in the Interest of I.J.G.

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-18-00299-CV ____________________

IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.G.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 317th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. C-230,177 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R.G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.G. 1,2

The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds exist for

termination of R.G.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in

I.J.G.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2)

(West Supp. 2018).

1 To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and his parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The Order of Termination also terminated the parental rights of I.J.G.’s father, V.O., however, V.O. is not a party to this appeal. 1 Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which

counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional

evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a copy of the

Anders brief filed on her behalf. This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a

pro se response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This Court did not

receive a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the

appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous.

We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal.

Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating R.G.’s parental

rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by R.G.’s court-appointed appellate

counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all

appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event R.G. decides to pursue an appeal to the

Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to R.G. can be met “by filing a

petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

2 AFFIRMED.

_________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice

Submitted on October 29, 2018 Opinion Delivered November 8, 2018

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.