In the Interest of: J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office

CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedJanuary 11, 2022
DocketSC99251
StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of: J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office (In the Interest of: J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of: J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office, (Mo. 2022).

Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.T., ) Opinion issued January 11, 2022 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SC99251 ) JACKSON COUNTY JUVENILE ) OFFICE, ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY The Honorable Jalilah Otto, Judge

The Jackson County circuit court found J.A.T. committed acts that would

constitute first-degree assault and armed criminal action if committed by an adult. J.A.T.

appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in requiring J.A.T. to participate in the

adjudication hearing via two-way video because it violated J.A.T.'s rights to due process

and confrontation under the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution.

The circuit court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.

Facts and Procedural History

The Jackson County juvenile officer filed a petition alleging J.A.T. committed acts

that would constitute first-degree assault, first-degree attempted robbery, and two counts

of armed criminal action if committed by an adult. The juvenile officer alleged J.A.T. committed the acts personally, or with an accomplice for whom J.A.T. would be

criminally responsible, and knowingly caused serious physical injury to the alleged

victim, Dalvon Stiner, by shooting him multiple times.

The adjudication hearing was continued multiple times by J.A.T. and the circuit

court. 1 Prior to the adjudication hearing, J.A.T. filed an "Objection to Adjudication by

Video" and argued J.A.T. had a right under the United States Constitution, the Missouri

Constitution, and Missouri statute to be adjudicated in person and to confront adverse

witnesses in person. At a pretrial conference, which occurred via two-way video

conferencing, J.A.T. objected to proceeding with the adjudication hearing "in this fashion

on video" based on the previously filed "Objection to Adjudication by Video." The

circuit court noted the juvenile officer had not yet filed a response to that objection, and

stated: "We don't know what the condition of things, public health-wise will be on [the

adjudication hearing date]. . . . I have looked at the request that you're making, but at this

time I'm not going to rule on it until closer to [the adjudication hearing date]." The

juvenile officer filed a "Response to Juvenile's Objection to Adjudication by Video" and

argued a two-way video hearing would protect J.A.T.'s constitutional rights and it was

appropriate due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The circuit court conducted the adjudication hearing, requiring J.A.T. to

participate via two-way live video from the juvenile detention facility. Only J.A.T.

1 The circuit court continued the adjudication hearing once on its own order "due to compelling and extenuating circumstances which include public health concerns related to the ongoing pandemic."

2 appeared by two-way video. 2 The circuit judge, J.A.T.'s attorney, the juvenile officer's

attorney, a deputy juvenile officer, a victim services representative, J.A.T.'s parents, and

the witnesses appeared in person at the hearing. J.A.T. renewed the objection to the

circuit court requiring J.A.T. to attend via two-way video. The circuit court overruled the

objection and stated its reasoning for doing so:

And just I think I've said this before or not in this case, but I have in other cases. In the times of the pandemic, of the coronavirus and COVID-19, we've had to make a number of significant adjustments to how we do things in court. One of them is utilizing the Webex technology, which the [Missouri] Supreme Court has explicitly given us permission to do so. That coupled with the fact that there have been numerous detention facilities who have had difficulty maintaining—or not maintaining, keeping COVID-19 out of their facilities. Our facility has done a great job of doing that. We want to keep doing that. One of the policies being put in place by the detention center of the Family Court is that the juveniles will not be transported to and from court to limit the exposure to germs of that particular juvenile as well as additional juveniles in detention. The Court believes that's reasonable for them to make such a policy. It's reasonable for the Court to follow it. 3 Furthermore, following the Webex procedure as outlined by the [Missouri] Supreme Court, I don't believe, violates [J.A.T.'s] due process rights in any way. For that reason, I will deny your request to have [J.A.T.] here in person.

(Footnote added).

Contrary to the circuit court's statements, this Court was careful to ensure its order

incorporating the operational directives would not be interpreted to permit the violation 2 An intern for J.A.T.'s attorney was present in the detention facility with J.A.T. during the adjudication hearing. J.A.T.'s attorney also relocated to the detention facility during a recess in the hearing and presented closing argument from the detention facility with J.A.T. via two-way video. 3 Exhibit A, Supreme Court of Missouri en banc, In re: Operation Directives for Easing COVID-19 Restrictions on In-Person Proceedings (May 4, 2020); Exhibit B, Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, 16th Judicial Circuit, In Re: Updated Court Operations upon Re- Opening of Courthouses Administrative Order 2020-084 (May 14, 2020).

3 of a juvenile's constitutional or statutory rights. Whether a hearing was required to be

held during a pandemic—or continued until a hearing could be held safely—is a different

issue than whether the law requires a hearing to be held in person and the juvenile and the

witnesses be required to appear face-to-face. Once a circuit court determines an

adjudication hearing must be held, nothing in this Court's Operational Directives

expressly permit prohibiting the accused juvenile from appearing in person if he objects

to appearing remotely.

This Court's Operational Directives, entered May 4, 2020, specifically provided

that "[p]roceedings pursuant to chapters 210 and 211 pertaining to juvenile

delinquency" were excluded from the provisions allowing for remote proceedings.

In re: Operation Directives, supra note 3 at C(2) (emphasis added). After listing that

exception and other exceptions, this Court directed:

Courts may set in-person hearings in the above listed proceedings but it does not mandate a judge set a hearing in any individual case. The presiding judge of each circuit court and the chief judges of each appellate court are authorized to determine the manner in which the listed in-person exceptions are to be conducted. Such proceedings shall be limited to the attorneys, parties, witnesses, security officers, and other individuals necessary to the proceedings as determined by the judge presiding over the proceedings. The judge presiding over such proceedings has the discretion to excuse jurors or other individuals who cannot or should not appear as a result of risks associated with COVID-19.

Id. (emphasis added).

This Court specifically cautioned about the requirement for in-person proceedings

in delinquency adjudications. Id. This Court gave circuit court presiding judges the

discretion to determine the manner of in-person proceedings. Id. But this Court

4 specifically provided that parties, attorneys, and witnesses were among the people who

are physically present at in-person proceedings. See id. Nothing in this Court's directives

encouraging remote proceedings for many types of hearings supports the circuit court's

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Snyder v. Massachusetts
291 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1934)
In Re GAULT
387 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Illinois v. Allen
397 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1970)
United States v. Gagnon
470 U.S. 522 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Allen v. Illinois
478 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Kentucky v. Stincer
482 U.S. 730 (Supreme Court, 1987)
State v. Johns
34 S.W.3d 93 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2000)
State v. Middleton
998 S.W.2d 520 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1999)
State v. Justus
205 S.W.3d 872 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2006)
State v. Knese
985 S.W.2d 759 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1999)
State of Missouri v. Jesse Driskill
459 S.W.3d 412 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2015)
In the Interest of D.C.M., a Minor v. Pemiscot County Juvenile Office
578 S.W.3d 776 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2019)
In the Interest of N.D.C.
229 S.W.3d 602 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2007)
State v. Miller
372 S.W.3d 455 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2012)
State v. Grate
68 Mo. 22 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1878)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
In the Interest of: J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-jat-v-jackson-county-juvenile-office-mo-2022.