In the Interest of: J.C., a Minor

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided July 31, 2017·No. In the Interest of: J.C., a Minor No. 654 EDA 2017·Unpublished

Opinion

J-S44033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : APPEAL OF: Y.C., Mother : No. 654 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered January 18, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court Division, No(s): CP-51-AP-0001308-2016; CP-51-DP-0000932-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017

Y.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by

the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily

terminate her parental rights to her minor son, J.C. (“Child”), born in 2016,

pursuant to section 2511 of the Adoption Act, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, and

to change his permanency placement goal to adoption. We affirm.

In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and

procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial

Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 1-10.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court erred [sic] when it found that [DHS,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] had met its burden to terminate [Mother’s] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)[,] (2), [](5) [and] (8)?

2. Did the trial court erred [sic] when it found that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in [] Child’s best J-S44033-17

interests[,] and that [DHS] had met its burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

3. Did the trial court erred [sic] in changing the permanen[cy] placement goal from reunification to adoption?

Brief for Mother at 3.1

In her first issue, Mother contends that the evidence did not establish,

by clear and convincing evidence, sufficient grounds to involuntarily

terminate her parental rights. Id. at 9. Mother asserts that, “from the

beginning of the case[, she] began to work on her case objectives for

visitation, housing, mental health and drug treatment before she was

incarcerated for the probation violation.” Id. at 10. Mother also asserts

that, prior to her incarceration, she “had housing with her brother and then

was able to get her own apartment.” Id. Mother claims that, after she “was

released from incarceration, she continued to work on her case objectives,

had negative drug screens[,] and was then able to visit with [Child] in

September 2016.” Id. Mother argues that the trial court “completely

discounted [her] actual work on her case objectives.” Id.

1 Mother failed to address her third issue in the argument section of her brief. Therefore, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument section of an appellant’s brief is to be “divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Even if Mother had properly presented this issue, we would have determined that it lacks merit based on our disposition of Mother’s first two issues.

-2- J-S44033-17

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mother’s first issue, set forth

the relevant law, and determined that DHS had established, by clear and

convincing evidence, grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). 2 See Trial Court

Opinion, 3/24/17, at 10-13, 15. We agree with the reasoning of the trial

court, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s first issue. See id.

In her second issue, Mother contends that the evidence did not

establish, by clear and convincing evidence, sufficient grounds to determine

whether involuntarily terminating her parental rights was in Child’s best

interest. Brief for Mother at 12. Mother asserts that the caseworker had

insufficient time to observe Mother’s interactions with Child, so as “to truly

develop a comprehensive analysis of the nature of the bond between

[them.]” Id. Mother also claims that “[t]he [trial c]ourt’s visitation

restrictions on [her,] and the time that she has been incarcerated have

made it difficult for Mother to work on establishing a bond with [Child].” Id.

2 Although the trial court indicated, in its Decree, that Mother’s parental rights had been involuntarily terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8), the trial court did not address subsection 2511(a)(8) in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. Moreover, termination under subsection 2511(a)(8) would not have been appropriate, as 12 months had not elapsed between the date when Child was removed from Mother’s care, and the date of the termination Order. Nevertheless, satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of subsection 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Thus, because the trial court properly determined that involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b), its Order warrants affirmation.

-3- J-S44033-17

Mother argues that, with additional time and contact with Child, she will be

able to continue to develop a significant parent-child bond with him. Id.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mother’s second issue, set

forth the relevant law, and determined that the issue lacks merit. See Trial

Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 14-15. We agree with the reasoning of the trial

court, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s second issue. See id.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/2017

-4- Circulated 06/29/2017 04:1 PM

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

IN THE INTEREST OF: : FAMILY COURT DIVISION : JUVENILE BRANCH

J. C., a Minor : CP-51-AP-0001308-2016/CP-51-DP-0000932-2016 d/o/b: IIM016 Appeal of: : Superior Court No: 654 EDA 2017 Y. I. C., Mother

OPINION C:

.

INTRODUCTION

Y.I.C. ("Mother"), Appeals from the Decree and Order entered by this Court on

January 18, 2017, granting the Petition to Involuntarily Teiniinate Mother's Parental

Rights, and changing the Permanency Goal from reunification to Adoption, of her minor

son, J.C., ("Child"), (d/o/b: 101/2016). The Petition was filed by the Department of Human Services ("DHS") on December 30, 2016, and served on Mother.

This Court held a Goal Change/Termination of Parental Rights Hearing on

January 18, 2017. After a full Hearing on the merits, this Court found that clear and

1 convincing evidence was presented to terminate the parental rights of Mother, and the

rights of unknown putative Father and change the permanency goal to Adoption. 1

In response to the Decree and Order of January 18, 2017, counsel for Mother

filed a Notice of Appeal with Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on

February 16, 2017.

STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL

In her Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Mother raises the

following issues:

1. The trial court erred when it found that the Department of Human Services by clear and convincing evidence had met its burden to terminate Appellant's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8).

2.

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