COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00009-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.H. AND D.H., CHILDREN
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FROM THE 324TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 324-543049-13
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Mother, who is proceeding pro se on appeal, raises three issues
and numerous subissues attempting to challenge the proceedings held in the trial
court and the final decree of divorce. We will affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and Mother married on February 24, 2009, and two children, J.H.
(Daughter) and D.H. (Son), were born during the marriage. The parties ceased
living together in December 2011, and Father filed for divorce in September
2013. At the time of the trial, Daughter was six years old, and Son was almost
four years old.
A. The Divorce Trial2
Father testified that he is employed as an air traffic controller. Father
testified that Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 3 While they were
married, Father noticed that Mother’s mental condition had deteriorated; Mother
attempted suicide and threatened violence against Father and the children.
Father testified that Mother had threatened to kill herself four or five times and
that she had attempted suicide with pills and alcohol twice—once in 2010 and
again in 2011. Father testified that Mother had assaulted him on multiple
occasions, including attempting to stab him with a knife and punching him while
he was asleep. Father testified that Mother had threatened to drown Daughter in
2 At the outset of the divorce trial, at which Mother appeared pro se, the parties stipulated to the division of personal property and debts and the maintenance of health insurance for the children. 3 Father testified that Mother had also been diagnosed with schizophrenia but that she had disagreed with the diagnosis because she had wanted a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Mother went to a different psychiatrist, who diagnosed Mother with bipolar disorder, and Mother was satisfied with that diagnosis.
2 the bathtub and had threatened to stab Father and Daughter. Father said that
Mother had also thrown items at the children.
Father explained that CPS had received a referral regarding Mother in May
2013. The referral was triggered after Father stopped paying for daycare
because Mother was not working and Mother told the daycare workers that she
should receive free daycare. When the daycare workers asked Mother why she
needed daycare if she was not working,4 Mother told them that she might
become homicidal toward the children because they stressed her out. CPS
instructed Father to care for the children until further notice; Mother was allowed
supervised contact only.
When, in October 2013, CPS authorized Mother’s unsupervised
possession of the children on a standard possession schedule, Mother failed to
follow the schedule. She claimed that CPS told her not to return the children to
Father, and Father was forced to file a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the return
of the children.
Charlotte McWilliams with Tarrant County Family Court Services prepared
a social study and recommended that Father retain custody of the children but
that Mother be given increased access to them.
Edna Roberts, a pastor and director of a church daycare center, testified
that Mother had enrolled Daughter in the church’s daycare in September 2011
4 Father testified that Mother was unemployed because she believed that she had PTSD from working as a 911 dispatcher at the police department.
3 and had enrolled Son four months later. According to Roberts, when Mother
brought the children to daycare, they “were almost immaculate every day in their
dress” and that when Father brought the children to daycare, “they were
disarrayed[,] and their hair was not combed.”
Mother testified that Father constantly threatened her and once tried to
coerce her into killing herself. Mother said that Father is mentally abusive and
had previously pushed her into a wall and into a television.
Mother denied abusing or neglecting her children. Mother explained that
she had been in counseling for four years and said that her psychiatrist of three
years had no issues with Mother caring for her children. Mother denied that she
was an unfit mother and pointed out that her other daughter, who lived with
Mother and was not Father’s child, was doing excellent in school and had never
been in trouble.
Mother denied that she had ever threatened or attempted suicide. Mother
admitted that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, and panic
disorder, but denied having been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Mother agreed,
however, that she had indicated on her Supplemental Security Income form that
she had bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and “everything [she] could.”
Mother last worked in 2010, when she was laid off from her job as a 911
dispatcher while she was on “stress leave.” Mother testified that she was
currently receiving Social Security disability benefits due to neuropathy. Mother
said that despite her low income, she had the ability to support, care for, and
4 educate her children. When the trial court questioned how Mother was able to
take care of two little children but was unable to sit in an office and work, Mother
agreed that she was capable of working in an office if she had to. Mother
testified that it was not in the children’s best interest for Father to be appointed
their managing conservator because Father had an unusual work schedule, had
allowed his brother—who had allegedly abused drugs and alcohol—to pick up
the children from daycare, and had taken the children out of daycare.
After the divorce trial, the trial court summarized its rulings in two letters to
the parties. Mother and Father were appointed as joint managing conservators;
Father was granted the exclusive right to establish the domicile of the children
within a ten-mile radius of the children’s current residence; Father was granted
the exclusive right to make educational and significant legal decisions for the
children; a week-on/week-off possession schedule was set; neither party was
ordered to pay child support;5 the parties’ agreement to the division of property
was confirmed; and the divorce was granted.
B. Motion to Modify the Prior Ruling and Application for a Protective Order
Before the trial court signed a final decree, however, Father filed a motion
to modify the trial court’s rulings due to new evidence, a motion for a protective
5 The trial court noted in its letter that based on Mother’s testimony, “it appears that she is underemployed and could go back to work if she was willing to do so.” The trial court also stated, “I have concerns that she is simply failing to work since she is receiving disability and charitable contributions in order to remain financially afloat.”
5 order, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court set Father’s
motions for a hearing. The day before the hearing, Mother filed a pro se “Rule 11
Agreement-Reset” and a motion for continuance. On the day of the hearing,
Mother appeared in court and executed a form titled, “Pro Se Appearance.”
Beside her signature on the form, Mother wrote “is here to ask for a continuance
for representation.” When the trial court called the case for a hearing on Father’s
motions, however, Mother was not present in the courtroom. The bailiff indicated
that Mother had spoken with him prior to leaving the courtroom, and the trial
court asked the bailiff to take the witness stand. The bailiff testified that he had a
conversation with Mother before she left and had advised her not to go too far
because her case would be called shortly. The bailiff testified that Mother “just
kept walking.” The bailiff had later called Mother’s cell phone and left a
message; Mother returned his call; and he advised Mother that the trial court had
said her case would be called at 9:45 and that if she was not present at 9:45,
“her case would be defaulted.” Mother told the bailiff that she needed a
continuance and asked whether she could participate by phone. The bailiff
checked with the trial court and told Mother that the trial court had declined her
request to participate by phone.
The trial court then asked the bailiff to call Mother’s name three times at
the door; the bailiff complied, and Mother did not appear. The trial court denied
Mother’s motion for continuance because she did not appear to argue her
6 motion. The trial court stated that the hearing on Father’s motion to modify the
prior ruling would be conducted despite Mother’s absence.
Father testified that he had registered the children for school at Dallas Park
Elementary—the school that corresponds with Father’s residence. But Father
learned on August 17 that Mother had taken the children out of Dallas Park
Elementary and had enrolled them in J.A. Hargrave Elementary. Father spoke
with the principal at J.A. Hargrave who confirmed that Son was not eligible to
attend pre-k at J.A. Hargrave and that the children should be attending Dallas
Park. Father unenrolled the children from J.A. Hargrave and re-enrolled them at
Dallas Park. Mother attempted to unenroll the children from Dallas Park a
second time but was unsuccessful because all of the school’s officials had been
alerted to the situation.
When Father picked up the children from Mother’s home around August
15, he noticed that Daughter “was carrying her arm a little strangely.” Daughter
told Father that Mother had hit her and had hurt her arm and that it had been hurt
for a few days. Daughter said that she had not been to the doctor or to the
hospital. Father took Daughter to the emergency room at Cook Children’s
Hospital, where Daughter was diagnosed with a fractured right clavicle. At the
hospital, CPS and the police got involved; Father said that the CPS case was still
pending.
Father learned that the children were not attending school during Mother’s
weeks of possession; at the hearing, Father tendered and the trial court admitted
7 into evidence a copy of the children’s school attendance record, showing that
they had missed school during Mother’s periods of possession. Father testified
that Daughter had follow-up doctor appointments for her shoulder and that
Mother had rescheduled the appointments twice without telling Father and then
did not take Daughter to the rescheduled appointments. Father testified that at
the time of the hearing on September 23, he had not seen the children in three
weeks. Although Father had called and texted Mother, requesting to see and to
speak with the children, and had gone to Mother’s house, she did not answer the
door and would not allow Father access to the children. Father testified that he
had last spoken to Mother the Thursday before the hearing and that she said that
she would call the police if he came to her house.
Father testified that he had missed approximately one week of work due to
dealing with Mother’s “shenanigans” and that it was starting to jeopardize his job.
Father asked the trial court to appoint him as sole managing conservator of the
children, to allow him to move the children to Longview, to order Mother to pay
child support, and to order Mother to pay attorney’s fees. Father testified that
appointing him as sole managing conservator is in the children’s best interest
and is necessary to protect the children’s physical and emotional well-being.
Father reiterated Mother’s previous threats to kill the children and testified that he
had concerns for the safety and welfare of the children. Father said he felt that
the children were in serious, immediate danger and that he was requesting any
protective order that the trial court deemed necessary.
8 After Father’s attorney put on evidence of his attorney’s fees, the trial court
set aside its conservatorship rendition from the July 20 trial. Based on evidence
presented at both the trial and at the post-trial hearing on Father’s motion, the
trial court signed a final decree ordering that Father be appointed as sole
managing conservator of the children with all the rights of a sole managing
conservator, that Father had the right to establish the children’s residence
without any geographic restriction, and that Mother be appointed as possessory
conservator of the children. The trial court made further orders, including that
Mother pay child support of $235 monthly; that Father maintain health insurance
for the children; that Mother have supervised visitation at the visitation center at
the courthouse or a similar facility in the town where Father relocates and that
Mother pay any fees for visitation; that a writ of attachment issue immediately for
the children; and that Father’s attorney have a judgment against Mother in the
amount of $3,600 for trial attorney’s fees and $7,500 for appellate attorney’s fees
in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by Mother.
C. Motion for New Trial
Mother hired counsel and filed a motion for new trial and to abate the final
decree of divorce. Father filed a response, and the trial court set a hearing on
the motion and response. After hearing arguments from both sides and
testimony from Mother, the trial court signed an order denying Mother’s motion
for new trial and to abate the final decree of divorce.
9 After the hearing on her motion for new trial, Mother discharged her
attorney and filed a pro se request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court asked the parties to prepare proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but only Father complied. The trial court ultimately made
seventy-five findings of fact and eighteen conclusions of law. Proceeding pro se,
Mother perfected this appeal raising three issues.6
III. ISSUE 1
Mother’s first issue is worded to complain that the final decree of divorce,
findings and conclusions, and orders were unconstitutional, were an abuse of
discretion, were contrary to lawful guidelines and statutes, were not in the best
6 Mother’s three issues on appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the trial court[’]s Final Decree of Divorce[,] conclusions, findings[,] and orders were rendered unconstitutionally, under an abuse of discretion, contrary to lawful guidelines and statutes, against the best interest of the children standard, and in opposition of the legal, factual, sufficient, preponderance of the evidence?
2. Whether the Final Decree of Divorce should be vacated, modified, reversed[,] or remanded in the interest of justice because the Appellant (“mother”) was denied due process of law and due diligence for close to three years in this cause?
3. Whether the orders and findings of the Final Decree of Divorce and the order denying Appellant’s Motion for New Trial are void and should be abated because the trial judge prevented Appellant (“mother”) from presenting a complete record for appeal by denying appellant public hearings in open court, denying her basic jurisprudence, and rendering judgment in a manner inconsistent with due process?
10 interest of the children, and were not supported by legally and factually sufficient
evidence. Mother’s arguments under this issue, however, do not match the
complaints stated in her issue. We address the arguments actually presented
under Mother’s first issue to the extent we are able to ascertain them. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(f).
Mother argues that she was not given three days’ notice of the hearing on
Father’s post-trial motion as required under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(b).
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(b). But the proposed “Rule 11 Agreement-Reset” Mother
filed recites that “I was served with your Motion to Modify this Saturday on
September 19, 2015. The court date is set for September 23, 2015.” And the
certificate of service indicates notice was served on Mother on September 16,
2015. Thus, the record before us reflects that Mother was provided with more
than three days’ notice of the September 23, 2015 hearing. See id.; see also
Graham-Rutledge & Co. v. Nadia Corp., 281 S.W.3d 683, 692 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2009, no pet.) (recognizing that certificate of service by attorney is prima
facie evidence of fact of service and is conclusive in absence of proof that notice
or document was not received).
Mother also argues that the final divorce decree is void for lack of due
process because “[a] proper inquiry into the substantial change of circumstances
and the best interests of the children did not occur because both parties were not
given an equal opportunity to prepare.” But Mother chose to leave the courtroom
and to not argue or to present her motion for continuance to the trial court.
11 Accordingly, Mother cannot now complain about the trial court’s failure to grant
her a continuance to prepare or to obtain counsel. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1
(generally recognizing that request must be made to trial court as a prerequisite
to presenting complaint for appellate review). Moreover, we note that Mother’s
motion for continuance was not verified or “supported by affidavit”; under such
circumstances, we presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying her motion for continuance. See Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624,
626 (Tex. 1986); In re A.D.A., 287 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2009, no pet.).
Mother further argues that Father’s motion to modify the trial court’s
judgment was not in conformity with rule 45 because it was not verified and was
so vague that it did not give her fair notice of the facts upon which it was based.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 45. But Rule 45 does not require verification, and our review
of Father’s motion demonstrates that it adequately provided fair notice to Mother
given the allegations as a whole. See id.; see, e.g., Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d
609, 612 (Tex. 2007) (recognizing Texas’s fair-notice pleadings standard is
satisfied when the opposing party can ascertain the nature and basic issues of
the controversy and the type of evidence that might be relevant to the
controversy); Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.
2000) (recognizing that the purpose of fair-notice pleadings rule is to give
opposing party sufficient information to prepare a defense).
12 Mother next argues that the trial court’s findings in the final decree of
divorce relating to conservatorship are legally and factually insufficient.
Specifically, Mother argues that there was no evidence that naming Father sole
managing conservator was in the children’s best interest because he was not
home on a daily basis. In determining conservatorship, the best interest of the
child shall be the primary consideration. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.002,
.134(a) (West 2014). As set forth in detail above, the evidence showed that
during Mother’s possession periods following the divorce trial, she unenrolled the
children from the school where Father had them enrolled and moved them to a
school that Son was not qualified to attend; she did not take the children to
school; she refused to return the children to Father for his periods of possession,
which required Father to obtain a writ of attachment for their return; she failed to
seek medical treatment for a fracture to Daughter’s clavicle that occurred while
Daughter was in Mother’s care; and she continued to suffer mental health issues,
triggering concerns about Mother’s past threats to harm the children. The trial
court expressed concern that the children would suffer serious physical harm or
be removed from the state if they were to remain in Mother’s possession. This
evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s decision to exercise its discretion to
determine that it was in the children’s best interest to appoint Father as sole
managing conservator and Mother as possessory conservator of the children.
See, e.g., Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) (stating trial
court possesses wide latitude in determining best interest of minor child); see
13 also In re Marriage of Robinson, 16 S.W.3d 451, 454–56 (Tex. App.—Waco
2000, no pet.) (upholding appointment of husband as sole managing conservator
in circumstances similar to those here).
Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by creating its own
child support guidelines when the trial court deemed her to have net monthly
resources of $940 and ordered her to pay $235 per month in child support.
Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that she was
intentionally not employed. The trial court has the discretion to apply the support
guidelines to the earning potential of an obligor if it determines an obligor is
intentionally unemployed or underemployed. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 154.066 (West 2014); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011). Mother
testified at trial that despite her neuropathy, for which she was receiving $730 per
month in disability, she was capable of working in an office. Mother testified that
she had previously earned $45,000 to $50,000 per year (or $3,750 to $4,167 per
month) as a 911 dispatcher with the Fort Worth Police Department. Based on
Mother’s testimony, the trial court issued findings that Mother was intentionally
underemployed and was voluntarily remaining unemployed and set Mother’s
monthly child support payments at $235 based on deemed net monthly
resources of $940 per month. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125(b) (West
Supp. 2015) (setting forth child support guidelines and requiring trial court to
presumptively apply the following schedule in rendering child support: “2 children
[=] 25% of Obligor’s Net Resources”). Applying this standard, the trial court did
14 not abuse its discretion in its child support determination. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. §§ 154.066, .125(b); Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 83.
In four pages of her brief at the end of her first issue, Mother makes bare
assertions of error, without meaningful argument or authority, regarding findings
of fact 15, 18, 19, 25, 28 through 32, 39, 50 through 53, 58 through 75. Because
bare assertions of error, without meaningful argument or authority, waive error,
these contentions of error by Mother are waived. See Bufkin v. Bufkin, 259
S.W.3d 343, 354 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pets. denied); see also Fredonia
State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994)
(observing that appellate court has discretion to deem issues waived due to
inadequate briefing).
IV. ISSUE 2
In her second issue, Mother argues that she was denied due process and
due diligence because the case was not disposed of within six months and
because of the trial court’s alleged bias and prejudice.7
Mother complains that the case was not disposed of within six months from
the appearance date.8 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(2) provides that
7 To the extent Mother’s second issue again includes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the trial court’s conservatorship and possession determinations, we have addressed these contentions in connection with her first issue. 8 Mother’s reliance on Texas Government Code section 74.024 for this proposition is misplaced; that section broadly states that “[t]he supreme court may adopt rules of administration setting policies and guidelines necessary or 15 “[a]ny case not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the
Supreme Court under its Administrative Rules may be placed on a dismissal
docket.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(2) (emphasis added). Because the rule is
permissive rather than mandatory, Mother has not shown herself entitled to any
relief on appeal. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.016(1) (West 2013)
(explaining that “may,” when used in a statute, indicates that the provision is
discretionary, not mandatory); Black v. Dietzman, No. 02-14-00165-CV, 2015 WL
1869084, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that rule 165a is permissive and provided no relief on appeal when
appellant challenged length of time case had remained pending in trial court).
Mother also contends that the trial court was biased or prejudiced against
her, depriving her of a fair trial. Mother alleges that the trial court demonstrated
its bias or prejudice by (1) allegedly reprimanding Mother, (2) allegedly denying
her motion to amend temporary orders to accommodate the vacation of Father’s
attorney, (3) allegedly sending an ex parte letter to Father’s attorney, and (4)
allegedly sending her a letter stating that he would not address her letter
requesting help in obtaining an emergency injunction. But judicial remarks during
desirable for the operation and management of the court system and for the efficient administration of justice.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 74.024(a) (West 2013). The rule governing contested family law cases is Texas Rule of Judicial Administration 6.1(c)(1). See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.1(c)(1) (providing that district court judges should, “so far as reasonably possible,” ensure that contested family law cases are disposed of within six months from appearance date or within six months from the expiration of the waiting period provided by the family code where such is required, whichever is later).
16 the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel,
the parties, or their cases ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001). Nor do a
judge’s expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or even anger
establish bias; a judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration will not
support an assertion of judicial bias or prejudice. See id. at 241 (holding no
evidence of judicial bias existed based on careful examination of judge’s
allegedly improper comments in context of entire record); In re D.L.S., No. 02-10-
00366-CV, 2011 WL 2989830, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 21, 2011, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that, on record presented, trial judge did not
demonstrate any bias). Moreover, Mother’s allegations of judicial bias and
prejudice are not substantiated by the record.9
We overrule Mother’s second issue.
V. ISSUE 3
In her third issue, Mother argues that the trial court prevented her from
presenting a complete record for appeal. Mother raises multiple arguments
within her third issue; below, we discuss those that are discernable.
9 The record reflects that the trial court sustained several of Mother’s objections; allowed inordinate leeway when Mother attempted to lay predicate for exhibits; and took the time to explain procedural issues to Mother, such as why she would not be allowed to question witnesses about certain exhibits, as well as why certain exhibits were not admissible.
17 Mother argues that due to the “destroyed inaudible portions of the
reporter’s records in this cause, . . . Appellant is entitled to a new trial.” Mother
apparently complains that the court reporter did not report and transcribe portions
of the proceedings that were not audible to her. Mother asserts that “the trial
judge literally advised Appellant (‘mother’) off the record not to object because
she would get her turn during her testimony.”10 Mother forfeited any error
concerning “off-the-record” comments by failing to object to the court reporter’s
failure to record the comments or to take other steps to ensure the record
reflected what had occurred. See Rittenhouse v. Sabine Valley Ctr. Found., Inc.,
161 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding alleged
error in court reporter’s failure to report hearing on motion not preserved when
appellant failed to object at hearing); see also, generally, Arkoma Basin
Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2008)
10 During the trial, while Mother was questioning McWilliams, the following dialog took place:
Q. [By Mother] And you stated that my -- what did you state my diagnosis was?
A. I believe I said that it was bipolar disorder.
Q. That’s not my diagnosis.
THE COURT: That’s what she testified to. I’ll let you testify about your diagnosis when it is your turn.
We are unsure whether this exchange forms the basis of Mother’s complaint.
18 (recognizing that “[t]he cardinal rule for preserving error is that an objection must
be clear enough to give the trial court an opportunity to correct it”).
Mother argues that a typographical error in the trial court’s finding of fact
number 70 caused her irreparable harm. Because Mother does not explain how
this typographical error purportedly caused the rendition of an improper
judgment, any error stemming from the alleged typo is harmless. See Tex. R.
App. P. 44.1(a) (providing that no civil judgment may be reversed unless error
complained of probably caused rendition of an improper judgment); see also H.H.
Holloway Trust v. Outpost Estates Civic Club Inc., 135 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding typographical error in
finding of fact harmless).
Finally, Mother also argues that she was denied an opportunity to be heard
in a public trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial is limited to criminal prosecutions; Mother cites
no authority for the proposition that this right applies to a civil trial. Moreover, we
have reviewed the portions of the record cited by Mother as violating her right to
a public trial, and the record does not support her contention; witnesses were
excluded because the rule was invoked, but that does not render a trial a
nonpublic trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 267(a) (providing that at the request of a
19 party in civil case, witnesses shall be sworn and removed from the courtroom to
some place where they cannot hear testimony of other witnesses).
We overrule Mother’s third issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Mother’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DELIVERED: June 2, 2016