In the Interest of I.G., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1707
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1707 Filed January 23, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF I.G., Minor Child,

G.T., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, John D. Lloyd, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Deborah L. Johnson of Deborah L. Johnson Law Office, P.C., Altoona, for

appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad

litem for minor child.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ. 2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

A mother challenges the statutory grounds relied on by the district court for

termination of her parental rights to a one-year-old child, asserts termination is not

in the child’s best interest, requests a six-month extension to work toward

reunification, and argues that a guardianship should be established in lieu of

termination. Upon our review, we affirm on the issues preserved for appellate

review.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

I.G. was born in February 2023 and came to the attention of the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) at just three months of age due

to physical injuries for which the parents could not provide a credible explanation.

The parents, who lived together, continued to provide inconsistent and noncredible

explanations for the baby’s injuries. I.G. was removed from parental custody in

May 2023.

The mother initially denied knowledge as to the cause of the baby’s injuries.

About a month after I.G.’s removal from parental custody, the mother reported to

HHS that the father had caused I.G.’s injuries. The mother reported the father told

her he punched the baby and that his fingernails “may” have caused the marks on

the baby’s face. The mother also reported that the father would call the baby a

“bitch,” threatened to throw the baby across the room, and also threatened to kill

the baby.

HHS completed a founded child abuse assessment in June 2023 for both

physical abuse and denial of critical care, listing the father as the perpetrator for 3

physical abuse and both parents as perpetrators for denial of critical care. The

assessment detailed the baby’s injuries as

bruising on her back. The bruising starts around her shoulder blades and runs down to her tail bone. Bruising covers the width of her back. The discoloration ranges in color and is shades of purple, brown, and yellow in different areas. Medical notes indicate [I.G.] has large areas of ecchymosis (bruising) on the posterior trunk from base of neck down to just about the diaper area.

The report also noted that I.G. had “abrasions on her face. The marks near her

eyes are approximately an inch in length. There are 3 to 4 abrasions total. These

marks are just under her eyes. They are bright red in color and seem inflamed.”

I.G. was adjudicated by consent of the parties as a child in need of

assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.96A(2), 232.96A(3)(b), and

232.96A(14) (2023). The mother was ordered to undergo various evaluations and

participate in services. In July 2024, the father entered a plea of guilty via an Alford

plea to child endangerment, a class “D” felony, and was sentenced to prison.

While the mother initially engaged in some services, she ceased

participation in February 2024, eight months before the termination hearing. Her

visits with I.G. remained fully supervised. At the time of the termination hearing,

the mother was residing with the father’s mother. The mother stated her intention

to continue a relationship with the father after his release from prison.1 The mother

also reported that she intended to have the father in I.G.’s life if her parental rights

remained intact.

1 A family centered services worker reported that the mother and father were engaged, and the mother intended to have another baby with the father once he was released from prison. 4

The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(d), (h) and (i) (2024). The mother challenges the statutory

grounds, argues termination is not in the child’s best interest, requests an

extension of time to work toward reunification, and requests that a guardianship

be established in lieu of termination.2 We address each of the mother’s arguments

in turn.

II. Standard of Review

We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d

518, 522 (Iowa 2020). “[T]hus ‘it is our duty to review the facts as well as the law

and adjudicate rights anew on those propositions properly preserved and

presented to us.’” In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981) (citation

omitted). In reviewing the decision to terminate, “[o]ur primary concern is the best

interests of the child.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).

III. Statutory Grounds

When the district court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory

ground, we may affirm on any ground we find supported by clear and convincing

evidence. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 775 (Iowa 2012). We elect to address the

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), which allows the district court

to terminate the rights of a parent if all of the following have occurred: (1) the child

is three years of age or younger, (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need

of assistance pursuant to section 232.96, (3) the child has been removed from the

physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve

2 The father consented to the termination of his parental rights. He is not a party to this appeal. 5

months, or for the last six consecutive months, and any trial period at home has

been less than thirty days, and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that the

child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section

232.102 at the present time.

The mother appears to challenge only the fourth element—whether the child

could be safely returned to the mother’s custody at the present time.3 She argues

that because the abuse was inflicted by the father and “[t]he father is now in prison,

[t]he child is no longer in danger of serious risk.” But this argument ignores the

culpability of the mother in the abuse of I.G. The mother was living in the same

home and did not report the abuse. And she did not seek medical treatment. She

was listed as a perpetrator for denial of critical care in an HHS founded abuse

assessment. The mother has continued in a relationship with the father despite

his plea of guilty to child endangerment and has been unable to commit to keeping

I.G. from the father once he is released from prison.4 And the mother ceased

participating in services eight months before the termination hearing. I.G. could

not be safely placed in her mother’s custody at the present time.5

3 While the mother does not challenge the first three elements, on our de novo

review we observe that I.G. is under three years of age, was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, and has been out of parental custody at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months, and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. 4 After the father went to prison the mother lived for some a period with a new

boyfriend who the mother reported was domestically violent toward her. 5 “At the present time” means the time of the termination hearing. See In re A.M.,

843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). 6

IV. Best Interest

The mother asserts that the district court made no best interest findings.

The State counters that the district court considered the best interest of I.G. in the

termination order. The district court order reads, in part:

In a termination proceeding the state must prove the grounds for termination and in addition must prove that the termination is in the best interests of the child. The best interest of the child is the overriding concern. The state must meet this burden by clear and convincing evidence. This standard denotes proof that is more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Insight as to the child’s best interest “can be gained from evidence of the parent’s past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is capable of providing.”

(Footnotes omitted.)

The mother argues that the court did not make a specific finding that

termination of parental rights was in I.G.’s best interest after determining the

statutory grounds had been met. Yet the mother failed to move the district court

to expand the findings. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues

must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will

decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002);

see also A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 773 (“[T]he general rule that appellate arguments

must first be raised in the trial court applies to [child in need of assistance] and

termination of parental rights cases.”). Normal error-preservation rules apply in

termination-of-parental-rights cases. A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 773.

The mother was required to file a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.904(2) to preserve error on the issue. See In re T.N., No. 02-1633,

2002 WL 31641552, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2002) (requiring the filing of a 7

rule 1.904(2) motion to preserve error on challenge to selection of guardian).

Given the lack of such motion and ruling, we have nothing to review.

But if we were to elect to bypass the normal rules of error preservation, we

would determine the record before us contains ample evidence that termination of

the mother’s parental rights is in I.G.’s best interest. We highlight the abuse

inflicted on I.G. and the injuries suffered by this infant in her parental home by the

father and at the complacency of the mother. While the mother initially participated

in services directed at resolving the issues that brought I.G. under the district

court’s jurisdiction, the mother disengaged from these services. And critically, she

cannot demonstrate she could protect I.G. if her parental rights remained intact.

A glimmer of hope—I.G. is in a pre-adoptive home and is reported to be

meeting all milestones. While previously in physical therapy, she is now walking,

and physical therapy is not needed at this time. The current relative placement

intends to proceed with adoption if the mother’s rights are terminated. We

conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

V. Extension of Time for Reunification Efforts

The mother also asserts she should be afforded additional time to work

toward reunification. The court can delay permanency and give a parent six more

months if it concludes the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the

extension. See Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), .117(5). But the mother has not

preserved this issue for our review. The mother did not request an extension of

time before the district court. While the HHS worker was posed a question on

direct examination by the county attorney as to whether additional time would

correct the situation, the district court did not rule on this issue. And the mother 8

failed to move under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904. So we again have

nothing to review and cannot reach the merits of this claim.

VI. Guardianship in Lieu of Termination

Lastly, the mother argues the court should establish a guardianship in lieu

of terminating her parental rights. See id. §§ 232.104(2)(d), .117(5). But we first

address whether this claim has been preserved for our review. Despite the

mother’s contention in her petition on appeal that she requested a guardianship in

lieu of termination, we see nowhere in the record where such a request was made.

And the district court did not rule on this potential permanency option. Like

the mother’s best interest argument and argument under 232.104(2)(b), we have

nothing to review and do not address the merits of the mother’s argument on the

guardianship issue.

VII. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights, as clear and

convincing evidence supports termination on a ground relied on by the district

court. The mother’s claims of best interest, an extension of time for reunification

efforts, and the establishment of a guardianship are not preserved for our review,

and we therefore do not reach the merits of the mother’s arguments on those

claims.

AFFIRMED.