in the Interest of J.D.O., Jr., a Child

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 6, 2010·No. 07-10-00370-CV·Published

Opinion

NO. 07-10-0370-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

DECEMBER 6, 2010

IN THE INTEREST OF J.D.O., JR., A CHILD

FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 74,608-D; HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

ORDER

The appellant is the father of J.D.O., Jr., and is a prison inmate appearing pro se.

He seeks to appeal the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to J.D.O., Jr.

and appointing appellee the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services the

child’s permanent managing conservator. By this order, we address our jurisdiction of

the appeal. Finding we possess jurisdiction of the case as a restricted appeal, we will

continue the existing abatement and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings

consistent with this order.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The trial court signed the order of termination on July 30, 2010. The father filed a

notice of appeal in the trial court on September 22. The notice states it was “forwarded” to the district clerk on September 15. We abated the appeal to consider our jurisdiction.

In the Interest of J.D.O., Jr., No. 07-10-0370-CV, 2010 Tex. App. Lexis 8423 (Tex.App.--

Amarillo Oct. 20, 2010, order) (per curiam); see M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d

671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). At our direction, the parties have each filed a brief

on the issue of appellate jurisdiction.

In a civil case, appeal is perfected by a timely-filed notice of appeal. Tex. R. App.

P. 25.1(a). The procedures for an accelerated appeal under the Rules of Appellate

Procedure apply to an appeal from a final order terminating the parent-child relationship.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 109.002(a), 263.405(a) (Vernon 2008); In re K.A.F., 160

S.W.3d 923, 924-25 (Tex. 2005). In an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must

be filed within twenty days after the judgment or order is signed. Tex. R. App. P.

26.1(b). Additional time to file a notice of appeal may be granted so long as the notice

of appeal is filed within fifteen days after the deadline under Rule of Appellate

Procedure 26.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3 (authorizing discretionary extension of time);

Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (motion for extension implied if

notice of appeal filed in good faith within fifteen-day period of Rule 26.3).

Once the fifteen-day grace period passes, however, a party’s attempt to appeal

will not invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction to determine the merits of the appeal.

See Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 617; Castillo v. Texas Dep’t of Family and Protective

Services, No. 03-09-0634-CV, 2010 Tex. App. Lexis 5621, at *1-*2 (Tex.App.--Austin

January 29, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in termination of parental rights case, court

noted it had no authority to extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal once the

2 fifteen-day period lapsed). Rather, if a notice of appeal is not timely filed, the jurisdiction

of the appellate court is invoked only to the extent the court may determine its lack of

jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. See Fry v. Goodpasture, Ltd., No. 07-05-0324-CV,

2005 Tex.App. Lexis 8779, at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo October 21, 2005, no pet.) (memo.

op.) (citing In re Simpson, 932 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1996, no writ)).

Here, the fifteen-day grace period of Rule 26.3 ended on September 3. The

father filed his notice of appeal no earlier than September 15.1 It was, therefore,

untimely.

The father argues in his jurisdictional brief that he had no notice of the order of

termination until September 7. It is undisputed that the father was not present for the

termination hearing and was not represented by counsel. The order, in fact, recites that

while properly noticed, the father “wholly made default.” Rule 4.2 of the Rules of

Appellate Procedure and Rule of Civil Procedure 306a provide for additional time to file

documents when a party does not receive or acquire notice of the signing of a

judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2; Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. Application of these rules,

however, begins with the filing of a sworn motion with the trial court during the period of

its plenary power over the judgment, measured from the date the movant establishes he

or his counsel first learned of the judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); In re Lynd Co., 195

1 In his notice of appeal, the father states he forwarded a copy to the district clerk on September 15, 2010. The document bears the clerk’s September 22 file stamp. For this discussion we assume the father’s notice of appeal was filed September 15, according to the “mailbox rule.” See Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam); Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (both finding pleadings filed when received for mailing by prison authorities); Tex. R. Civ. P. 5 (“mailbox rule”).

3 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). Nothing before us shows such a

motion was filed. Rules 4.2 and 306a do not aid our jurisdiction over the father’s

appeal.

We conclude the father’s notice of appeal was not timely and did not invoke our

appellate jurisdiction, unless we may treat his case as a restricted appeal. Our order

abating the appeal directed the parties also to address whether we have jurisdiction

over the appeal as a restricted appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c).

If a notice of appeal is filed within six months of the day the order or judgment

appealed is signed, a restricted appeal is available provided the appellant: (1) filed a

notice of appeal within six months of the trial court’s order; (2) was a party to the

underlying suit; (3) did not participate in the hearing; and (4) can demonstrate error

apparent on the face of the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c) and 30; Gold v. Gold,

145 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. 2004). The face of the record consists of all papers on file

in the appeal including the reporter’s record. Norman Communications v. Texas

Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (discussing former writ of

error procedure).

In its jurisdictional brief, the Department cites two private termination cases that

proceeded as restricted appeals.2 The Department further states it found no authority

prohibiting a Department termination case from proceeding as a restricted appeal. The

Department also finds Family Code § 161.211 supports the availability of a restricted

2 In re J.A.M.R., 303 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2010, no pet.); In re N.A.F., 282 S.W.3d 113, 115, 115 n.1 (Tex.App.--Waco 2009, no pet). 4 appeal in termination cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211(a) (Vernon 2008) (an

order terminating the parental rights of a person who was personally served is not

subject to collateral or direct attack after the sixth month after the date the order of

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