In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-16-00024-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., A.C. AND A.C., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 251st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 64507-C, Honorable Jack M. Graham, Presiding
May 4, 2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
A.M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her children, J.C.,
A.C., and A.C. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). She
contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to support termination on those
grounds and to support the finding that termination was in the best interests of the
children. We affirm.
The pertinent standard of review is discussed in In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. 2002) and In the Interest of J.R.Y., No. 07-15-00393-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS
3221, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 29, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) We refer the
parties to those cases for its discussion. Next, to warrant termination of the parent-child relationship, the State must prove
both a statutory ground under § 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) As previously mentioned, the statutory grounds upon
which the trial court based its decision to terminate here were § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),
and (O) of the Texas Family Code. Only one need have sufficient evidentiary support
for the decision to be affirmed. See In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894-95 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (stating that only one statutory ground need support
termination). And, the first ground upon which we focus is that encompassed in
§ 161.001(b)(1)(O).
Subsection O permits termination if the parent “failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the
return of the child who has been in permanent or temporary managing conservatorship
of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a
result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect
of the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (West Supp. 2015).
Furthermore, the “failure to comply” is construed strictly. In the Interest of D.N., 405
S.W.3d 863, 872 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.); accord, In re L.G., No. 07-14-
00365-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 26, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “[g]enerally, Texas courts take a strict approach when
applying § 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Family Code”). That is, it does not contemplate or
permit a certain degree of non-compliance. Id. The parent must comply with all of the
court ordered provisions to avoid the application of § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Nor does the
2 statute allow for excuses. In re L.G., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8. Again, the
focus lies upon a parent’s failure to comply with the court order; the reasons for non-
compliance or the degree of compliance generally are irrelevant. Id. A.M. argues here
that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that she failed to comply with any of
the conditions ordered by the trial court.
According to the record before us, the trial court order establishing the conditions
for A.M. securing the return of her children was signed in September of 2014. Various
of those provisions required that she be drug-free and submit to drug tests. A.M.
admitted to having taken illegal drugs up to December 13, 2014, or about three months
after the conditions were imposed on her. Other evidence illustrated that she missed at
least two drug tests after being ordered to submit to same. Given this, a reasonable
fact finder could have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of determining that she
failed to comply with the order in question, and the contrary evidence is not so
significant as to prevent a fact finder from forming a firm belief or conviction to that
effect. So, the finding regarding § 161.001(b)(1)(O) has factually sufficient evidentiary
support.
Next, we consider whether the evidentiary record supports the conclusion that
termination was in the best interests of the child. In making this assessment, “we
peruse the record with an eye upon what are known as the Holley factors.” In re L.G.,
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8-9. They include 1) the desires of the child, 2) the
present and future physical and emotional needs of the child, 3) the present and future
emotional and physical danger to the child, 4) the parental abilities of the persons
seeking custody, 5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in
3 promoting the best interest of the child, 6) the plans for the child by the individuals or
agency seeking custody, 7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, 8) acts or
omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not
appropriate, and 9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976); In re L.G., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *9.
Additionally, “[e]vidence that proves one or more of the statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest.”
In the Interest of T.C.C.H., No. 07-11-00179-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10134, at *25
(Tex. App.—Amarillo December 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) With these
considerations in mind, we review the evidence below.
A.M. was in her mid-twenties at the time of trial. Furthermore, the children in
question ranged in age (at the time of trial) from two years old to about six and were
placed with their grandmother. The two older ones expressed a desire to live with their
current caretaker, that is, their grandmother. Both, though, expressed that they enjoyed
visits with their mother, and the oldest one wanted them to continue. Before being
placed with their grandmother, the children had lived at eight different locations since
the Department became involved in August of 2014. This evinced an unstable living
environment, according to one witness.
A.M. also admitted to having begun ingesting methamphetamine in February of
2014 and “taking it a few times a week.” Apparently, she also consumed Adderall at the
same time and favored it.1 To this we add A.M.’s admissions that 1) one of the children
1 Apparently, Adderall contains a combination of amphetamine and dextroamphetamine. Both stimulate the central nervous system and affect chemicals in the brain and nerves that contribute to hyperactivity and impulse control.
4 had tested positive for drugs, 2) she wanted to commit suicide around December 13,
2014, because her sister did not invite her to a wedding, 3) her brain was “rewire[d]” due
to taking methamphetamine, 4) she was also ingesting the anti-depressants
“Trazodone” and “Klonopin,” 5) she exposed the children to one or more instances of
domestic violence between her and another person, and 6) others were giving or
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-16-00024-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., A.C. AND A.C., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 251st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 64507-C, Honorable Jack M. Graham, Presiding
May 4, 2016
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
A.M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her children, J.C.,
A.C., and A.C. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). She
contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to support termination on those
grounds and to support the finding that termination was in the best interests of the
children. We affirm.
The pertinent standard of review is discussed in In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. 2002) and In the Interest of J.R.Y., No. 07-15-00393-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS
3221, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 29, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) We refer the
parties to those cases for its discussion. Next, to warrant termination of the parent-child relationship, the State must prove
both a statutory ground under § 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. See In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) As previously mentioned, the statutory grounds upon
which the trial court based its decision to terminate here were § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),
and (O) of the Texas Family Code. Only one need have sufficient evidentiary support
for the decision to be affirmed. See In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 894-95 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (stating that only one statutory ground need support
termination). And, the first ground upon which we focus is that encompassed in
§ 161.001(b)(1)(O).
Subsection O permits termination if the parent “failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the
return of the child who has been in permanent or temporary managing conservatorship
of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a
result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect
of the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (West Supp. 2015).
Furthermore, the “failure to comply” is construed strictly. In the Interest of D.N., 405
S.W.3d 863, 872 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.); accord, In re L.G., No. 07-14-
00365-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 26, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that “[g]enerally, Texas courts take a strict approach when
applying § 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Family Code”). That is, it does not contemplate or
permit a certain degree of non-compliance. Id. The parent must comply with all of the
court ordered provisions to avoid the application of § 161.001(b)(1)(O). Nor does the
2 statute allow for excuses. In re L.G., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8. Again, the
focus lies upon a parent’s failure to comply with the court order; the reasons for non-
compliance or the degree of compliance generally are irrelevant. Id. A.M. argues here
that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that she failed to comply with any of
the conditions ordered by the trial court.
According to the record before us, the trial court order establishing the conditions
for A.M. securing the return of her children was signed in September of 2014. Various
of those provisions required that she be drug-free and submit to drug tests. A.M.
admitted to having taken illegal drugs up to December 13, 2014, or about three months
after the conditions were imposed on her. Other evidence illustrated that she missed at
least two drug tests after being ordered to submit to same. Given this, a reasonable
fact finder could have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of determining that she
failed to comply with the order in question, and the contrary evidence is not so
significant as to prevent a fact finder from forming a firm belief or conviction to that
effect. So, the finding regarding § 161.001(b)(1)(O) has factually sufficient evidentiary
support.
Next, we consider whether the evidentiary record supports the conclusion that
termination was in the best interests of the child. In making this assessment, “we
peruse the record with an eye upon what are known as the Holley factors.” In re L.G.,
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *8-9. They include 1) the desires of the child, 2) the
present and future physical and emotional needs of the child, 3) the present and future
emotional and physical danger to the child, 4) the parental abilities of the persons
seeking custody, 5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in
3 promoting the best interest of the child, 6) the plans for the child by the individuals or
agency seeking custody, 7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, 8) acts or
omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not
appropriate, and 9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976); In re L.G., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3017, at *9.
Additionally, “[e]vidence that proves one or more of the statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest.”
In the Interest of T.C.C.H., No. 07-11-00179-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10134, at *25
(Tex. App.—Amarillo December 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) With these
considerations in mind, we review the evidence below.
A.M. was in her mid-twenties at the time of trial. Furthermore, the children in
question ranged in age (at the time of trial) from two years old to about six and were
placed with their grandmother. The two older ones expressed a desire to live with their
current caretaker, that is, their grandmother. Both, though, expressed that they enjoyed
visits with their mother, and the oldest one wanted them to continue. Before being
placed with their grandmother, the children had lived at eight different locations since
the Department became involved in August of 2014. This evinced an unstable living
environment, according to one witness.
A.M. also admitted to having begun ingesting methamphetamine in February of
2014 and “taking it a few times a week.” Apparently, she also consumed Adderall at the
same time and favored it.1 To this we add A.M.’s admissions that 1) one of the children
1 Apparently, Adderall contains a combination of amphetamine and dextroamphetamine. Both stimulate the central nervous system and affect chemicals in the brain and nerves that contribute to hyperactivity and impulse control.
4 had tested positive for drugs, 2) she wanted to commit suicide around December 13,
2014, because her sister did not invite her to a wedding, 3) her brain was “rewire[d]” due
to taking methamphetamine, 4) she was also ingesting the anti-depressants
“Trazodone” and “Klonopin,” 5) she exposed the children to one or more instances of
domestic violence between her and another person, and 6) others were giving or
loaning her money to pay her expenses such as rent and child support. A.M. also
described her inability to retain paid employment since her children were removed;
apparently, she had been unemployed for a majority of the time between removal and
trial. Another witness described A.M.’s arrest for possessing marijuana and drug
paraphernalia in a car, while her children happened to be in the car at the time.
Since their placement with their grandmother, the children have adjusted.
Though J.C. was aggressive and disobedient and was experiencing “bathroom
accidents” when placed with the grandmother, his behavior has significantly improved.
He is also doing well in school. The other two children are doing well and appear to be
developing as expected. The children’s grandmother also evinced a willingness to
adopt the children if A.M.’s parental rights were terminated.
There is also evidence of improvement on the part of A.M., of going to
counseling, and of complying with other conditions imposed by the aforementioned
court order. So too did she happen to find a job around the time trial began. Other
evidence suggests that the children miss their mother and act out after leaving her. Yet,
our job is not to substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Instead, we look at
the evidence it had before it and determine whether that evidence was sufficient to
justify its decision. In looking at the record as a whole, we cannot deny that it contained
5 enough evidence to enable that fact finder to reasonably decide that termination was in
the best interests of the child. Additionally, the contrary evidence is not so significant as
to prevent a reasonable person from forming a firm belief or conviction to that end.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s order terminating A.M.’s parental
relationship with her children has the support of factually sufficient evidence, overrule
her issues, and affirm that order.
Brian Quinn Chief Justice