Thomas C. Clark, II, J. and Renée D. Hardin-Tammons, J. concur.