IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1890 Filed February 5, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF J.E., Minor Child,
S.E., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
Strausser, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son.
AFFIRMED.
Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Jean Pfeiffer, Muscatine, attorney and guardian ad litem, for minor child.
Considered by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
A one-year-old boy was taken to the hospital after suffering a head injury.
While there, his treating physicians observed that his injuries contradicted his
mother’s version of events. The son was placed with his grandmother. And for
the next fifteen months, he remained out of his mother’s custody.
During this time, the mother made little progress toward caring for herself
or the son. Indeed, she struggled with keeping herself healthy—refusing
medication, skipping medical appointments, and failing to treat lice and fleas for
prolonged periods of time. She also had trouble meeting her son’s needs, often
relying on others to provide housing or supplies. And because of the mother’s
sporadic participation in services, she never progressed beyond fully supervised
visits. So the juvenile court eventually terminated her parental rights.
The mother appeals, and we affirm. The juvenile court properly denied her
request for six more months to work toward reunification, as she offered little
evidence showing she could make the necessary progress to eliminate the need
for removal by the end of that period. From there, the mother concedes that,
absent that extra time to make progress, the son could not be returned to her
custody. So termination was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h)
(2024). As for the son’s best interest, the mother only makes a passing reference
to this issue in her petition on appeal, so we find it waived. Similarly, the mother
never advocated for a permissive exception during the termination hearing, and
we cannot consider the issue for the first time on appeal. We thus affirm the
termination of the mother’s parental rights. 3
I. Factual Background and Proceedings
In March 2023, the mother1 took her one-year-old son to the hospital after
he suffered a head injury. Although she reported he fell three feet from his bed,
the treating physicians noted that the resulting injuries—a subdural hematoma and
retinal hemorrhages—were inconsistent with that kind of fall and more likely
resulted from “non-accidental trauma.” So the hospital performed a child-abuse
assessment, which showed the son was also positive for methamphetamine. The
mother agreed to a safety plan placing the son with his grandmother. And the son
was later adjudicated in need of assistance and placed in his grandmother’s
custody.
Throughout the child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings, the mother
struggled to care for herself and the son. After moving into a new apartment, the
mother got head lice. She was provided with kits, sprays, and detailed instructions
and videos. But the mother reported she did not understand how to use the
products, so the issue persisted for over nine months. Her apartment also had a
flea infestation, and the son was observed with flea bites after his visits with the
mother. She was offered parenting training but was discharged for missing too
many sessions. And during the sessions she did attend, the mother had trouble
retaining the information.
The mother was referred for a psychological evaluation. During that
evaluation, the mother reported suffering from several mental-health conditions but
1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2024), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110. 4
also that she “does not believe in medication” and fears it will cause her to gain
weight. The evaluator also found the mother’s cognitive abilities were on the
“extremely low range of intellectual functioning.” The evaluator expressed concern
that, while the mother “has the potential to be able to learn basic care of her child,”
it would be hard for her to grasp “how her life decisions will indirectly impact her
child and her child’s safety.”
Despite the mother’s belief that therapy—rather than medication—was
better for her, she skipped many mental-health appointments. She was later
discharged as a patient by her healthcare provider for missing too many
appointments. While visiting the son, the mother would sometimes be distracted
or on her phone. And she could not always provide for the son’s needs during
those visits—relying on her mother or others for help providing diapers or snacks.
After roughly a year of little progress toward reunification, the State
petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a hearing, the juvenile
court terminated the mother’s rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and “i” of Iowa Code
section 232.116(1). The juvenile court emphasized the mother’s inability to keep
herself, and thus her son, safe and healthy. Indeed, it was unlikely the mother
would ensure the son’s medical needs were met, as she herself rarely attended
appointments. The court also noted the mother’s lack of progress in caring for the
son—her discharge from the parenting training, her inattentiveness during visits,
and her reliance on others to meet the son’s needs. Significantly, the mother
continued to offer shifting explanations for how the son’s initial head injury
occurred, none of which the court found credible. And so, because the son had 5
been out of his mother’s care for over a year and the mother had not shown any
meaningful improvement, termination was appropriate. The mother appeals.
II. Additional Time for Reunification
The mother first argues that the juvenile court should have granted her six
more months to work toward reunification rather than terminating her rights.
Juvenile courts may “deny termination and give the parent an additional six months
for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021)
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). As with other issues within termination
proceedings, our review is de novo. Id. at 322.
The mother never progressed beyond fully supervised visits, many of which
were outside her home because of lice or flea concerns. While the mother believes
she could make progress if given more time, she offered no evidence during the
hearing to show how she would approach services, appointments, and caring for
the son differently going forward. Indeed, she testified she believed she was
prepared for visits with her son, met his needs, and was not at fault for missing
appointments or failing to complete the parenting training.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1890 Filed February 5, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF J.E., Minor Child,
S.E., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
Strausser, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son.
AFFIRMED.
Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Jean Pfeiffer, Muscatine, attorney and guardian ad litem, for minor child.
Considered by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
A one-year-old boy was taken to the hospital after suffering a head injury.
While there, his treating physicians observed that his injuries contradicted his
mother’s version of events. The son was placed with his grandmother. And for
the next fifteen months, he remained out of his mother’s custody.
During this time, the mother made little progress toward caring for herself
or the son. Indeed, she struggled with keeping herself healthy—refusing
medication, skipping medical appointments, and failing to treat lice and fleas for
prolonged periods of time. She also had trouble meeting her son’s needs, often
relying on others to provide housing or supplies. And because of the mother’s
sporadic participation in services, she never progressed beyond fully supervised
visits. So the juvenile court eventually terminated her parental rights.
The mother appeals, and we affirm. The juvenile court properly denied her
request for six more months to work toward reunification, as she offered little
evidence showing she could make the necessary progress to eliminate the need
for removal by the end of that period. From there, the mother concedes that,
absent that extra time to make progress, the son could not be returned to her
custody. So termination was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h)
(2024). As for the son’s best interest, the mother only makes a passing reference
to this issue in her petition on appeal, so we find it waived. Similarly, the mother
never advocated for a permissive exception during the termination hearing, and
we cannot consider the issue for the first time on appeal. We thus affirm the
termination of the mother’s parental rights. 3
I. Factual Background and Proceedings
In March 2023, the mother1 took her one-year-old son to the hospital after
he suffered a head injury. Although she reported he fell three feet from his bed,
the treating physicians noted that the resulting injuries—a subdural hematoma and
retinal hemorrhages—were inconsistent with that kind of fall and more likely
resulted from “non-accidental trauma.” So the hospital performed a child-abuse
assessment, which showed the son was also positive for methamphetamine. The
mother agreed to a safety plan placing the son with his grandmother. And the son
was later adjudicated in need of assistance and placed in his grandmother’s
custody.
Throughout the child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings, the mother
struggled to care for herself and the son. After moving into a new apartment, the
mother got head lice. She was provided with kits, sprays, and detailed instructions
and videos. But the mother reported she did not understand how to use the
products, so the issue persisted for over nine months. Her apartment also had a
flea infestation, and the son was observed with flea bites after his visits with the
mother. She was offered parenting training but was discharged for missing too
many sessions. And during the sessions she did attend, the mother had trouble
retaining the information.
The mother was referred for a psychological evaluation. During that
evaluation, the mother reported suffering from several mental-health conditions but
1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2024), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110. 4
also that she “does not believe in medication” and fears it will cause her to gain
weight. The evaluator also found the mother’s cognitive abilities were on the
“extremely low range of intellectual functioning.” The evaluator expressed concern
that, while the mother “has the potential to be able to learn basic care of her child,”
it would be hard for her to grasp “how her life decisions will indirectly impact her
child and her child’s safety.”
Despite the mother’s belief that therapy—rather than medication—was
better for her, she skipped many mental-health appointments. She was later
discharged as a patient by her healthcare provider for missing too many
appointments. While visiting the son, the mother would sometimes be distracted
or on her phone. And she could not always provide for the son’s needs during
those visits—relying on her mother or others for help providing diapers or snacks.
After roughly a year of little progress toward reunification, the State
petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a hearing, the juvenile
court terminated the mother’s rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and “i” of Iowa Code
section 232.116(1). The juvenile court emphasized the mother’s inability to keep
herself, and thus her son, safe and healthy. Indeed, it was unlikely the mother
would ensure the son’s medical needs were met, as she herself rarely attended
appointments. The court also noted the mother’s lack of progress in caring for the
son—her discharge from the parenting training, her inattentiveness during visits,
and her reliance on others to meet the son’s needs. Significantly, the mother
continued to offer shifting explanations for how the son’s initial head injury
occurred, none of which the court found credible. And so, because the son had 5
been out of his mother’s care for over a year and the mother had not shown any
meaningful improvement, termination was appropriate. The mother appeals.
II. Additional Time for Reunification
The mother first argues that the juvenile court should have granted her six
more months to work toward reunification rather than terminating her rights.
Juvenile courts may “deny termination and give the parent an additional six months
for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021)
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). As with other issues within termination
proceedings, our review is de novo. Id. at 322.
The mother never progressed beyond fully supervised visits, many of which
were outside her home because of lice or flea concerns. While the mother believes
she could make progress if given more time, she offered no evidence during the
hearing to show how she would approach services, appointments, and caring for
the son differently going forward. Indeed, she testified she believed she was
prepared for visits with her son, met his needs, and was not at fault for missing
appointments or failing to complete the parenting training.
While the law demands “patience” with parents, our “full measure of
patience” is reserved for those “who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills.”
In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987). As we often emphasize, “the crucial
days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to
face up to their own problems.” Id. (cleaned up). At the time of the hearing, the
son had been removed from his mother’s care for fifteen months. During that time,
the mother made little progress in caring for herself or the son and has given us 6
no basis to find that she will improve going forward. And we share the juvenile
court’s concern about her shifting explanations for the son’s initial head injury.
Without that accountability, or other evidence showing the mother was close to
reunifying with her son, the juvenile court correctly denied her request for additional
time.
III. Termination Merits.
Our three-step termination framework is well established. First, the State
must prove by clear and convincing evidence one or more grounds for termination.
See Iowa Code § 232.116(1). Second, the State must similarly prove that
termination is in the son’s best interest. See id. § 232.116(2). And third, the parent
carries the burden to show that one or more permissive exceptions should
preclude termination. See id. § 232.116(3). Across our de novo review, we give
due weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings. W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 322.
On the first step, the mother argues the juvenile court erred in terminating
her rights under paragraphs “d,” “h,” and “i” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Yet
the mother concedes all elements of paragraph “h,” including that the son could
not have been returned to her custody at the time of the hearing. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(h); see also In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). Because
we have already found that the mother was not entitled to six more months, and
she agrees that without that extra time the son could not be returned to her
custody, we affirm termination under paragraph “h.” See In re L.H., 949
N.W.2d 268, 270 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (explaining when one ground for termination
is supported, we need not consider other grounds). 7
Moving to the second step, the mother’s petition on appeal makes only a
passing reference to termination not being in the son’s best interest. The mother’s
single buried sentence—not separately stated as one of “the legal issues
presented for appeal”—without any further argument as to why termination is not
in the son’s best interest does not properly present the issue for our consideration.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.1401—Form 5. Because we cannot “craft an argument on her
behalf,” we find the mother has waived any best-interest challenge. In re L.F.,
No. 24-1141, 2024 WL 4620507, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024).
Finally, the mother argues that termination should have been avoided
because the son was in the custody of a relative. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a).
But our review of the hearing record does not show the mother argued for a
permissive exception, nor did the juvenile court address this exception in its ruling.
Because the doctrine of error preservation protects interests beyond the State’s, it
matters not that the State does not contest it here. See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime
Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000). And when a parent does not argue
for a permissive exception during the termination hearing, the parent may not do
so for the first time on appeal. See In re J.R., No. 24-0942, 2025 WL 52738, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2025) (en banc). So we do not consider this permissive
exception. And we thus affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.