IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1608 Filed November 21, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF I.C., Minor Child,
L.B., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Brandy R. Lundy of Lundy Law, PLC, Fort Dodge, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Alesha M. Sigmeth Roberts of Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Clarion, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, none of the exceptions to
termination should be applied, and it would be contrary to the child’s best interests
to give the mother an extension of time. We affirm the termination of the mother’s
parental rights.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
L.B. is the mother and S.C. is the father of I.C., born in 2017.1 There have
been concerns about the mother’s substance abuse, mental-health needs, and low
intellectual functioning. In 2022, the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) received a report that the mother was permitting a homeless man,
A.M., to stay in her apartment and watch the child while she was at work. There
was also a report that A.M. inappropriately touched the child. The mother did not
believe the child’s statements and continued in a romantic relationship with A.M.
The child was removed from the mother’s care in September and placed
with family friends. The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA)
under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(3)(b) (2022). A parenting evaluation “strongly
recommended that [the mother] have someone to reside with her to assist her if
[the child] is to return to her home” based on her mental-health problems and
intellectual disability.
The mother began participation in recommended Dialectical Behavioral
Therapy (DBT) and she participated in this every two weeks. The therapist
1 The father was in prison throughout the juvenile court proceedings. He has not appealed the termination of his parental rights. 3
determined the mother should have normal therapy as the therapist did not think
the mother could “handle” DBT therapy. It was also recommended that she
participate in group alcohol counseling. She attended this counseling for a period
of time but then quit. After a few months, the mother re-engaged with group alcohol
counseling.
The mother was in a relationship with A.S., who was using
methamphetamine and marijuana. He pled guilty to a charge of possession of
methamphetamine, second offense, and was placed on probation. He told social
workers that he smoked marijuana every day. The mother and A.S. had a
contentious relationship. The mother and A.S. lived in an apartment with A.S.’s
mother.
On August 23, 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate the parents’
rights. At the hearing, A.S. became upset and left the courtroom during the
testimony of the family’s HHS social worker. The mother testified she was in the
process of obtaining independent housing. She asked for an extension of time for
the child to be returned to her care.
The juvenile court entered an order on September 20 terminating the
mother’s rights under section 232.116(1)(f) (2023). The court found termination
was in the child’s best interests, noting, “The mother still suffers from poor mental
health and is mentally unable to care for the child. [The mother] is no closer to
reunification today than when [the child] was removed 12 months ago.” The court
declined to apply any of the exceptions to termination found in section 232.116(3).
The court also denied the mother’s request for a six-month extension of time. The
court stated, “The unfortunate fact of the matter is that the mother is not mentally 4
and intellectually capable of raising I.C. on her own and will not be able to do so in
six months under even the most optimistic of scenarios.” The mother appeals the
termination of her parental rights.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). The State must prove its allegations for termination
by clear and convincing evidence. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts
as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. Our
primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40
(Iowa 2014).
In general, we follow a three-step analysis in reviewing the termination of a
parent’s rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). First, we consider
whether there is a statutory ground for termination of the parent’s rights under
section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we look to whether termination of the parent’s
rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Third,
we consider whether any of the exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3)
should be applied. Id. But in instances where the parent does not raise a claim
relating to any of the three steps, we do not address them and instead limit our
review to the specific claims presented.2 See id. at 40 (recognizing we do not
consider a step the parent does not challenge).
2 The mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
statutory ground for termination of parental rights in this case, so we do not address that issue. 5
III. Best Interests
The mother claims termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best
interests. She asserts that she and the child enjoy their time together during
supervised visits.
In considering the best interests of a child, we give “primary consideration
to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the
child under section 232.116(2).” Id. at 41. “It is well-settled law that we cannot
deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id.
At the termination hearing the mother testified she did not believe A.M.
inappropriately touched the child because it never happened while she was
present, although she admitted she sometimes left the child alone with A.M. She
stated that even though A.M. allegedly touched the child, she still chose to be in a
relationship with him.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1608 Filed November 21, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF I.C., Minor Child,
L.B., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Brandy R. Lundy of Lundy Law, PLC, Fort Dodge, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Alesha M. Sigmeth Roberts of Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Clarion, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023). 2
CARR, Senior Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, none of the exceptions to
termination should be applied, and it would be contrary to the child’s best interests
to give the mother an extension of time. We affirm the termination of the mother’s
parental rights.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
L.B. is the mother and S.C. is the father of I.C., born in 2017.1 There have
been concerns about the mother’s substance abuse, mental-health needs, and low
intellectual functioning. In 2022, the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) received a report that the mother was permitting a homeless man,
A.M., to stay in her apartment and watch the child while she was at work. There
was also a report that A.M. inappropriately touched the child. The mother did not
believe the child’s statements and continued in a romantic relationship with A.M.
The child was removed from the mother’s care in September and placed
with family friends. The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA)
under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(3)(b) (2022). A parenting evaluation “strongly
recommended that [the mother] have someone to reside with her to assist her if
[the child] is to return to her home” based on her mental-health problems and
intellectual disability.
The mother began participation in recommended Dialectical Behavioral
Therapy (DBT) and she participated in this every two weeks. The therapist
1 The father was in prison throughout the juvenile court proceedings. He has not appealed the termination of his parental rights. 3
determined the mother should have normal therapy as the therapist did not think
the mother could “handle” DBT therapy. It was also recommended that she
participate in group alcohol counseling. She attended this counseling for a period
of time but then quit. After a few months, the mother re-engaged with group alcohol
counseling.
The mother was in a relationship with A.S., who was using
methamphetamine and marijuana. He pled guilty to a charge of possession of
methamphetamine, second offense, and was placed on probation. He told social
workers that he smoked marijuana every day. The mother and A.S. had a
contentious relationship. The mother and A.S. lived in an apartment with A.S.’s
mother.
On August 23, 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate the parents’
rights. At the hearing, A.S. became upset and left the courtroom during the
testimony of the family’s HHS social worker. The mother testified she was in the
process of obtaining independent housing. She asked for an extension of time for
the child to be returned to her care.
The juvenile court entered an order on September 20 terminating the
mother’s rights under section 232.116(1)(f) (2023). The court found termination
was in the child’s best interests, noting, “The mother still suffers from poor mental
health and is mentally unable to care for the child. [The mother] is no closer to
reunification today than when [the child] was removed 12 months ago.” The court
declined to apply any of the exceptions to termination found in section 232.116(3).
The court also denied the mother’s request for a six-month extension of time. The
court stated, “The unfortunate fact of the matter is that the mother is not mentally 4
and intellectually capable of raising I.C. on her own and will not be able to do so in
six months under even the most optimistic of scenarios.” The mother appeals the
termination of her parental rights.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). The State must prove its allegations for termination
by clear and convincing evidence. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts
as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. Our
primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40
(Iowa 2014).
In general, we follow a three-step analysis in reviewing the termination of a
parent’s rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). First, we consider
whether there is a statutory ground for termination of the parent’s rights under
section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we look to whether termination of the parent’s
rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Third,
we consider whether any of the exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3)
should be applied. Id. But in instances where the parent does not raise a claim
relating to any of the three steps, we do not address them and instead limit our
review to the specific claims presented.2 See id. at 40 (recognizing we do not
consider a step the parent does not challenge).
2 The mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
statutory ground for termination of parental rights in this case, so we do not address that issue. 5
III. Best Interests
The mother claims termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best
interests. She asserts that she and the child enjoy their time together during
supervised visits.
In considering the best interests of a child, we give “primary consideration
to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing
and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the
child under section 232.116(2).” Id. at 41. “It is well-settled law that we cannot
deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id.
At the termination hearing the mother testified she did not believe A.M.
inappropriately touched the child because it never happened while she was
present, although she admitted she sometimes left the child alone with A.M. She
stated that even though A.M. allegedly touched the child, she still chose to be in a
relationship with him. Her relationship with A.M. ended only when he became
involved with someone else and she became involved with A.S. As noted, A.S.
has problems with substance abuse. The mother continues to associate with
inappropriate paramours and places her relationship with them over the well-being
of the child.
Furthermore, the mother is unable to effectively care for the child due to her
mental-health problems and low intellectual functioning. The parenting evaluation
found the mother was unable to care for the child on her own. We determine that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. 6
IV. Exceptions
The mother asserts that the juvenile court should have applied an exception
to termination. She states that termination of her parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See
Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).
The exceptions to termination found “in section 232.116(3) are permissive,
not mandatory.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).
“The court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to apply the factors in
section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child relationship based on the unique
circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child[ ].” In re A.R., 932
N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). “[O]nce the State has proven a ground for
termination, the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an
exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) . . . .” In re A.S., 906
N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). The child’s best interests remain our first
consideration. Id. at 475.
The juvenile court found:
The Court finds that there is no clear and convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. . . . It is true that [the child] is bonded with his mother, but any sadness the child may experience in the short-term will be far outweighed by the benefits to him in the long-term.
We agree with the court’s assessment. The mother has not met her burden to
show termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the child. See Iowa
Code § 232.116(3)(c). 7
V. Extension of Time
The mother contends the juvenile court should have granted her an
extension of time. She testified that she was working on obtaining housing. The
mother planned to move into her own apartment, where she stated the child could
be placed in her care.
A six-month extension of time may be granted under sections 232.104(2)(b)
and 232.117(5) if parental rights are not terminated following a termination hearing.
In re D.P., No. 21-0884, 2021 WL 3891722, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2021).
An extension of time may be granted if the court “determin[es] that the need for
removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). “The judge considering [the extension]
should however constantly bear in mind that, if the plan fails, all extended time
must be subtracted from an already shortened life for the children in a better
home.” Id. (citation omitted).
On this issue, the juvenile court stated:
The mother’s main argument in favor of six additional months is that she will soon be eligible for a housing voucher, which will allow her to get a place of her own to bring [the child] back to. While that would be a commendable accomplishment, the lack of suitable housing is not the Court’s main concern. Even if [the mother] got the best apartment ever, [the child] could not be safely returned to the mother there. The unfortunate fact of the matter is that the mother is not mentally and intellectually capable of raising [the child] on her own and will not be able to do so in six months under even the most optimistic of scenarios. [The mother] is to be applauded for all the hard work she has put in, but those efforts have not put her in a place where she can safely and effectively raise I[the child] on her own. [The mother’s] mental health is still too fragile and she has identified no one who could be healthy and positive supports for her. Her current drug-using boyfriend is not appropriate. 8
Unfortunately, the Court has no confidence that the mother’s prognosis will be better in six months’ time. [The mother] has had a year to work towards reunification, but she is no closer to that goal than she was 12 months ago.
We conclude a six-month extension of time is not appropriate. The
evidence does not show the child could be returned to the mother’s care within six
months. At the termination hearing, the mother showed she would still be unable
to protect the child.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.