Opinion issued November 27, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-00469-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF J.D.R.G., A CHILD,
On Appeal from the 310th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2015-64238
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This parental termination appeal involves one child (J.D.R.G.), whom the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took into custody at seven
months old. His mother argues that the evidence is factually and legally insufficient
to support the trial court’s conclusions that (1) she committed the predicate acts required for termination and (2) termination was in her child’s best interest. See TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). We disagree and affirm.
Background
On March 7, 2016, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
(“the Department”) received a referral for neglectful supervision of then seven-
month-old J.D.R.G. (“J.D.R.G.”). The referral expressed concerned about J.N.G.’s
(“Mother’s”) mental state after she threw herself on the floor of an emergency room,
yelled she was dying, and left J.D.R.G. alone in a hospital room. The Department
investigated, met with Mother, and observed J.D.R.G. Mother told the caseworker
that she did not have mental health issues that would affect her child and she did not
wish to be involved with the Department. Mother was referred to Family Based
Safety Services.
Soon thereafter, the Department received a second referral for neglectful
supervision of J.D.R.G. Mother had been arrested at a church, where she had
previously been asked to leave. Before she was arrested, Mother threw herself on
the ground, “went into a fit,” and yelled at law enforcement to kill her. J.D.R.G.,
who was with Mother at the time, was left in the care of a church member. Mother’s
conduct resulted in a trespass conviction.
Although the church member kept J.D.R.G. for some time, the member
eventually informed the caseworker that she could no longer care for J.D.R.G.
2 because Mother threatened her, so she no longer felt safe. At a family team meeting,
Mother and J.D.R.G.’s father1 stated that they did not have any viable placement
options for J.D.R.G.
The Department filed a petition for protection and conservatorship and for
termination of both parents’ parental rights. The Department was granted emergency
temporary managing conservatorship of J.D.R.G. and he was placed with a foster
family. Following an adversary hearing, the court appointed the Department
temporary managing conservator.
The court then ordered Mother to follow a family service plan. The plan set
forth services and classes required before J.D.R.G. could return home. The plan
required Mother to participate in parenting classes; maintain contact with J.D.R.G.
through visits; establish and maintain stable housing for at least six months;
participate in a psychological evaluation and psychiatric evaluation and follow all
recommendations; participate in individual counseling and follow all
recommendations; and maintain contact with her caseworker.
Nearly two years later, after several status and permanency hearings, the case
proceeded to a bench trial. During the trial, the court heard testimony from the
following witnesses:
1 The trial court also terminated J.D.R.G.’s father’s parental rights. He has not appealed that determination. 3 Janeka Russell. Janeka Russell, therapeutic case manager at Star of Hope,
testified first. She explained that Mother initially qualified for a Star of Hope
program that helps young women who have aged out of foster care and are expecting
or have young children. While in the program, Mother could (and did) receive
shelter, meals, and help applying for benefits.
Russell worked with Mother from October 2016 until February 2017, when
Mother was terminated from the program after threatening Russell. In February
2017, Mother came to a meeting with Russell and wanted to discuss her “restriction”
status, a punishment Mother experienced for failure to come to classes and for
curfew violations. The restriction meant that Mother could not leave the building.
Russell explained that she did not have the power to change the restriction. Mother
then threatened Russell, prevented her from leaving the office or calling for help,
and tried to start a fight. Russell attempted to call the front desk for help several
times, but Mother hung up the phone each time. When Russell was finally able to
call for help, she told the front desk to call 911, and Mother left her office. The police
came but did not arrest Mother. Mother was terminated from the program, and
Russell would not recommend that she be invited back.
Ramona Walton. Ramona Walton, Transitional Aged Youth and Family
Services Manager at Star of Hope, testified that she asked Mother to leave after the
incident with Russell. She explained that Star of Hope allowed Mother to return to
4 obtain her belongings, and when Mother did so, she angrily demanded to see other
staff members. Walton said that although Mother attended some parenting and life
skills classes, she did not complete either program.
Diana Schultz. Diana Schultz was, at the relevant time, the Department’s
Supervisor for Investigations. She explained that Mother threatened the caregiver in
J.D.R.G.’s Parental Child Safety Placement, and the caregiver called Schultz to
retrieve J.D.R.G. Mother denied threatening anyone.
Schultz also explained that Mother had a history with the Department. An
initial report expressed concerns for J.D.R.G.’s safety, but the investigation was
closed.
Mother. Mother testified on several topics. For one, she said that she currently
took no medications for her depression except for fish oil. She said that her doctor
told her she could take fish oil or prescribed medications, even though her medical
records showed prescriptions for three medications and no fish oil.
Mother disclosed that she had two unplanned pregnancies while J.D.R.G. was
in the Department’s care. On the day she testified, she was five months pregnant;
she also had a miscarriage in July 2017. She said that she was receiving prenatal care
from a midwife. But she could not provide the last name of the midwife.
Mother testified that, in May 2016, she was held on a mental health warrant
after going to the hospital with suicidal ideations then demanding to be released. She
5 admitted that she has had suicidal thoughts for years and frequently goes to the
hospital. The thousands of pages of medical records evidence the frequency with
which Mother visited hospitals.
As far as housing, Mother testified that she had lived in at least three different
places with friends during the pendency of her case. She also lived at Star of Hope
(the program discussed above) until she was terminated from the program. She said
that she signed a lease for an apartment where she lived at the time.
As to her employment, she testified to minimal employment in the 23 months
since her son was placed in foster care. She said that she worked at Luby’s for six
weeks and received one paycheck. She also said that she worked at Ike’s BBQ,
although she had no documentation to prove it. Finally, she testified that she worked
for six weeks at a Harris County youth program.
Regarding therapy, she testified that she stopped seeing the Department-
referred therapist because she found scheduling to be a “headache.” She said she had
a new therapist.
When asked about her criminal history, she admitted she had been charged
with crimes on numerous occasions and she had been arrested and jailed twice since
the Department became involved with J.D.R.G.’s care. She was arrested was due to
the above-mentioned altercation at a church. She was also arrested for assaulting a
former boyfriend, and she failed to attend court. In November 2017, she was charged
6 with making a false police report. Finally, she described an incident at a prior court
date in which she said that police “escorted” her to the courtroom, but she admitted
that she had been detained.
Mother testified that she believed she substantially complied with her service
plan.
Davien Guidry. Davien Guidry, conservatorship worker for the Department,
testified that she was the only caseworker to have worked on the case, and she had
been working it for two years. She explained that Mother’s family service plan was
created with collaboration from the Department, her supervisor, the Department’s
attorney, Mother’s attorney, a disability attorney, and Mother. Mother completed
parts, but far from all, of her service plan.
As to housing, Guidry explained that Mother did not allow her to visit
Mother’s apartment, despite Guidry’s numerous requests. Guidry viewed
photographs, but she could not verify that they were accurate depictions of the
property, and she did not know until Mother testified that Mother received assistance
in paying for the apartment.
As to financial stability, Guidry testified that Mother never provided
verification of her employment or financial assistance.
As to psychological assistance, Guidry explained the agency’s concerns about
Mother’s behavior, anger, aggressiveness, and lack of control of her moods and
7 emotions. Mother was diagnosed with depression, A.D.H.D., and bipolar disorder.
The agency paid for a specific service provider, Deblin Health, to provide extra
assistance to Mother. And Mother’s psychological evaluation recommended that she
participate in regular psychological intervention and individual therapy. It also
recommended completing parenting classes.
But Mother did not follow the recommendations from the evaluation other
than completing parenting classes. For example, Mother did not complete individual
therapy at Deblin Health. She voluntarily quit the program. When Guidry attempted
to discuss other therapist options, Mother told her that she already had a replacement.
But Guidry was never able to verify the therapist. In Guidry’s opinion, therapy could
have potentially addressed the agency’s concerns about Mother’s ability to parent
and control her emotions. But without it, Guidry did not believe that Mother could
cope with a toddler.
Guidry testified that she read over 2,000 pages of Mother’s medical records.
She estimated that Mother went to the emergency room three or four times a month
during the two years J.D.R.G. was in care. Mother usually complained of stomach
issues, disease concerns, or suicidal thoughts. Mother also asked for pregnancy tests.
Guidry also explained that Mother did not update her on life events, as
required by the service plan. Mother never informed the caseworker that she had a
miscarriage, and Mother did not tell the caseworker about her arrests in August and
8 November 2017. Mother had many angry outbursts at Guidry, including on the first
day of trial, when Guidry had a bailiff escort her out of the building.
As far as visitation, Guidry testified that the agency paid for a therapist to
accompany Mother to visits, but the therapist was not able to help during Mother’s
many angry outbursts. She explained that these outbursts sometimes happened in
front of J.D.R.G., and he appeared scared when this happened.
Mother was a safety concern during visits. Her visits were monitored by two
individuals, rather than one, so she could not make false allegations against
caseworkers. Mother threatened Guidry verbally and physically. On a few occasions,
she had to be escorted out of visitation.
Mother did not consistently maintain contact with J.D.R.G. When visits were
scheduled, Mother frequently missed them or was very late. During a year and a half
of weekly visits, Mother was significantly late 15 times and missed 10 visits. Each
time, J.D.R.G. was ready for the visits, after traveling 30 minutes each way to attend.
On visits she did attend, J.D.R.G. did not bond with her.
On a few occasions, the Department halted visitation because of various
concerns. The first time, visitation stopped because of concerns of Mother’s
outbursts. The Department wanted to know what was causing them and if Mother
was taking medication. Mother refused to show her caseworker any medications for
months, and she had no visits for two or three months. On another occasion, she had
9 an outburst in front of J.D.R.G., and security escorted her out. On a third occasion,
visits were stopped when the Department learned that Mother had a warrant for her
arrest. Another time, Mother had to stay in a room while Guidry escorted everyone
out because Mother continuously yelled at the foster parent.
The Department expressed concern about Mother’s aggression and her
altercations with a variety of people during the pendency of the case.
Foster Mother. J.D.R.G.’s foster mother testified that he had been in her care
for about two-and-a-half years. She explained that he was developmentally behind
when he arrived at her home at seven months old. But he worked to overcome those
setbacks and became developmentally on target. J.D.R.G. bonded with Foster
Mother’s three other children and husband, and her husband’s employment was
stable. She testified that, if allowed to adopt J.D.R.G., they would treat him as their
own child and provide for him beyond 18 years old.
Foster Mother described two incidents where Mother lashed out and
frightened her and J.D.R.G. First, Mother came to Foster Mother’s car before a visit
and started yelling at J.D.R.G. Mother put her body on the car and both Foster
Mother and J.D.R.G. were frightened. On a second occasion, Mother confronted
Foster Mother at Star of Hope and yelled at her about filing taxes for J.D.R.G.
J.D.R.G. became scared.
10 Mother’s Witnesses. The court also heard from three witnesses for Mother.
First, Kelly Opot of the Harris County Youth Collective testified that Mother was
one of 11 fellows chosen to lead youth outreach. The court also heard from Adrianne
Fontenot who testified that Mother lived with her for a month after J.D.R.G. was
born. Fontenot was a professor at Lone Star College, and she was also a childbirth
and breastfeeding educator. She testified that during the month in her house, Mother
was attentive and affectionate to J.D.R.G. On cross-examination, Fontenot admitted
that she did not know about Mother’s suicide attempt or previous hospitalizations.
Finally, the court heard from Ingrid Wright, Mother’s maternal aunt who
testified that, although she lives in Lubbock, she would like to adopt J.D.R.G. She
explained that as part of a risk assessment, the Department asked for her husband’s
criminal background in October 2017. She has two children with her husband, whom
she met in 2000 but married in 2014 after he was released from prison. On cross-
examination, she acknowledged that her husband’s criminal record spanned from
1993 to 2014, and she understood the agency’s trepidation with a 23-year criminal
record. Nevertheless, she believed that people can have a change of heart. Her
husband’s criminal record was entered into evidence.
Analysis
On appeal, Mother asserts that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s predicate findings regarding endangerment,
11 constructive abandonment, and failure to complete the service plan. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E) (endangerment), (N) (constructive abandonment),
(O) (failure to comply with court-ordered service plan). She also disputes the trial
court’s determination that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best
interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
To terminate parental rights, the State must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that there is at least one predicate statutory ground for termination and that
the termination is in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b); see also In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263–64 (Tex. 2002). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’
means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.
To assess legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and decide “whether a reasonable
trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We assume that any disputed facts were resolved in favor
of the finding as long as a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. If “no
reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” that the matter on which
the State bears the burden of proof is true, then we “must conclude that the evidence
is legally insufficient.” Id. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we
12 consider the entire record, including disputed evidence. Id. The evidence is factually
insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have resolved in favor of the finding is so significant that the
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction. Id.
A. Predicate Ground
Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
termination of her parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because she
complied with some requirements of the family service plan and those
accomplishments were sufficient. We hold that Mother failed to comply with the
court’s order. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
A trial court may terminate parental rights under Subsection O if (1) the
Department has been the child’s temporary managing conservator for at least nine
months, (2) the Department took custody of the child as a result of an emergency
removal for child abuse or neglect, (3) a court issued an order establishing actions
necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child, and (4) the parent did not
comply with the court order. Id.; see also In re K.N.D., No. 01-12-00584-CV, 2014
WL 3970642, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] August 14, 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op. on reh’g) (explaining a trial court may direct a parent to perform specific
acts by ordering her to comply with a family service plan). A court may not order
termination under subsection (O) if the parent proved by a preponderance of the
13 evidence that the parent was unable to comply with specific provisions of the court
order, that the parent made a good faith effort to comply, and that the parent’s failure
to comply was not attributable to any fault on the part of the parent. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(d).
Here, Mother does not challenge the fact that J.D.R.G. was removed for abuse
or neglect under Chapter 262 or that J.D.R.G. was in the Department’s care for over
nine months. These unchallenged findings are binding on us “unless the contrary is
established as a matter of law, or if there is no evidence to support the finding.” In
re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)
(quoting McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see also In re
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (Unchallenged findings of fact supported
termination under section 161.001(1)(O) because record supported those findings.).
The record supports each of the unchallenged findings.2
Mother argues that termination is improper because she substantially
complied with the family service plan. The record does not support her contention.
The plan required Mother to:
• participate in parenting classes;
2 The undisputed evidence showed that J.D.R.G. had been in the managing conservatorship of the Department for well over nine months and had been removed from Mother’s care in an emergency proceeding due to abuse or neglect. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013). 14 • maintain contact with J.D.R.G. through visits;
• establish and maintain stable housing for at least six months;
• participate in a psychological evaluation and psychiatric evaluation and follow all recommendations;
• participate in individual counseling and follow all recommendations; and
• maintain contact with her caseworker.
Mother did not substantially comply with this plan. To begin, the record shows
that although Mother completed a psychological evaluation, she did not follow its
recommendations, including taking medication for her depression and participating
in regular individual therapy. There is no evidence that she completed the required
therapy; instead, the evidence shows that she chose to stop working with the referred
therapist.
Mother also failed to maintain regular contact with her caseworker. She did
not update her caseworker on important occurrences, such as her arrests and her
pregnancies.
Mother failed to verify her housing, employment, or finances. Although she
submitted a lease, she refused to allow the caseworker to tour the apartment and
verify who lived there or that it was a safe and structured home environment as
required by the service plan.
15 In addition, although Mother admitted she had been diagnosed with
depression, she failed to treat her mental illness, and she did not demonstrate stability
and an ability to protect J.D.R.G. from harm. Mother’s decision not to participate in
therapy resulted in the Department having the same concerns about Mother at trial
that it did when it removed J.D.R.G. from her care.
Mother likewise refused medication for her mental illness. Although a doctor
had prescribed several medications, Mother testified that she took only fish oil. Even
when Mother’s visits with J.D.R.G. were discontinued due to concerns she was not
taking medication, she refused to show her caseworker the prescribed medications
for several months.
Mother also failed to attend many scheduled visits with J.D.R.G. Mother was
late 15 times and cancelled 10 times. On several occasions she was so late that she
missed most of the visit.
The trial court had discretion to judge the credibility of witnesses and to
believe the Department’s witnesses. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (We assume that
any disputed facts were resolved in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder
could have done so.). The record does not reflect that Mother substantially complied
with the recommendations in her service plan. I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d at 354. And the
record does not show that Mother was unable to comply with specific provisions of
16 the court order, that she made a good faith effort to comply, or that her failure to
comply was not attributable to any fault of her own. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(d).
The Department presented clear and convincing evidence that J.D.R.G.’s
removal was due to abuse or neglect, that the child had been in the Department’s
care for over nine months, and that Mother failed to substantially comply with the
provisions of the trial court’s order. Legally and factually sufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s finding made pursuant to subsection (O) of Section
161.001(b)(1). See In re B.C., No. 11-18-00098-CV, 2018 WL 4624198, at *2 (Tex.
App—Eastland Sept. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
B. Best Interest
Before terminating parental rights, the Department must also establish by
clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX.
FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Only if no reasonable factfinder could form a belief or
conviction that termination was in J.D.R.G.’s best interest can we conclude that the
evidence is legally insufficient. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 116 (Tex. 2014).
There is a strong presumption that the child’s best interest will be served by
maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex.
2006) (per curiam). But prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe
environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 263.307(a). To determine whether termination of the parent-child relationship was
17 in the child’s best interest, we evaluate the evidence in light of the factors set out in
Holley v. Adams: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs
of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child
now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of
the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship
is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The list of Holley factors is not exhaustive, nor is
evidence of all nine factors required to support a judgment of termination. Id. at 372.
The Texas Family Code also sets out factors to be considered in evaluating
the parent’s willingness and ability to provide the child with a safe environment,
including: the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; the willingness
and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services
and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; the
willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and
personal changes within a reasonable period of time; and whether the child’s family
demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child with
minimally adequate health and nutritional care, a safe physical home environment,
18 and an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 263.307(b); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2014, pet. denied).
Here, legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in J.D.R.G.’s best
interest.
Child’s Desires and the Stability of the Proposed Placement
J.D.R.G. was very young at the time of trial, and we have no evidence of his
desires. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may
consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well cared for by
them, and have spent minimal time with a parent. In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 205
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
No evidence suggests that J.D.R.G. bonded with Mother. Although Mother
initially had weekly visits with J.D.R.G., she was frequently late and had loud
outbursts (scaring him) when she attended, and she missed numerous visits. Her
visits stopped completely in November 2017.
In contrast, evidence showed that J.D.R.G. was well cared for in his foster
home and that his foster parents wished to adopt him. His development improved
from lagging to on target, and he bonded with his foster parents and their children.
19 The evidence weighs in favor of the finding that termination is in J.D.R.G.’s
best interest.
Child’s emotional and physical danger now and in the future
A parent who lacks the ability to provide a child with a safe and stable home
is unable to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs. In re T.C., No. 01-
17-00497-CV, 2018 WL 4126600, at *21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a), (b)(12)(D)
(emphasizing child’s need for prompt and permanent placement in safe
environment). Evidence of Mother’s residency is equivocal at best. Mother would
not allow anyone from the Department to view her residence and verify that it was
safe for a child. She also did not provide proof of her employment, testified only to
recent employment, and did not demonstrate an ability to provide for herself and
J.D.R.G. See In re B.J., No. 01-15-00886-CV, 2016 WL 1389054, at *10–11 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent who did not
demonstrate she could provide safe and stable home was unable to meet children’s
needs). Mother was convicted of trespass, and she had two pending criminal charges
as well. See In re T.L.S., No. 01-12-00434-CV, 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s criminal
20 history considered in determining “present and future emotional and physical danger
to the children”).
In addition, Mother admitted having suicidal ideations, and she did not
complete the service plan to address her mental health. She stopped attending
therapy and taking medication to address her diagnoses, she went to the hospital
multiple times a month throughout the pendency of the case, and she angrily lashed
out at Foster Mother, her caseworker, staff at Star of Hope, and others, often in front
of J.D.R.G. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, no pet.) (“[T]he trial court could have considered [the mother’s] mental state
[thoughts of hurting herself, mental health diagnoses, and seizures as endangering
[the child’s] well-being.”); In re C.D., 664 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1984, no writ) (considering mother’s schizophrenia and resulting suicidal thoughts,
hospitalizations, and violence in concluding “when a parent’s mental state allows
[her] to engage in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child, that conduct has bearing on the advisability of terminating the parent’s
rights.”).
The parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, and acts or omissions of the parent
J.D.R.G.’s emotional and physical needs have been met in his foster home.
The foster parents want to adopt him, and he is bonded with them and their children.
21 In contrast, the evidence showed that Mother was unable to meet J.D.R.G.’s
needs. See In re C.J., No. XX-XXXXXXX-CV, 2008 WL 4447687, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] July 10, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Mother chose to terminate
individual therapy with the therapist recommended by the Department, and she did
not provide proof of additional therapy. She chose to stop taking her medication. Her
outbursts and threats resulted in a loss of services, shelter, and stability at Star of
Hope. Moreover, Mother provided no evidence of how she would financially
provide for J.D.R.G. and she did not allow the caseworker to verify that her
apartment offered him safe housing.
The caseworker testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
J.D.R.G.’s best interest because Mother had done little to regain possession of him,
and her lack of attention to her mental health meant that her situation had not
improved. Mother offered some excuses (such as issues with transportation), but
they do not rise to the level that no reasonable factfinder could have decided that
termination was in J.D.R.G.’s best interest. K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 116.
Considering all of the Holley factors and reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the best interest of J.D.R.G. Moreover, none of the disputed evidence
was so significant that the factfinder could not have formed such a firm belief or
22 conviction. We therefore conclude that the evidence was both legally and factually
sufficient to support termination of appellant’s parental rights to J.D.R.G.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jennifer Caughey Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Caughey.