In the Interest of J.F., K.F., Y.F., and K.F., Minor Children

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 25-1097
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1097 Filed October 29, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF J.F., K.F., Y.F., and K.F., Minor Children,

J.M.-T., Father, Appellant,

K.F., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Erik I. Howe, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights to four and three children respectively. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Michael A. Horn of Horn Law Offices, Des Moines, for appellant father.

Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Teresa Pope of Pope Law PLLC, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor

children.

Sarah Dewein, Urbandale, attorney for minor children K.F. and Y.F.

Heidi Miller of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney

for minor children J.F. and K.F.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

A mother appeals termination of her parental rights to four children born

between 2012 and 2017. The father of the three youngest children separately

appeals the termination of his parental rights. The putative father of the oldest

child also had his parental rights terminated, but he does not appeal. After

considering the arguments properly presented in the mother’s and father’s

petitions on appeal, we affirm.

In May 2022, the parents signed a consent to give the grandmother

temporary custody of the children. In July, after the mother assaulted the

grandmother in the presence of at least one child, the Iowa Department of Health

and Human Services (HHS) conducted a child protective assessment for

allegations against the parents concerning substance abuse, denial of critical care,

and physical abuse. HHS found two allegations of denial of critical care credible—

for failure to supervise and marijuana use in the children’s presence. An HHS

worker noted the children’s health was poor as each had “lice and a skin condition.”

At some point the parents relocated to Puerto Rico, and in October the

grandmother was appointed as emergency temporary custodian. After the parents

returned to Iowa, a child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petition was filed for each

child. The children were each adjudicated CINA in November 2023 and formally

placed with the grandmother.

HHS was concerned with the parents’ recurrent drug abuse, their mental

health, and general parenting ability. HHS recommended that the parents

complete substance-abuse and mental-health evaluations (and follow any 3

subsequent recommendations from those evaluations), comply with random drug

screenings, and participate in a parenting course.

The parents had completed a substance-abuse treatment program but

relapsed in their marijuana use and tested positive on or failed to attend several

subsequent drug tests. The parents attended two parenting classes in the six

months between the permanency hearing in November 2024 and the termination

trial the following March, despite having access to online classes since August.

Both parents failed to seek mental-health services because, in the mother’s words,

“[the therapist] said there was no reason for him to see me because what I was

going through was something normal to feel sad about[,]” and the father said “I

don’t see a reason for me to be seeing a psychiatrist or anything like that.”

Each child is in individual therapy; two children have been diagnosed with

and are medicated for depression. One child is deaf with a cochlear implant and

participates in speech therapy. And two others are medicated for asthma. An

HHS worker testified that the grandmother’s home was safe, and the children have

expressed the desire to continue to live with her. This sentiment was echoed by

their guardian ad litem (GAL). One child is openly hostile to reunification and visits

with the mother, to the point it affects her mental health. The juvenile court

suspended visits until HHS determined—with therapeutic input—they would be

appropriate for the child; HHS never reached that determination. As of trial, the

mother had not seen this child in two years.

Over the life of the case, the parents never progressed past two two-hour

supervised visits per week. Even then, the parents were not consistent with

attendance. During their involvement with the juvenile court, the mother hasn’t 4

had stable employment, while the father had somewhat stable seasonal

employment. As of trial, they were living in a relative’s five-member household to

save money for an apartment. The father was unsure which school district the

children would be enrolled in if he were to gain custody. And both parents believed

that the children could be immediately returned to their care; the mother believed

she did everything HHS asked of her and the father could not recall the safety

concerns raised at previous court proceedings.

HHS, the county attorney, the children’s GAL, the attorneys representing

the children, and the guardian’s attorney all recommended termination of parental

rights. The juvenile court terminated both parents’ parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) (2025). The mother and father separately appeal, and we

review de novo. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

Statutory elements. The mother’s petition only challenges the fourth

element under paragraph (f), which requires “clear and convincing evidence that

at the present time the child[ren] cannot be returned to the custody of the

child[ren]’s parents.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f) (emphasis added). She argues

that she would continue her counseling and mental-health treatment after

reunification, thereby becoming a safe custodian at some indeterminate point in

the future. But the statutory language requires us to look at the time of

termination—not a hypothetical future date—to determine whether the parents can

resume custody. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018). And the

mother has not even acknowledged her mental-health needs exist (let alone

adequately addressed them), nor has she completed a parenting course in the

nearly sixteen months since the children were removed. Cf. In re H.R.K., 5

433 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he requirement that the parents

acknowledge and recognize the abuse before any meaningful change can occur

is essential in meeting the child’s needs.”). The mother’s disregard for her own

mental health and ignorance of her children’s mental-health needs weighs against

reunification. And mother’s testimony makes it clear she has not addressed the

safety concerns with physical abuse. The court noted “[t]he parents did virtually

nothing to remedy [the children’s fear of living with them] other than try to

participate in visitation which did not ameliorate the concerns.” We, like the

juvenile court, find clear and convincing that the children cannot be returned to the

mother’s custody.

Likewise, to the extent the father challenges the same element, he argues

that he substantially followed the court’s orders in seeking substance-abuse

treatment and that he has the capacity and resources to resume custody

regardless of whether he has complied with every aspect of HHS’s case plan. He

points to his gainful (albeit seasonal) employment and housing. But even more

than the mother, the father has not taken the removal of the children seriously.

Like the mother, he recurringly tested positive for marijuana use after completing

substance-abuse treatment. He dismissed working on his mental health, testifying:

“I’m not doing [therapy] because I don’t see a reason for me to be seeing a

psychiatrist or anything like that.” He also only completed two parenting sessions

despite having access to online materials for nearly seven months. He wasn’t sure

which school district the children would be enrolled in if he gained custody because

he doesn’t “have contact with [the children] or contact with the school.” When 6

asked, he couldn’t recall the safety concerns the court instructed him to address

before he could regain custody.

The juvenile court found “there had been no substantial change” in either

parent’s conduct in the year leading to the termination trial and “[the parents] were

unable to identify any substantial service engagement to address the parenting

concerns or substance use concerns.” While “failure to comply with [HHS]’s case

plan cannot be considered grounds to terminate parental rights, such a failure can

be considered evidence of the parent’s attitude toward recognizing and correcting

the problems which resulted in the loss of custody.” In re J.L.P., 449 N.W.2d 349,

352 (Iowa 1989). We agree with the juvenile court that the father’s failure to

meaningfully address his underlying problems precluded him from resuming

custody.

Best interests. The mother next argues termination is not in the children’s

best interests because “[a]ny danger perceived by not terminating could be

addressed through continued individual therapy and counseling.” In assessing

best interests, we give primary weight to the children’s safety, the best placement

for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and the children’s physical,

mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). On review,

we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in these children’s best

interests. To reiterate, the mother has made little—if any—progress toward

resolving her problems with mental health, substance abuse, or parenting. The

children have lived with the grandmother for more than three years, where they

are receiving mental-health treatment and report feeling secure. The children’s

fear of returning to the mother’s care highlights their need for the permanency, 7

stability, and safety offered by termination and adoption. See In re H.S., 805

N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (“[T]he child’s safety and need for a permanent home

are paramount concerns.”). Similarly, the father has made little progress over the

life of the case, and the children deserve and need stability and permanency.

Permissive exceptions. The mother urges that her bond with the children

and placement with a relative supports a permissive exception to thwart

termination. On this point, the court noted, “[i]f anything, the bond between these

children and their parents seems somewhat less pronounced given what the

children report about not wanting to return to parental custody.” We agree. There

is no evidence of a bond that would convince us by clear and convincing evidence

that termination would be detrimental to the children and we should invoke that

permissive exception on this record. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c); In re M.W.,

876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting we consider the bond in the context of

a case’s unique circumstances and the child’s best interests).

The father makes only a passing reference to the bond exception by means

of an outdated statute citation and no accompanying argument or reference to the

record. We find this claim waived. In termination cases, parents have the burden

of proving permissive exceptions. In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2025) (en banc). “Where a party has failed to present any substantive

analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been waived.” L.N.S. v. S.W.S.,

854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). And even if the claim had been

briefed, the same issues discussed with the mother’s claim are present here. We

are not persuaded to apply the permissive exception. 8

Both the mother and father alternatively suggest we create a guardianship

with the grandmother and decline termination under the exception in Iowa Code

section 232.116(3)(a). Like the juvenile court, we reject this alternative. Our courts

have often said “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to

termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). We

consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the age of the children, the

length of removal, the relationship between the parent and the potential guardian,

and “the availability of other viable permanency options.” See id. at 478. The

juvenile court found the parents and grandmother’s relationship “has continually

degraded over time” and that a guardianship wouldn’t be beneficial for the children.

This alternative is especially confusing since the mother’s petition accuses the

grandmother of poisoning the children’s view of the parents, using them to obtain

state funds, and refusing to allow visits for the past year. These allegations are

not supported by the record. We note that HHS’s case manager and the children’s

GAL recommended termination rather than the creation of a guardianship after

personally observing all parties involved. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112

(Iowa 2014) (“It is significant to us that neither the third-party service providers nor

the GAL believed [the child] could be safely returned to her parents at the time of

trial.”). We affirm the court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.