In the Interest of J.G., D.G., and A.G., Children v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 28, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00291-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00291-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.G., D.G., AND A.G., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 108th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 097794-E-FM, Honorable Carry Baker, Presiding

January 28, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Mother appeals from a final order terminating her parental relationship with her

three children, JG, DG, and AG. 1 The latter ranged from three to four years old when trial

began in May 2024. Ultimately, the trial court approved termination on several statutory

grounds, including § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). It also found that termination favored the

children’s best interests. Mother attacks on appeal solely the finding related to best

interests and contends that it lacked the support of legally and factually sufficient

evidence. We affirm.

1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to the children by their initials, and family

members by their relationship to the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). Analysis

The applicable standards for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence are discussed

in In re A.M., No. 07-21-00052-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5447 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July

8, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We apply them here.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding concerning the

best interests, we generally consider the factors itemized in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d

367 (Tex.1976). Those factors guide our analysis here, as well. Furthermore, not all

need favor termination, however. “The absence of evidence about some . . . would not

preclude a fact-finder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that

termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that

the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,

27 (Tex. 2005). And, all must remember that the best interests of the children, not the

parent, control. In re E.P., No. 07-23-00449-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3671, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo May 29, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

We also note that evidence supporting the predicate statutory grounds for

termination may be considered in assessing the best interest of a child. In re M.D., No.

07-21-00149-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7217, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 30,

2021, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see also In re T.C., No. 07-18-00080-CV,

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 6769, at *13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 23, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (noting that a parent who chooses to forgo a challenge to predicate ground

findings tacitly concedes that sufficient evidence supports those findings). Furthermore,

evidence of ongoing parental drug use is particularly significant because past conduct

often portends future action. In re A.M., Nos. 07-18-00047-CV, 07-18-00048-CV, 2018

2 Tex. App. LEXIS 3688, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 23, 2018, pet. denied) (per curiam)

(mem. op.); see also In re K.J.B., No. 07-21-00235-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4134, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 16, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting “‘[p]ast is prologue’ all

too often”). With this in mind, we turn to the case at hand.

To quote from mother’s brief, “[she] focuses on her conduct after she began to take

the case ‘seriously.’” At that point, mother stopped using drugs, went to inpatient rehab

to begin her sobriety, and is taking other steps to maintain that sobriety going forward.

So, “she has taken steps to mitigate the cause of danger to the children in the future.”

That effort to take the case “seriously” began after the children were removed from

the home of their grandmother. They were so removed about a month before trial

convened on May 21, 2024. Thus, over the ensuing few weeks and as the proverbial

clock approached the midnight hour, she deemed it important to commence performing

services, participating in a drug rehabilitation program, and undertaking other measures

to secure the return of her children. Yet, none of those services or programs had been

completed at the time trial began.

Furthermore, earlier in May 2024, mother again tested positive of

methamphetamine. So too did at least two of the three children test positive for that drug.

Said testing also revealed the presence of cocaine within one or more of the children.

Though mother denied ever ingesting cocaine, she admitted to smoking

methamphetamine. Her ingestion of that drug often occurred while on her way to

3 grandmother’s house to undertake sporadic visitations with the children. 2 At times, it also

happened in the garage of the house while laundering clothes.

As for housing at the time of trial, mother lived with her mother and stepfather; that

is, in the same home in which the children somehow were exposed to narcotics mother

denied taking. She also had pending an application to move into a shelter home. Little

was said about employment though. Mother once worked at a hotel cleaning rooms. The

establishment paid her $4 per room. She since quit that job.

Other evidence indicated that mother had been indicted for possessing controlled

substances in 2020. That resulted in the deferral of her adjudication and three years of

probation. Apparently, the latter term was extended for an additional year. Comparison

of this with the foregoing means mother continued to use controlled substances despite

being on probation for possessing a controlled substance and after the removal of her

children. She continued to use them despite the risk of incarceration and the loss of her

children.

Apparently, the trial court recessed the May trial to mid-summer. When the

proceeding resumed, mother still had yet to complete all of her services. More

importantly, she had pending against her criminal charges related to her exposing her

children to the controlled substances.

Once removed from grandmother, the children came to reside in a foster home.

Effort was made to find placement with a relative, but it had yet to prove successful.

2 Apparently, those visits were unsupervised and contrary to a term of mother’s service plan.

4 In short, evidence suggests mother improved. Yet, she waited over a year to

begin. Trial loomed and her children tested positive for drugs when she thought it was

time to act. Until then, she viewed her children living with her mother and her sporadic

visitation of them as sufficient. And, most importantly, little to no evidence indicates her

ability to permanently remain drug free or provide those children with a stable, safe home.

Again, she continued to ingest controlled substances while on probation for possessing

such contraband. She continued to use drugs as the clock ticked toward the hearing to

determine whether her parental rights would be terminated.

One can hope for improvement. But the best interests of children should not rest

on hope, belated caring by a parent, and tardy, incomplete effort by that same parent.

Recent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights. In re

K.D.C., No. 02-12-00092-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 13239, at *45-46 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346

(Tex. 2009) (recent, short-term improvements do “not conclusively negate the probative

value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices”).

Considering the evidence as a whole, we find it legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interests

of the children. We affirm the final order of the trial court.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice