IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-2045 Filed April 9, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF I.D., Minor Child,
I.O., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Michelle
Jungers, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her teenage son.
AFFIRMED.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Tammy L. Banning of Waterloo Juvenile Public Defender Office, Waterloo,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her thirteen-year-
old son, I.D., challenging the statutory ground for termination, asserting termination
of their bond would harm him, and suggesting the court establish a guardianship
rather than severing her rights.1 Examining the record with fresh eyes,2 we find
termination was appropriate because of the mother’s ongoing mental-health
struggles. The mother didn’t show that termination of the relationship would harm
I.D. And she did not ask the juvenile court to establish a guardianship, nor is one
appropriate. So we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The juvenile court first removed I.D. from his mother, I.O., in the summer of
2023 when she demonstrated irrational thinking and paranoid delusions. In its
adjudication order, the court found her mental-health condition put the child in
danger of harm from emotional abuse, lack of supervision, and threats of physical
harm. A child abuse report for denial of critical care and failure to provide proper
supervision was founded. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
placed I.D. with a foster family, where he remained throughout the proceedings.
The mother told the department that she had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia but disagreed that she suffered from that condition. She attended
group mental-health meetings and received diagnoses of depression and anxiety.
1 The juvenile court also terminated the rights of I.D.’s father, who last saw I.D.
when he was a baby. That parent is not involved in this appeal. 2 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The juvenile court’s factual findings do not bind us, but we give them weight, especially on witness credibility. Id. 3
She also started taking medication for anxiety and participated in medication
management with a doctor. Throughout the case, she had several jobs and
reported that she enjoyed working. She also found an apartment that the
department agreed would be appropriate for I.D.
Beyond those actions, the mother maintained sporadic contact with the
department and services throughout the case. She had only one visit with I.D.
during which she grew angry with the supervisor, escalating the situation until the
supervisor had to lock herself and the child in her car and call the police. After
that, I.D. consistently said that he did not want in-person interactions with his
mother. Thus, despite medication and mental-health treatment, concerns about
I.O.’s mental health persisted. She was ordered to get a psychological evaluation
but never did so. And she still held paranoid and irrational beliefs.
In December 2024, the court held a termination hearing. The department
social worker and case manager described I.O.’s persistent, detailed, and
disturbing delusions about I.D., the foster family, the department, her relatives, and
others.3 I.O. also testified, repeating many of these paranoid and irrational beliefs
and insisting that they are true. She also reported going to the hospital for several
days the previous August because of other delusions.
Meanwhile, I.D.’s guardian ad litem said: “He is a great kid.” His therapist
reported improvements in his mental health since his placement in foster care. I.D.
feels safe and happy with his foster parents and is close with his foster siblings.
3 I.D.’s guardian ad litem reported that he is unaware of many delusions his mother
holds about him and would be “devastated” to hear them. 4
He declines in-person contact with his mother and wants to stay with the foster
family, who is a concurrent placement for adoption.
The juvenile court terminated I.O.’s parental rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2024). She appeals.
II. Discussion
“Terminations follow a three-step analysis.” A.R., 932 N.W.2d at 591. First,
we determine whether the State met the statutory grounds; then we consider if
termination is in the child’s best interests; and, finally, we decide whether
circumstances warrant applying a statutory exception. See id. The mother raises
challenges at the first and third steps. And she suggests a guardianship rather
than termination.
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
First, I.O. argues that the State failed to prove the statutory ground for
termination under section 232.116(1)(f). In her petition on appeal, she asserts the
State did not offer clear and convincing evidence of subparagraph (), that the child
cannot be returned to her custody at the present time. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); see In re M.H., 12 N.W.3d 159, 161 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024)
(interpreting “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination trial). She
argues that she has maintained employment, has safe and stable housing, takes
her medications, and has been engaging in mental-health services.
True, I.O. has taken some positive steps. But despite an outward
appearance of stability, she continues to hold bizarre beliefs about her son. Those
delusions have caused her son psychological harm, though he is processing his
trauma with his therapist. I.O. failed to obtain an evaluation to determine whether 5
treatment could help address her delusions. She rejects her diagnosis of
schizophrenia. And she denies that her bizarre beliefs are delusions or
hallucinations. Given the persistence of her mental-health impairment and the
trauma it has caused I.D., we agree with the juvenile court that he cannot safely
return to the mother’s custody at the present time.
B. Statutory Exception
Next, I.O. argues that severing her relationship with her son would harm
him and suggests the court should apply a statutory exception.4 See Iowa
Code § 232.116(3) (providing the court may bypass termination on clear and
convincing evidence it “would be detrimental . . . due to the closeness of the
parent-child relationship”). It is the parent’s burden to prove a statutory exception
applies. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).
In deciding whether I.O. has met that burden, we focus on whether I.D. will
be harmed by termination and whether that harm overpowers his mother’s inability
to provide for his developing needs.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-2045 Filed April 9, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF I.D., Minor Child,
I.O., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Michelle
Jungers, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her teenage son.
AFFIRMED.
Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Tammy L. Banning of Waterloo Juvenile Public Defender Office, Waterloo,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her thirteen-year-
old son, I.D., challenging the statutory ground for termination, asserting termination
of their bond would harm him, and suggesting the court establish a guardianship
rather than severing her rights.1 Examining the record with fresh eyes,2 we find
termination was appropriate because of the mother’s ongoing mental-health
struggles. The mother didn’t show that termination of the relationship would harm
I.D. And she did not ask the juvenile court to establish a guardianship, nor is one
appropriate. So we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The juvenile court first removed I.D. from his mother, I.O., in the summer of
2023 when she demonstrated irrational thinking and paranoid delusions. In its
adjudication order, the court found her mental-health condition put the child in
danger of harm from emotional abuse, lack of supervision, and threats of physical
harm. A child abuse report for denial of critical care and failure to provide proper
supervision was founded. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
placed I.D. with a foster family, where he remained throughout the proceedings.
The mother told the department that she had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia but disagreed that she suffered from that condition. She attended
group mental-health meetings and received diagnoses of depression and anxiety.
1 The juvenile court also terminated the rights of I.D.’s father, who last saw I.D.
when he was a baby. That parent is not involved in this appeal. 2 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The juvenile court’s factual findings do not bind us, but we give them weight, especially on witness credibility. Id. 3
She also started taking medication for anxiety and participated in medication
management with a doctor. Throughout the case, she had several jobs and
reported that she enjoyed working. She also found an apartment that the
department agreed would be appropriate for I.D.
Beyond those actions, the mother maintained sporadic contact with the
department and services throughout the case. She had only one visit with I.D.
during which she grew angry with the supervisor, escalating the situation until the
supervisor had to lock herself and the child in her car and call the police. After
that, I.D. consistently said that he did not want in-person interactions with his
mother. Thus, despite medication and mental-health treatment, concerns about
I.O.’s mental health persisted. She was ordered to get a psychological evaluation
but never did so. And she still held paranoid and irrational beliefs.
In December 2024, the court held a termination hearing. The department
social worker and case manager described I.O.’s persistent, detailed, and
disturbing delusions about I.D., the foster family, the department, her relatives, and
others.3 I.O. also testified, repeating many of these paranoid and irrational beliefs
and insisting that they are true. She also reported going to the hospital for several
days the previous August because of other delusions.
Meanwhile, I.D.’s guardian ad litem said: “He is a great kid.” His therapist
reported improvements in his mental health since his placement in foster care. I.D.
feels safe and happy with his foster parents and is close with his foster siblings.
3 I.D.’s guardian ad litem reported that he is unaware of many delusions his mother
holds about him and would be “devastated” to hear them. 4
He declines in-person contact with his mother and wants to stay with the foster
family, who is a concurrent placement for adoption.
The juvenile court terminated I.O.’s parental rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2024). She appeals.
II. Discussion
“Terminations follow a three-step analysis.” A.R., 932 N.W.2d at 591. First,
we determine whether the State met the statutory grounds; then we consider if
termination is in the child’s best interests; and, finally, we decide whether
circumstances warrant applying a statutory exception. See id. The mother raises
challenges at the first and third steps. And she suggests a guardianship rather
than termination.
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
First, I.O. argues that the State failed to prove the statutory ground for
termination under section 232.116(1)(f). In her petition on appeal, she asserts the
State did not offer clear and convincing evidence of subparagraph (), that the child
cannot be returned to her custody at the present time. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); see In re M.H., 12 N.W.3d 159, 161 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024)
(interpreting “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination trial). She
argues that she has maintained employment, has safe and stable housing, takes
her medications, and has been engaging in mental-health services.
True, I.O. has taken some positive steps. But despite an outward
appearance of stability, she continues to hold bizarre beliefs about her son. Those
delusions have caused her son psychological harm, though he is processing his
trauma with his therapist. I.O. failed to obtain an evaluation to determine whether 5
treatment could help address her delusions. She rejects her diagnosis of
schizophrenia. And she denies that her bizarre beliefs are delusions or
hallucinations. Given the persistence of her mental-health impairment and the
trauma it has caused I.D., we agree with the juvenile court that he cannot safely
return to the mother’s custody at the present time.
B. Statutory Exception
Next, I.O. argues that severing her relationship with her son would harm
him and suggests the court should apply a statutory exception.4 See Iowa
Code § 232.116(3) (providing the court may bypass termination on clear and
convincing evidence it “would be detrimental . . . due to the closeness of the
parent-child relationship”). It is the parent’s burden to prove a statutory exception
applies. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).
In deciding whether I.O. has met that burden, we focus on whether I.D. will
be harmed by termination and whether that harm overpowers his mother’s inability
to provide for his developing needs. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa
2010). To that end, I.O. and I.D. participated in a child-parent relationship
assessment six months before the termination hearing. A licensed social worker
reported that the mother and son do not have a secure bond. I.O. is paranoid and
distrusting of her son, and I.D. feels unsafe and insecure in their relationship.
If anything, their relationship has deteriorated since then. I.D. remains
adamant that he does not want to visit I.O. and desires to stay with the foster family.
4 The State generously reads I.O.’s petition on appeal to include a best-interests
argument under Iowa Code section 232.116(2). But I.O. does not cite that section in her petition on appeal, nor does she address the standards set out in that provision. So we do not address that step of the termination process. 6
I.O. asserts that I.D. encourages her to seek services, trust her case workers, and
make progress in this child-welfare proceeding. But that argument suggests the
mother needs the child rather than the child needing the mother. No doubt, I.D.
cares about his mother’s wellbeing. But she has not met her burden to show that
termination of her rights would harm him.
C. Guardianship
Finally, I.O. suggests that placing I.D. in a guardianship would be preferable
to terminating her parental rights. But we cannot find any request for a
guardianship in the record. Thus, she failed to preserve this argument for appeal.
See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d, 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). Even if she had raised the
issue in the juvenile court, a delay of permanency—with no potential guardian yet
identified—would not serve I.D.’s best interests. See In re D.S., 563 N.W.2d 12,
14–15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). So we affirm the termination of her rights.