Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00126-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF I.L.Y. AKA I.L.Y.H. AND M.R.M., CHILDREN
From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-PA-00550 Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 19, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children, I.L.Y.
and M.R.M. 1 Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting 0F
termination under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), and (Q) of the Texas Family Code, the best- interest finding, and the conservatorship appointment. Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding under subsection (E) and the best interest finding, we affirm the termination order.
1 To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we refer to appellant as “Mother” and to the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
Mother is the biological parent of I.L.Y. and M.R.M. 2 The Department became involved 1F
with the family after receiving a report that M.R.M. had tested positive for amphetamines at birth and Mother tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana at the time of delivery. Mother denied using illegal drugs and explained the positive test results were attributable to secondhand marijuana smoke or possibly laced cigarettes. Approximately one month later, the Department received a second intake after Mother was arrested during a homicide investigation. During the investigation, Mother provided law enforcement with a false name, had an active warrant for her arrest, was found in possession of a firearm despite being prohibited from possessing one, and appeared intoxicated while caring for M.R.M. Based upon these two incidents, the Department filed its original petition seeking conservatorship of the children and termination of Mother’s parental rights.
By the time the children were officially removed, neither child remained in Mother’s care.
Mother had forced I.L.Y. from the home after an altercation, and he spent the night outside his high school before Patricia Baxter, a neighbor, took him into her home. Shortly thereafter, Mother’s roommate left M.R.M. on Baxter’s front porch. Both children remained in Baxter’s care throughout the pendency of the case, except for a brief period during which I.L.Y. was placed at a facility for inpatient substance-abuse treatment.
Following removal, the Department developed a family service plan requiring Mother to maintain stable housing and employment, complete parenting and domestic violence classes, participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, submit to random
2 I.L.Y. was sixteen years old at the time of trial, and M.R.M. was almost one.
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drug testing, complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations, and refrain from further criminal activity.
Mother completed several of these services while she was incarcerated during the pendency of the case, including parenting classes, domestic violence classes, anger management classes, cognitive behavioral therapy, substance abuse programming, and a ninety-day Intermediate Sanction Facility (ISF) program. Mother also testified that, once she was able, she reported weekly to parole, participated in counseling, submitted to drug testing while residing in a halfway house, and was attempting to obtain identification, employment, and housing. The Department nevertheless presented evidence that Mother failed to complete all required services. According to the conservatorship caseworker, Mother did not complete the required substance abuse assessment or psychological evaluation and failed to provide proof of stable housing or employment.
Certified criminal records admitted into evidence establish that Mother had an extensive criminal history predating the Department’s involvement. After repeatedly violating the terms of her deferred adjudication community supervision, Mother was adjudicated guilty of felony theft and sentenced to a three-year prison term. This occurred around the same time the children were removed from her care. During the pendency of this case, Mother remained incarcerated from March 19 through July 30, 2025, and again from September 7 through December 23, 2025, after she violated parole. At the time of trial, Mother had been released from prison but was residing in a halfway house in Austin, where the children could not reside.
The evidence also addressed the children’s circumstances following removal. I.L.Y.
initially struggled with depression, anger, substance abuse, and failing grades. After entering Baxter’s home, he completed substance abuse treatment, participated in counseling and psychiatric treatment, gained approximately forty pounds, improved his grades, and expressed that he felt safe
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in Baxter’s home and wished to remain there. He further told the Department and CASA that he no longer wanted contact with Mother.
M.R.M. likewise demonstrated significant improvement while living with Baxter. The evidence showed that, at the time of removal, she experienced breathing and feeding difficulties and that she had significant developmental concerns. While she was with Baxter, M.R.M. underwent surgery for tracheomalacia, received ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy, remained on medication, and made substantial developmental progress. Baxter testified M.R.M. had bonded with her family, and that she wished to adopt both children.
Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Family
Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), and (Q), 3 found termination was in the children’s best 2F
interest, and appointed the Department permanent managing conservator.
ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Involuntary termination of parental rights requires the Department to prove both that the parent committed a predicate act under subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Given the profound consequences of terminating a parent’s rights to her child, the Department must prove both elements by clear and convincing evidence. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(a); In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *1 (Tex. June 5, 2026); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). Clear and convincing evidence requires a degree of proof that will produce in the factfinder
3 The court found that Mother:
(1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
(2) constructively abandoned the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N).
(3) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in her conviction, confinement, and inability to care for the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).
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“a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019). The clear and convincing standard “guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.” In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). This heightened standard of proof necessarily extends to appellate review in such cases. A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31; In re G.M.M., 721 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, no pet.).
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting termination, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the trial court’s finding. See A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We resolve disputed evidence in favor of the finding when reasonable and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.; In re J.L.B., No.04-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov.1, 2017, pet. denied). If no reasonable factfinder could reach that conclusion on the record before it, the evidence is legally insufficient and judgment must be rendered for the parent. Id.
A factual sufficiency analysis, in comparison, requires us to weigh all the evidence— supporting, conflicting and contrary—to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). If the contrary evidence is so significant that it prevents a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the finding, the evidence is factually insufficient. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014); In re M.T.C., No. 04-16-00548-CV, 2017 WL 603634, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.). But
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when the evidence, viewed as a whole, permits a firm belief or conviction, we must defer to the factfinder’s judgment. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.
B. Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (E)
Subsection (E) allows termination if the parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well- being. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). “Endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or physical well-being. Boyd v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Endangering conduct need not be directed at the child, and the child need not actually suffer injury. Id. Instead, subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act that create a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering the child’s well-being. In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 350–51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). An endangering course of conduct may include drug use, criminal conduct, repeated incarceration, and instability. Because subsection (E) focuses on a parent’s course of conduct, the relevant inquiry may encompass such conduct occurring outside the child’s presence or after the child’s removal. In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102- CV, 2019 WL 3937278, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied).
Mother contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (E). We disagree.
M.R.M. tested positive for amphetamines at birth, and Mother tested positive for amphetamines and cannabis. There was evidence that much of Mother’s criminal history involved drug related offenses. The trial court also heard evidence that the Department received an initial referral because Mother appeared intoxicated while caring for her infant. Illegal drug use may properly be considered in a termination proceeding because drug use may “constitute endangering
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conduct and involve endangering conditions.” K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *14. Particular to this case, drug use exposes a child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. A parent’s use of drugs during pregnancy may likewise support an endangerment finding. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024); In re T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.); see also In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (finding that the “appellant posed an emotional and physical danger to her children now and in the future because she exposed her unborn child to illegal drugs”).
Moreover, the evidence of drug use did not stand alone. Mother’s criminal history is extensive, including substance abuse, identity theft, and grand theft auto offenses. Shortly after M.R.M.’s birth, Mother was arrested during a murder investigation involving her boyfriend after allegedly refusing to cooperate with police, providing an alias to law enforcement while subject to an active arrest warrant and illegally possessing a firearm. Mother was subsequently incarcerated for eight of the ten months this case was pending.
A parent’s criminal conduct and resulting imprisonment may constitute evidence of endangerment. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533–34. A parent’s criminal convictions and the corresponding periods of imprisonment are relevant in determining whether a parent engaged in a course of conduct that has the effect of jeopardizing the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312–13 (Tex. 2021). We may consider conduct occurring both before and after the child’s removal. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345.
Prior to the events leading to the children’s removal, Mother’s community supervision was repeatedly modified and ultimately revoked, resulting in adjudication and a three-year sentence. When she was released on parole during the pendency of this case, she reoffended and was again
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incarcerated. Thus, Mother’s criminal conduct and resulting incarceration repeatedly rendered her unavailable to care for her children and complete her service plan. Although imprisonment alone does not constitute an endangering course of conduct, it is properly considered when the parent’s criminal conduct results in repeated incarceration and instability for the children. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533–34; J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312–13.
The evidence clearly showed instability affecting these particular children as a result of Mother’s conduct. I.L.Y. was kicked out of Mother’s home and slept in a high-school parking lot before Baxter took him in. Mother’s roommate subsequently left one month old M.R.M. on Baxter’s porch. I.L.Y. thereafter required a three-month substance-abuse program and ongoing therapy and psychiatric care. He ultimately expressed that he no longer wanted contact with Mother. The evidence further revealed that M.R.M. had tremors and developmental delays as a result of being exposed to amphetamines prior to birth. She requires ongoing physical, speech, and occupational therapy. The trial court could consider these circumstances as part of the cumulative evidence concerning the effect Mother’s course of conduct had on the children’s physical and emotional well-being.
Mother nevertheless presented evidence of her efforts toward rehabilitation. She completed two parenting classes, anger management, domestic-violence and substance-abuse courses, cognitive behavioral therapy, and a ninety-day ISF program. After her release from prison, she testified that she reported to parole, attended counseling, underwent drug testing, and was attempting to obtain identification, employment, and housing.
While the trial court could consider this evidence, it was not required to assign it controlling weight. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. Mother completed some but not all required services, and her criminal conduct continued after the Department’s involvement. At trial, she remained in a
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halfway house where the children could not live, did not have employment or independent housing, and admitted she could not then care for the children. The factfinder could reasonably consider Mother’s recent efforts in light of her current situation and course of conduct throughout the case.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the record supports a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered her children’s physical or emotional well-being. And considering the entire record, including Mother’s evidence of rehabilitation and completed services, the disputed evidence is not so significant that the trial court could not reasonably have formed that same belief or conviction. Accordingly, we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsection (E).
Because only one predicate violation under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a termination order, we need not address Mother’s complaints regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s subsection (N) and (Q) findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 n.1 (Tex. 2019) (recognizing appellate courts may review findings under subsections (D) or (E) without reviewing other grounds); In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied).
C. Best Interest Finding Mother also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s best interest findings. When considering the best interest of a child in the context of involuntary parental termination, a strong presumption favors preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). At the same time, the Texas Family Code presumes that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in a child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). The Department must rebut the first presumption and satisfy the second
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with clear and convincing evidence. Interest of E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 332 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.).
Courts evaluate best interest using a non-exclusive list of statutory factors. 4 TEX. FAM. CODE 3F
ANN. § 263.307(b). The Texas Supreme Court has also provided a similar framework 5 to consider 4F
in determining a child’s best interest. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied).
When evaluating a child’s best interest, we may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence. In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Conduct supporting a statutory ground for termination is probative of best interest, and the factfinder may measure a parent’s future ability to meet a child’s needs by past conduct. In re C.H.,
4 These factors include: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child [or] the child’s parents; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills... ; and (13) whether an adequate social support system ... is available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ANN. § 263.307(b). 5 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 n.9 (Tex. 2013).
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89 S.W.3d at 28; In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d at 620. Ultimately, the focus must remain on the child’s best interest, not the interest of the parent. In re J.E.F., No. 04-26-00086-CV, 2026 WL 1326514, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (citing Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ)). In this case, the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s best-interest finding.
First, the desires of the children weigh in favor of termination. I.L.Y. expressed that he wanted to remain with Baxter, felt safe there, and did not want to participate in visits with Mother. The CASA advocate likewise testified that I.L.Y. felt safe, happy, and secure with Baxter, that M.R.M. was thriving, and that both children’s needs were being met. The caseworker corroborated this, noting that the children were in a stable, loving home free of violence, drugs and criminal activity.
The children’s needs also support the best interest finding. I.L.Y. entered care emotionally unstable, depressed, angry, and failing classes. By trial, he had improved academically, gained weight, received treatment for drug abuse, and was receiving therapy and psychiatric care. He was also interacting socially, expressing interest in school activities, and had become extremely protective of his baby sister.
At the time of removal, M.R.M. had serious medical and developmental concerns, including breathing and feeding problems, tracheomalacia, reflux, tremors, and physical delays. While living with Baxter, she has bonded with the family, received medical care that enabled her to breath and eat more easily, and received physical, speech, and occupational therapy. In contrast, the caseworker testified that Mother has not demonstrated the ability to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs.
The stability evidence further favors termination. Baxter has cared for both children for most of the case. In fact, M.R.M. has lived with Baxter for all but one month of her life. See In re S.J.R.-
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Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 693 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (explaining that when children are too young to express their desires, fact finder may consider that child has bonded with caregiver, is well-cared for, and has spent minimal time with parent). Both children are attached to Baxter and are improving in her care. See In re H.F.F., No. 04-25-00458-CV, 2025 WL 3716156, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 23, 2025, pet. denied) (noting child’s need for certainty, permanence, and stable home is principal consideration in best interest decision); In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (citing permanence and stability as paramount factors when considering whether termination is in a child’s best interest). Baxter has become licensed during the pendency of this case and she expressed her desire to adopt both children.
Mother’s contrary evidence regarding her service completions, participation in therapy, parole compliance, and efforts to obtain employment and housing does not make the evidence insufficient. The trial court could consider Mother’s efforts but still reasonably conclude they came too late and do not outweigh Mother’s drug-related conduct, criminal activity, repeated incarceration, inability to presently care for the children, and the children’s need for permanence. See In re J.C.H-P., No. 04-23-00636-CV, 2023 WL 7006285, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 25, 2023, pet. denied) (explaining that evidence proving statutory ground for termination is probative on the issue of best interest).
Contrasting the children’s demonstrated improvement in a stable placement and their need for consistency, care, and supervision with the risk of harm posed by Mother’s conduct and instability, the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Any evidence to the contrary is not so overwhelming that it would prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming such a conviction. The
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evidence is therefore both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding.
D. Conservatorship Mother also challenges the Department’s appointment as the children’s permanent managing conservator. An order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and the children of all legal rights and duties with respect to each other. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b). Because we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights, she no longer has the right to contest the Department’s conservatorship appointment. In re A.K.B., No. 04-23-00154-CV, 2024 WL 3056663, at *27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 20, 2024, pet. denied); In re H.D.J.A., No. 04-24-00515-CV, 2024 WL 5195300, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 23, 2024, no pet.). Mother’s challenge to the Department’s appointment as permanent managing conservator is therefore overruled.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of termination and appointment of conservatorship is affirmed.
H. Todd McCray, Justice