IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-2108 Filed June 3, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF J.H., Minor Child,
C.M., Father, Petitioner-Appellee.
S.H., Mother, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clayton County, Linnea M.N. Nicol,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child.
AFFIRMED.
Cory R. Gonzales, Strawberry Point, for appellant mother.
C.M., Waukon, self-represented appellee father.
David G. Baumgartner, Strawberry Point, attorney and guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child,
J.H. She argues the juvenile court erred when it determined the father met his
burden to prove she abandoned J.H. under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3) (2019)
and found termination was in J.H.’s best interest. On our review, we affirm.
I. Background
J.H. was born in 2005 and was fourteen years old at the time of the
termination hearing. The mother was seventeen years old when J.H. was born.
The mother and father have not been in a relationship or lived together since before
J.H. was born. J.H. lived with the mother until she was one year old, at which time
the mother gave guardianship of J.H. to J.H.’s maternal grandmother. J.H. resided
with her maternal grandmother for approximately the next eleven years. During
much of the period when J.H. lived with the maternal grandmother, the father
exercised regular visitation. The time with the grandmother ended in February
2017, when it was discovered the grandmother was abusing prescription drugs.
As a result, juvenile authorities removed J.H. from the grandmother’s care and
placed her with the father in Wisconsin. When J.H. went to live with the father, the
mother could not take custody of J.H. because the mother had been charged with
conspiracy to possess or manufacture methamphetamine and was still on
probation related to that charge.
After J.H. had lived with her father for approximately one year, a decree was
entered in a separate district court proceeding. The decree issued by the district
court granted the mother and father joint legal custody of J.H. and placed J.H. in
the physical care of the father, subject to the mother’s visitation rights. A few 3
months later, in September 2018, the parties stipulated to modification of the
decree based on the mother’s continued use of illegal drugs and romantic
association with men who were a threat to J.H. The modification eliminated
scheduled visits for the mother and only allowed visitation “at the sole discretion
of” the father. The stipulation was incorporated into a district court decree.
The father petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights in this
proceeding in July 2019, alleging in part that the mother had abandoned J.H. by
failing to maintain contact with her. After the termination hearing, the juvenile court
granted the petition and terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother
appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Private termination proceedings under chapter 600A are reviewed de
novo.” In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). “Although we are not
bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when
considering credibility of witnesses.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Our primary consideration is the child’s best interest. Id.; Iowa Code § 600A.1.
III. Discussion
a. Statutory Grounds
The mother first argues the father has not shown she abandoned J.H. under
section 600A.8(b). Under that provision, “a parent is deemed to have abandoned
the child unless the parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated
contact with the child as demonstrated by contribution toward support of the child
of a reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means.” Iowa Code
§ 600A.8(3)(b). A parent can demonstrate substantial and continuous or repeated 4
contacts by “[v]isiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able
to do so” or through “[r]egular communication with the child or with the person
having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to
visit the child.” Id. § 600A.8(3)(b)(1)–(2).
The mother argues the father has not shown she abandoned J.H. because,
following the September 2018 order granting the father discretion over her visits
with J.H., the father prevented her from seeing J.H. While the father did refuse to
allow some visits to occur, the mother omits the father’s expressed justification for
refusing to allow the visits: the mother’s refusal to promise her boyfriend, J.G.,
would not be present at the visits. After the district court entered the September
2018 order amending visitation, the father repeatedly requested assurance from
the mother that J.G. would not be present for visits. The mother declined. While
there is little evidence on the record about why J.G. is not an appropriate person
for J.H. to be around, we note J.G. was named as a co-defendant alongside the
mother in a different methamphetamine charge than the one discussed before.1
Additionally, prior to the September order, the mother filed an application for
contempt based on the father’s alleged refusal to let J.H. visit the mother while
J.G. was present. In its ruling on the contempt application, the district court hearing
the application concluded the father “acted responsibly” by denying visitations with
the mother when J.H. would be exposed to J.G. and the mother had “chosen [J.G.]
over her child.” Upon our de novo review of the record, the father has established
that the mother failed to visit the child at least monthly when she was physically
1 The second methamphetamine charge against the mother was dismissed. 5
and financially able to do so, and such lack of contact was not caused by the father
preventing the contact. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(1).
The mother also claims the father failed to prove she did not regularly
communicate with J.H. or the father when physically and financially unable to visit.
See id. § 600A.8(3)(b)(2). However, the record establishes the mother made very
little effort to communicate with J.H. when she was not physically seeing the child.
See In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 2012) (“Parental responsibility
demands ‘affirmative parenting to the extent it is practicable and feasible under the
circumstances.’” (quoting In re Goettsche, 311 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981))).
For the two-year period leading up to the termination hearing, the mother called
J.H. only a handful of times. The mother’s communication with J.H. through letters
and Facebook was also sporadic, sometimes sending messages back-and-forth
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-2108 Filed June 3, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF J.H., Minor Child,
C.M., Father, Petitioner-Appellee.
S.H., Mother, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clayton County, Linnea M.N. Nicol,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child.
AFFIRMED.
Cory R. Gonzales, Strawberry Point, for appellant mother.
C.M., Waukon, self-represented appellee father.
David G. Baumgartner, Strawberry Point, attorney and guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child,
J.H. She argues the juvenile court erred when it determined the father met his
burden to prove she abandoned J.H. under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3) (2019)
and found termination was in J.H.’s best interest. On our review, we affirm.
I. Background
J.H. was born in 2005 and was fourteen years old at the time of the
termination hearing. The mother was seventeen years old when J.H. was born.
The mother and father have not been in a relationship or lived together since before
J.H. was born. J.H. lived with the mother until she was one year old, at which time
the mother gave guardianship of J.H. to J.H.’s maternal grandmother. J.H. resided
with her maternal grandmother for approximately the next eleven years. During
much of the period when J.H. lived with the maternal grandmother, the father
exercised regular visitation. The time with the grandmother ended in February
2017, when it was discovered the grandmother was abusing prescription drugs.
As a result, juvenile authorities removed J.H. from the grandmother’s care and
placed her with the father in Wisconsin. When J.H. went to live with the father, the
mother could not take custody of J.H. because the mother had been charged with
conspiracy to possess or manufacture methamphetamine and was still on
probation related to that charge.
After J.H. had lived with her father for approximately one year, a decree was
entered in a separate district court proceeding. The decree issued by the district
court granted the mother and father joint legal custody of J.H. and placed J.H. in
the physical care of the father, subject to the mother’s visitation rights. A few 3
months later, in September 2018, the parties stipulated to modification of the
decree based on the mother’s continued use of illegal drugs and romantic
association with men who were a threat to J.H. The modification eliminated
scheduled visits for the mother and only allowed visitation “at the sole discretion
of” the father. The stipulation was incorporated into a district court decree.
The father petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights in this
proceeding in July 2019, alleging in part that the mother had abandoned J.H. by
failing to maintain contact with her. After the termination hearing, the juvenile court
granted the petition and terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother
appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Private termination proceedings under chapter 600A are reviewed de
novo.” In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). “Although we are not
bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when
considering credibility of witnesses.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Our primary consideration is the child’s best interest. Id.; Iowa Code § 600A.1.
III. Discussion
a. Statutory Grounds
The mother first argues the father has not shown she abandoned J.H. under
section 600A.8(b). Under that provision, “a parent is deemed to have abandoned
the child unless the parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated
contact with the child as demonstrated by contribution toward support of the child
of a reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means.” Iowa Code
§ 600A.8(3)(b). A parent can demonstrate substantial and continuous or repeated 4
contacts by “[v]isiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able
to do so” or through “[r]egular communication with the child or with the person
having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to
visit the child.” Id. § 600A.8(3)(b)(1)–(2).
The mother argues the father has not shown she abandoned J.H. because,
following the September 2018 order granting the father discretion over her visits
with J.H., the father prevented her from seeing J.H. While the father did refuse to
allow some visits to occur, the mother omits the father’s expressed justification for
refusing to allow the visits: the mother’s refusal to promise her boyfriend, J.G.,
would not be present at the visits. After the district court entered the September
2018 order amending visitation, the father repeatedly requested assurance from
the mother that J.G. would not be present for visits. The mother declined. While
there is little evidence on the record about why J.G. is not an appropriate person
for J.H. to be around, we note J.G. was named as a co-defendant alongside the
mother in a different methamphetamine charge than the one discussed before.1
Additionally, prior to the September order, the mother filed an application for
contempt based on the father’s alleged refusal to let J.H. visit the mother while
J.G. was present. In its ruling on the contempt application, the district court hearing
the application concluded the father “acted responsibly” by denying visitations with
the mother when J.H. would be exposed to J.G. and the mother had “chosen [J.G.]
over her child.” Upon our de novo review of the record, the father has established
that the mother failed to visit the child at least monthly when she was physically
1 The second methamphetamine charge against the mother was dismissed. 5
and financially able to do so, and such lack of contact was not caused by the father
preventing the contact. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(1).
The mother also claims the father failed to prove she did not regularly
communicate with J.H. or the father when physically and financially unable to visit.
See id. § 600A.8(3)(b)(2). However, the record establishes the mother made very
little effort to communicate with J.H. when she was not physically seeing the child.
See In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 2012) (“Parental responsibility
demands ‘affirmative parenting to the extent it is practicable and feasible under the
circumstances.’” (quoting In re Goettsche, 311 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981))).
For the two-year period leading up to the termination hearing, the mother called
J.H. only a handful of times. The mother’s communication with J.H. through letters
and Facebook was also sporadic, sometimes sending messages back-and-forth
multiple times a day and other times allowing months to go between messages.
Based on our de novo review of the record, the father proved the mother failed to
have regular communication with the child when the mother was not otherwise
physically visiting her.
The mother’s marginal efforts to keep in contact with and visit J.H. and her
refusal to accommodate the father’s understandable request to avoid exposing
J.H. to J.G. shows the mother has not maintained “substantial and continuous or
repeated contact with” J.H. under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b).
The father has met his burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that the mother has abandoned the child as set forth in Iowa Code section
600A.8(3)(b). 6
b. Best Interest
We next consider whether it is in J.H.’s best interests for the mother’s
parental right to be terminated. At this step of the analysis, we consider “whether
a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent.” Iowa Code
§ 600A.1(2). In making that determination, we consider, but are not limited to “the
fulfillment of financial obligations, demonstration of continued interest in the child,
demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and
demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in
the child’s life.” Id. § 600A.1(2). It is the father’s burden to prove termination is in
J.H.’s best interest. G.A., 826 N.W.2d at 131.
As discussed above, the mother has made minimal effort to visit J.H. and
maintain a place of importance in J.H.’s life. Termination is J.H.’s preferred
outcome,2 and she and the mother do not appear to have a strong bond. During
the termination hearing, the juvenile court engaged J.H. in a long colloquy. J.H.
told the court she noticed the mother “never really paid attention to” her and that
the father’s spouse, her stepmother, was “more of a mom than [the mother] has
ever been.” J.H. further told the court she felt abandoned by the mother and
wanted to take her father’s last name. See id. (considering the lack of close
relationship between the child and the parent whose rights were sought to be
terminated in the best-interest analysis). In the termination order, the juvenile court
noted that, while termination appears to have originally been the father and
2 In addition to J.H. stating her preference for termination, the guardian ad litem appointed for J.H. participated in the hearing and recommended granting the requested termination. 7
stepmother’s idea, termination “was the desire of [J.H.] throughout” the
proceedings. Additionally, the stepmother testified that she would be willing to
adopt J.H. if the mother’s parental rights were terminated. See id. (considering the
stepparent’s willingness to adopt the child in the best-interest analysis).
On our de novo review, we conclude the father met his burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s
parental rights is in J.H.’s best interest.