In the Interest of J.G. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 09-25-00067-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-25-00067-CV ________________

IN THE INTEREST OF J.G. ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 24DCFM0701 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child,

“Jenny.”1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds exist for termination of Mother’s, M.L., parental rights and that termination

of her parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (P), (2). 2

1To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child

and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights, but he is not a party

to this appeal. 1 Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (noting Anders procedures apply in parental-rights

termination cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the

record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s

judgment. The attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the

Anders brief she filed and notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief. The

Court likewise notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response, the deadline for

doing so, and provided Mother with a copy of the appellate record. Mother did not

file a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)

(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,

no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would

arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.

See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and

reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the

2 requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346

S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new

counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Should

Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s

obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for

an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations

omitted).

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice

Submitted on June 23, 2025 Opinion Delivered June 26, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.