IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1657 Filed January 25, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF I.O. and A.C., Minor Children,
D.N., Father of I.O., Appellant,
M.C., Father of A.C., Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. Block,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
Two fathers separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant father
D.N.
Michele R. McCann of McCann Law, PLLC, Cedar Falls, for appellant father
M.C.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until
withdrawal), Mary A. Triick, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorneys General, for
appellee State.
Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
The fathers of eight-year-old I.O. and six-year-old A.C. challenge the
termination of their parents rights.1 Both fathers contest the grounds for
termination and contend that termination was not in their child’s best interests
because of their close bond. In the alternative, they urge that permanency should
have been deferred for six months. After an independent review of the record, we
affirm the juvenile court’s decision to end the children’s legal relationships with
their fathers.2 Neither I.O.’s father, Dejoni, nor A.C.’s father, Malik, have
participated in the unification services ordered by the court and the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services. And, on this record, postponing
permanency would conflict with the mandates of Iowa
Code section 232.104(2)(b) (2022).
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
I.O. and A.C. were removed from their mother’s custody in March 2021
because of her inadequate supervision, drug use, and unsanitary conditions in the
home. On top of those concerns, kindergartner I.O. had missed almost a month
of school. After removing the children, the department contacted their fathers. 3
Dejoni conceded he was not currently “in a position” to care for his son. Malik’s
whereabouts were unknown. Given their unavailable fathers, the children were
1 The children’s mother does not appeal. 2 We review termination orders de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court’s factual findings, but they do not dictate our result on legal questions. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 3 The mother told case workers that the fathers had not been active in their
children’s lives. 3
placed with other relatives: I.O with his paternal great-grandmother and A.C. with
her paternal aunt.
As the months wore on, neither father participated in court-mandated
services or visited their children through official channels. For example, in July
2021, the court ordered Dejoni to obtain a substance-abuse evaluation and follow
through with any recommended treatment. But he failed to complete the
evaluation. And while Dejoni had some contact with I.O. at his grandmother’s
home, the department could not measure his parenting skills because the family
interactions were unsupervised.
As for Malik, for months his sister told the department that she did not know
how to get ahold of him. Only later did case workers learn that she had been
allowing her brother clandestine contact with A.C. During one of those unapproved
visits, A.C. was operating a lemonade stand when she witnessed her father be
shot in the back. Malik’s injuries from the bullet required hospitalization followed
by an extended stay at a rehabilitation center. Malik suffered nerve damage that
prevented him from visiting A.C. And he faced criminal charges unrelated to the
shooting.
After the shooting, the department moved A.C. into the same relative
placement as her brother. The case worker reported that the children were glad
to be reunited. What’s more, their difficult behaviors stabilized in the care of I.O.’s
great-grandmother, who wants to adopt them both.
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in April 2022. The juvenile
court heard from both fathers at the trial. In September, the juvenile court granted 4
the State’s petition under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e) and (f).
The fathers both challenge the termination order.
II. Analysis
A. Dejoni’s Appeal
Dejoni argues that the State did not prove the grounds for termination. 4
When the juvenile court terminates under more than one paragraph of
section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any ground supported by clear and
convincing evidence. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Looking to
paragraph (f),5 we find sufficient evidence to support the termination.
In a single sentence in the petition on appeal, Dejoni argues that he
“presented evidence that he was capable of caring for the child and that the child
could be placed in his care—or with additional time could ultimately be placed in
his care.” We disagree. Dejoni refused to engage in unification services. As the
juvenile court observed, the father “has demonstrated that he is not desirous of
4 Dejoni’s petition on appeal cites both grounds for termination in its issue heading, but focuses on the “significant and meaningful contact” element of paragraph (e), asserting that he “regularly saw his son” at the grandmother’s home. Further confusing the issue, counsel mistakenly refers to a different client in the body of the argument. 5 Termination is proper under that paragraph if the court finds that all of the
following have occurred: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). 5
being a placement for the child, only choosing to visit the child as it suits him.”
Termination was proper under paragraph (f).
Next Dejoni argues that termination of his parental rights was not in I.O.’s
best interests and, in fact, was detrimental to the child because of the closeness
of the father-son bond. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2), (3)(c). True, the record
shows that I.O. enjoys spending time with his father at the grandmother’s home.
But when we apply the framework in section 232.116(2), we find the child’s long-
term nurturing and growth will be furthered by moving toward adoption. In fact,
even Dejoni testified that he believed it was in I.O.’s best interest to stay in the
custody of the grandmother. And Dejoni has not met his burden to show that the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1657 Filed January 25, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF I.O. and A.C., Minor Children,
D.N., Father of I.O., Appellant,
M.C., Father of A.C., Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. Block,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
Two fathers separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant father
D.N.
Michele R. McCann of McCann Law, PLLC, Cedar Falls, for appellant father
M.C.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until
withdrawal), Mary A. Triick, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorneys General, for
appellee State.
Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad
litem for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Presiding Judge.
The fathers of eight-year-old I.O. and six-year-old A.C. challenge the
termination of their parents rights.1 Both fathers contest the grounds for
termination and contend that termination was not in their child’s best interests
because of their close bond. In the alternative, they urge that permanency should
have been deferred for six months. After an independent review of the record, we
affirm the juvenile court’s decision to end the children’s legal relationships with
their fathers.2 Neither I.O.’s father, Dejoni, nor A.C.’s father, Malik, have
participated in the unification services ordered by the court and the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services. And, on this record, postponing
permanency would conflict with the mandates of Iowa
Code section 232.104(2)(b) (2022).
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
I.O. and A.C. were removed from their mother’s custody in March 2021
because of her inadequate supervision, drug use, and unsanitary conditions in the
home. On top of those concerns, kindergartner I.O. had missed almost a month
of school. After removing the children, the department contacted their fathers. 3
Dejoni conceded he was not currently “in a position” to care for his son. Malik’s
whereabouts were unknown. Given their unavailable fathers, the children were
1 The children’s mother does not appeal. 2 We review termination orders de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court’s factual findings, but they do not dictate our result on legal questions. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id. 3 The mother told case workers that the fathers had not been active in their
children’s lives. 3
placed with other relatives: I.O with his paternal great-grandmother and A.C. with
her paternal aunt.
As the months wore on, neither father participated in court-mandated
services or visited their children through official channels. For example, in July
2021, the court ordered Dejoni to obtain a substance-abuse evaluation and follow
through with any recommended treatment. But he failed to complete the
evaluation. And while Dejoni had some contact with I.O. at his grandmother’s
home, the department could not measure his parenting skills because the family
interactions were unsupervised.
As for Malik, for months his sister told the department that she did not know
how to get ahold of him. Only later did case workers learn that she had been
allowing her brother clandestine contact with A.C. During one of those unapproved
visits, A.C. was operating a lemonade stand when she witnessed her father be
shot in the back. Malik’s injuries from the bullet required hospitalization followed
by an extended stay at a rehabilitation center. Malik suffered nerve damage that
prevented him from visiting A.C. And he faced criminal charges unrelated to the
shooting.
After the shooting, the department moved A.C. into the same relative
placement as her brother. The case worker reported that the children were glad
to be reunited. What’s more, their difficult behaviors stabilized in the care of I.O.’s
great-grandmother, who wants to adopt them both.
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in April 2022. The juvenile
court heard from both fathers at the trial. In September, the juvenile court granted 4
the State’s petition under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e) and (f).
The fathers both challenge the termination order.
II. Analysis
A. Dejoni’s Appeal
Dejoni argues that the State did not prove the grounds for termination. 4
When the juvenile court terminates under more than one paragraph of
section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any ground supported by clear and
convincing evidence. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Looking to
paragraph (f),5 we find sufficient evidence to support the termination.
In a single sentence in the petition on appeal, Dejoni argues that he
“presented evidence that he was capable of caring for the child and that the child
could be placed in his care—or with additional time could ultimately be placed in
his care.” We disagree. Dejoni refused to engage in unification services. As the
juvenile court observed, the father “has demonstrated that he is not desirous of
4 Dejoni’s petition on appeal cites both grounds for termination in its issue heading, but focuses on the “significant and meaningful contact” element of paragraph (e), asserting that he “regularly saw his son” at the grandmother’s home. Further confusing the issue, counsel mistakenly refers to a different client in the body of the argument. 5 Termination is proper under that paragraph if the court finds that all of the
following have occurred: (1) The child is four years of age or older. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). 5
being a placement for the child, only choosing to visit the child as it suits him.”
Termination was proper under paragraph (f).
Next Dejoni argues that termination of his parental rights was not in I.O.’s
best interests and, in fact, was detrimental to the child because of the closeness
of the father-son bond. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2), (3)(c). True, the record
shows that I.O. enjoys spending time with his father at the grandmother’s home.
But when we apply the framework in section 232.116(2), we find the child’s long-
term nurturing and growth will be furthered by moving toward adoption. In fact,
even Dejoni testified that he believed it was in I.O.’s best interest to stay in the
custody of the grandmother. And Dejoni has not met his burden to show that the
permissive factor in section 232.116(3)(c) should prevent termination. See In re
A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 42 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (explaining a court may bypass
termination if there is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be
detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
relationship). The closeness of the parent-child relationship is not a reason to
forego termination here. And luckily, their relationship need not end. The
grandmother has “voiced a willingness” to maintain contact between I.O. and
Dejoni after termination.
Finally, Dejoni suggests that “no adjudicatory harm would come to the child”
if he was given more time to work toward unification. See In re W.T., 967
N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he juvenile court may deny termination and give
the parent an additional six months for reunification only if the need for removal
‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” (quoting Iowa 6
Code § 232.104(2)(b))). But Dejoni offers nothing to show that he would be
prepared to parent I.O. full time within six months.
After giving careful consideration to all of Dejoni’s arguments, we affirm the
termination of his parental rights.
B. Malik’s Appeal
Like Dejoni, Malik challenges the grounds for termination. He argues that
the State did not present clear and convincing evidence that A.C. could not be
safely placed in his custody. He asserts that he has “obtained housing and
employment and, once physically healed from the gunshot wound, would be able
to provide a secure living environment for his daughter.” In explaining the shooting,
he insists that “he had no enemies and did not know he was being targeted by any
individuals.”
Targeted or not, Malik faced his own criminal charges at the time of the
termination hearing. And he did not meaningfully engage in services during the
child-welfare case. Malik attended only one authorized visit with A.C. And he
recognized that because of his recuperation from the gunshot, A.C. could not have
been placed in his custody “at the present time.” See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (defining “at
the present time” as the time of the termination hearing). Termination was proper
under paragraph (f).
Malik next argues termination was not in A.C.’s best interests and should
have been precluded by their strong bond. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2), (3)(c).
He asserts that after recovering from his gunshot injury, he will be “prepared to
fully address the physical, mental and emotional needs of his daughter.” In 7
describing their bond, he testified that A.C. knows him and cries when it’s time for
her to leave.
We don’t question Malik’s love for his daughter. But we find that her best
interests are served by termination of his parental rights. The record shows that
Malik has not been involved in his daughter’s life.6 And the child is thriving in the
care of I.O.’s grandmother. In fact, Malik acknowledged in his testimony that A.C.
was “in a good placement” and benefitted from being with her brother. We find
A.C.’s safety and physical, mental, and emotional needs are best met in that
placement. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also find that Malik has not shown
“the type of bond [with A.C.] that would make termination in this case improper.”
See W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 324.
Finally, Malik makes a plea for delayed permanency. At first glance, his
request for more time to recover from the gunshot wound before uniting with his
daughter seems like a reasonable ask. But we can’t view his current situation in a
vacuum. Before the shooting, he did not interact with the department or the
juvenile court to confirm his ability to parent A.C. As the State points out, he has
not shown that he can provide a safe home for his daughter. Without “specific
factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that justify believing the need
for removal from parental care would no longer exist after six months, a delay is
not warranted. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).
6 Malik testified that he stayed away from A.C. when he was “a major fugitive on the run” so he did not place her in harm’s way. But once he resolved the outstanding warrants, he tried to start a relationship with her.