Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00077-CV
In the Interest of I.S., a Child
On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 24-000347-CV-272
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The parental rights of I.S.’s mother (Mother) were terminated; she has
appealed. 1 In her sole issue, Mother contends that the trial court violated
Family Code section 201.015 as well as her due process rights by signing the
order terminating her parental rights before completing a de novo hearing. We
will reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand Mother’s case for a de novo
hearing.
1 The parental rights of I.S.’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed. Background
On February 3, 2025, following a bench trial before an associate judge,
the associate judge issued a letter stating that the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother had violated Family Code subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in I.S.’s best interest. See
generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). The associate judge’s letter ruling
further stated that Mother’s parental rights as to I.S. were terminated.
Thereafter, on February 6, 2025, Mother filed a request for a de novo
hearing. The associate judge then signed a formal order of termination on
February 14, 2025.
On February 18, 2025, the referring court conducted “the start of the de
novo hearing.” At that time, the referring court announced that it had
requested a copy of the official reporter’s record from the trial before the
associate judge. The referring court further explained that, once the record
was received, the de novo hearing would be set to be completed.
On March 7, 2025, however, before the de novo hearing was completed,
the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s order of
termination. The referring court’s order provides: “The above and foregoing
orders have been presented to this Court, and no demand for hearing having
been made in the time and manner permitted by law, it is ORDERED that said
orders be and are hereby adopted as orders of this Court.”
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 2 That same day, Mother filed a notice of accelerated appeal; however,
Mother pointed out in her notice of appeal: “A De Novo [hearing] was timely
requested. At the time of this filing, the matter is currently pending a final
hearing before the referring district court.”
Subsequently, on April 10, 2025, the referring court completed the de
novo hearing, and on April 15, 2025, the referring court signed a second order
adopting the associate judge’s order of termination. The referring court also
signed an order on April 21, 2025, which states: “[T]his Court declines to
change the Associate Judge’s ruling and affirms the Order of Termination
previously entered by the Associate Judge in this cause.”
Discussion
A party who timely requests a de novo hearing before the referring court
is entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court. In re N.W., No. 07-
17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 22, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015; State ex rel. Latty v.
Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing predecessor
statute of Family Code section 201.015). Furthermore, the referring court’s
failure to hold a de novo hearing after a timely request is filed is presumed
harmful. N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (citing Phagan v. Aleman, 29 S.W.3d
632, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 3 Here, the parties agree that Mother filed a timely request for a de novo
hearing on February 6, 2025. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 201.015, 201.2042.
The parties further agree that the referring court should not have signed an
order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on March 7, 2025,
before the de novo hearing was completed. See N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2;
see also Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 484. The parties disagree, however, about
whether such error was harmful.
Mother argues that she was harmed by such error whereas the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) argues that
the referring court cured the error. The Department points to the referring
court’s completion of the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025, followed by the
referring court’s signing of a second order adopting the associate judge’s order
of termination. But, in this case, the Department’s argument fails because, as
explained below, the referring court had lost jurisdiction by April 10, 2025,
when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and by April 15, 2025,
and April 21, 2025, when the referring court signed its additional orders. Cf.
In re Lausch, 177 S.W.3d 144, 154–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
orig. proceeding) (“The trial court’s reincarnation and adoption of the order
under the proper circumstances . . . cured the error.”).
An order that purports to dispose of all issues and all parties is a final,
appealable judgment. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; In re E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d 614,
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 4 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). Accordingly, the referring court’s
March 7, 2025 order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination was a
final, appealable judgment. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d
at 616.
The Department points out in its brief that the record is silent as to why
the referring court signed the order adopting the associate judge’s order of
termination on March 7, 2025. The Department observes that the March 7,
2025 order may have been signed inadvertently or may have been the product
of improper procedure. Either way, however, the order is a final, appealable
judgment that is merely voidable, not void. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485 (“A
judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering the judgment
had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render
judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Mere failure to follow proper
procedure will not render a judgment void.” (citations omitted)).
After signing a final judgment, a trial court retains plenary power for
only the next thirty days unless the judgment is modified, corrected, or
reformed during that thirty-day period, or a party timely files a motion that
extends the trial court’s plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; In re J.L.,
163 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2005) (“The Family Code . . . does not purport to
eliminate post-trial motions or otherwise constrict the trial court’s plenary
power.”). Here, neither of these plenary-power-extending events occurred.
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 5 Therefore, the referring court’s plenary power expired before April 10, 2025,
when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and before April 15,
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00077-CV
In the Interest of I.S., a Child
On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 24-000347-CV-272
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The parental rights of I.S.’s mother (Mother) were terminated; she has
appealed. 1 In her sole issue, Mother contends that the trial court violated
Family Code section 201.015 as well as her due process rights by signing the
order terminating her parental rights before completing a de novo hearing. We
will reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand Mother’s case for a de novo
hearing.
1 The parental rights of I.S.’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed. Background
On February 3, 2025, following a bench trial before an associate judge,
the associate judge issued a letter stating that the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother had violated Family Code subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in I.S.’s best interest. See
generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). The associate judge’s letter ruling
further stated that Mother’s parental rights as to I.S. were terminated.
Thereafter, on February 6, 2025, Mother filed a request for a de novo
hearing. The associate judge then signed a formal order of termination on
February 14, 2025.
On February 18, 2025, the referring court conducted “the start of the de
novo hearing.” At that time, the referring court announced that it had
requested a copy of the official reporter’s record from the trial before the
associate judge. The referring court further explained that, once the record
was received, the de novo hearing would be set to be completed.
On March 7, 2025, however, before the de novo hearing was completed,
the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s order of
termination. The referring court’s order provides: “The above and foregoing
orders have been presented to this Court, and no demand for hearing having
been made in the time and manner permitted by law, it is ORDERED that said
orders be and are hereby adopted as orders of this Court.”
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 2 That same day, Mother filed a notice of accelerated appeal; however,
Mother pointed out in her notice of appeal: “A De Novo [hearing] was timely
requested. At the time of this filing, the matter is currently pending a final
hearing before the referring district court.”
Subsequently, on April 10, 2025, the referring court completed the de
novo hearing, and on April 15, 2025, the referring court signed a second order
adopting the associate judge’s order of termination. The referring court also
signed an order on April 21, 2025, which states: “[T]his Court declines to
change the Associate Judge’s ruling and affirms the Order of Termination
previously entered by the Associate Judge in this cause.”
Discussion
A party who timely requests a de novo hearing before the referring court
is entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court. In re N.W., No. 07-
17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 22, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015; State ex rel. Latty v.
Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing predecessor
statute of Family Code section 201.015). Furthermore, the referring court’s
failure to hold a de novo hearing after a timely request is filed is presumed
harmful. N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (citing Phagan v. Aleman, 29 S.W.3d
632, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 3 Here, the parties agree that Mother filed a timely request for a de novo
hearing on February 6, 2025. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 201.015, 201.2042.
The parties further agree that the referring court should not have signed an
order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on March 7, 2025,
before the de novo hearing was completed. See N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2;
see also Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 484. The parties disagree, however, about
whether such error was harmful.
Mother argues that she was harmed by such error whereas the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) argues that
the referring court cured the error. The Department points to the referring
court’s completion of the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025, followed by the
referring court’s signing of a second order adopting the associate judge’s order
of termination. But, in this case, the Department’s argument fails because, as
explained below, the referring court had lost jurisdiction by April 10, 2025,
when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and by April 15, 2025,
and April 21, 2025, when the referring court signed its additional orders. Cf.
In re Lausch, 177 S.W.3d 144, 154–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
orig. proceeding) (“The trial court’s reincarnation and adoption of the order
under the proper circumstances . . . cured the error.”).
An order that purports to dispose of all issues and all parties is a final,
appealable judgment. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; In re E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d 614,
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 4 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). Accordingly, the referring court’s
March 7, 2025 order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination was a
final, appealable judgment. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d
at 616.
The Department points out in its brief that the record is silent as to why
the referring court signed the order adopting the associate judge’s order of
termination on March 7, 2025. The Department observes that the March 7,
2025 order may have been signed inadvertently or may have been the product
of improper procedure. Either way, however, the order is a final, appealable
judgment that is merely voidable, not void. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485 (“A
judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering the judgment
had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render
judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Mere failure to follow proper
procedure will not render a judgment void.” (citations omitted)).
After signing a final judgment, a trial court retains plenary power for
only the next thirty days unless the judgment is modified, corrected, or
reformed during that thirty-day period, or a party timely files a motion that
extends the trial court’s plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; In re J.L.,
163 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2005) (“The Family Code . . . does not purport to
eliminate post-trial motions or otherwise constrict the trial court’s plenary
power.”). Here, neither of these plenary-power-extending events occurred.
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 5 Therefore, the referring court’s plenary power expired before April 10, 2025,
when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and before April 15,
2025, and April 21, 2025, when the referring court signed its additional orders.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 82. Accordingly, the referring
court lacked jurisdiction to complete the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025,
and to sign its additional orders on April 15, 2025, and April 21, 2025. See
Martin v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 176 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
Judicial action taken after the court’s jurisdiction over a cause has
expired is a nullity. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486. Accordingly, the referring
court’s actions of completing the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025, followed by
signing a second order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination,
were a nullity and could not cure the referring court’s error of signing the order
adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on March 7, 2025, before
the de novo hearing was completed. See id.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court reversibly erred
by signing the order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on
March 7, 2025, before completing the de novo hearing. We sustain Mother’s
sole issue.
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 6 Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand Mother’s case for a de
novo hearing.
MATT JOHNSON Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 26, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Reversed and remanded CV06
In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 7