In the Interest of H.W. and D.D., Minor Children

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 25-1501
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1501 Filed December 17, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF H.W. and D.D., Minor Children,

K.W., Father of H.W., Appellant,

C.W., Father of D.D., Appellant,

M.S., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Korie Talkington,

Judge.

A mother and the fathers of two children separately appeal termination of

their parental rights. AFFIRMED ON ALL THREE APPEALS.

Jennifer Margret Triner Olsen, Davenport, for appellant father K.W.

Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, for appellant father C.W.

Steven W. Stickle of Stickle Law Firm, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Christine D. Frederick of Zamora, Taylor & Frederick, Davenport, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and

Langholz, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

The mother of two children—a male child, D.D., born in 2014 and a female

child, H.W., born in 2018—appeals the termination of her parental rights. Each

child has a different father, and those fathers also separately appeal termination

of their parental rights. On our de novo review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) in 2022 when D.D.’s custodian died; the mother could not

be located, and D.D.’s father was incarcerated. After locating the mother, HHS

became concerned about the mother and H.W.’s father using controlled

substances, as well as H.W.’s general living situation. HHS’s primary concern with

all three parents has been ongoing methamphetamine abuse.

As the juvenile court noted, “[t]hese cases have exhaustive histories” and

initially were separate but eventually combined, which is how they reach us on

appeal. Given the length and complexity of the proceedings, we address only the

pertinent facts in this opinion. Suffice to say for our purposes, both children were

found to be children in need of assistance (CINAs) and have been placed in foster

care since 2023. Each child’s case was continued at least once to allow the

parents additional time.

All three parents have shown periods of sobriety (or at least non-detectable

use) and participated to some degree in substance-abuse treatment; they have

also all experienced months-long relapses. Most concerning, the mother and

H.W.’s father have both continued to deny using methamphetamine despite

repeated positive test results. And while the mother has a slightly longer history 3

of testing negative than H.W.’s father, she has stayed with him despite him testing

positive for methamphetamine repeatedly while she was allegedly sober. D.D.’s

father had his parole revoked for substance abuse, admitted to past

methamphetamine use, and declined or no-showed for his most recent testing

appointments.

At one point in early 2024, the mother showed sufficient sobriety that both

children were temporarily returned to her custody. But when H.W.’s father tested

positive for methamphetamine and the mother exhibited behavioral indicators of

use, HHS implemented a safety plan and eventually removed the children again.

The children were then placed together in a foster home.

More recently, the mother and H.W.’s father continued to live together and

were consistent in attending fully-supervised visits with the children. HHS largely

did not have concerns about visits, other than a few occasions when workers

suspected they saw behavioral indicators that the mother had started using drugs

again. The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) was somewhat concerned that the

mother and H.W.’s father only wanted to visit with both children jointly and were

not willing to attend visits with the children separately.

Over the life of the case, D.D.’s father has cycled in and out of incarceration

for drug-related charges. And, as discussed above, he has not demonstrated

sobriety as of the termination trial. He was also largely disengaged from services.

As part of her report, the children’s GAL explained that she did not believe D.D.’s

father had shown sobriety, did not believe him to be an appropriate placement,

and did not think he was “truly interested in becoming one.” 4

D.D., now ten years old, refused visits with his father in the months

preceding termination, sometimes accompanied by outbursts. HHS encouraged

the child to attend visits but without success. Consistent with this, the child’s

therapist and another provider reported that the child shut down whenever they

tried to discuss his father, the child’s GAL reported that the child described the

father as “really mean,” and the child told his court appointed special advocate

(CASA) he didn’t like and didn’t want to see his father. D.D.’s father was not

allowed to call the child because he made inappropriate statements to him in the

past and has also threatened to call the police on the foster parents if they didn’t

let him speak with the child whenever he wanted. And D.D.’s father has come to

visits unprepared, which upset the child. As of trial, D.D.’s father was once again

incarcerated.

Evidence adduced at trial, as well as the GAL’s report, shows the children

are both doing well in their foster home, which is willing to serve as a long-term

placement. As of trial, they had been removed from their parents for almost two

and a half years aside from a brief trial home visit. The foster placement informed

the court at trial they intended to allow parental contact even after termination, so

long as it was positive experience for the children. And the GAL opined that this

was consistent with the children’s wishes.

None of the three parents testified at the termination trial. The majority of

the trial record concerns two toxicologists: Dr. Leo Kadehjian (who everyone called

“Dr. Leo” below) for the State and Dr. Sol Bobst for the mother. Both are

independent toxicologists, though their specific qualifications differ. 5

Dr. Leo has focused his forty-year career on drug testing, previously

oversaw drug testing for the federal court system, and taught at the National

Judicial College. He is familiar with the sweat-patch manufacturer at issue in this

case (including their laboratory procedures and visiting their lab). He testified as

to the accuracy and reliability of sweat-patch testing if the testing is done in

compliance with established protocols. He testified that claims about sweat

patches being contaminated by exposure to drugs through casual contact or in the

air are not realistic or supported by scientific evidence. And he was confident that

none of the lawful drugs these parents were taking would cause false-positive test

results for methamphetamine. He also explained that it was not inconsistent for a

person who tests positive for methamphetamine by sweat patch to sometimes test

negative in their urine, because methamphetamine has a short half-life and is

excreted out of the body within a few days after use, while the patch is usually

worn for one to two weeks. In Dr. Leo’s expert opinion, the test results in this case

reflected repeated methamphetamine use by the mother and H.W.’s father. He

wasn’t asked about D.D.’s father, presumably due to his refusal to test for HHS.

Dr. Bobst is also a toxicology consultant, is an adjunct professor, and has

his own business. His testimony was generally critical of the reliability of drug

testing and highlighted different ways tests could be contaminated or otherwise

become unreliable.

The juvenile court credited and accepted Dr. Leo’s testimony. The court

found Dr. Bobst was a qualified expert in the area of toxicology generally but not

sweat patches specifically, and that he lacked familiarity with the particular

manufacturer and laboratory at issue in this case. For this reason, the court 6

excluded a portion of Bobst’s testimony in which he opined that the sweat patch

testing in this case was unreliable based in part on the patches being worn for

longer than a week and the negative urine samples. But, even after giving his

opinion by offer of proof, Dr. Bobst could not rule out that the basis of the parents’

positive test results was their intentional consumption of methamphetamine.

The county attorney, HHS, the children’s GAL, and the CASA all

recommended termination of parental rights. The court terminated the mother’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (l) (2025); H.W.’s

father’s rights under the same sections; and D.D.’s father’s parental rights under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(c), (e), (f), and (l). The three parents separately

appeal, and we review their claims de novo. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312

(Iowa 2021).

II. Discussion

The three parents at issue in this appeal raise sometimes overlapping

claims, which we address under the appropriate substantive headings below. At

some points in the briefing, one or more of the parents seem to purport to raise

claims on behalf of the other. This is not permitted, and we do not consider any

arguments one parent advances on behalf of another. See In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d

454, 460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one

statutory ground, we are permitted to affirm if any ground is adequately supported

by the record. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Here we focus our

review on Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) for simplicity. We do not consider the 7

statutory grounds supporting termination of D.D.’s father because he does not

raise such a challenge on appeal. See, e.g., In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40

(Iowa 2010).

The portion of the mother’s petition challenging sufficiency of the evidence

under (f) only seems to challenge reasonable efforts. While section 232.116(1)(f)

“invoke[s] a requirement of reasonable efforts by [HHS],” we address the issue

under a separate heading in this opinion. See In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527–28

(Iowa 2019). To the extent the mother’s petition presents any other challenge

to (f), the best we can discern would be a challenge to whether the child could

safely return to her custody as of trial. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532–33

(Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (analyzing this element of the statutory ground).

We agree with the juvenile court that the mother’s substance-abuse history, as well

that of H.W.’s father, bodes poorly for the safety of the children in the shared home.

As does her failure to progress beyond fully-supervised visits. See In re L.H., 13

N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024), abrogated in part on other grounds by L.A.,

20 N.W.3d at 534–35. The mother has not meaningfully acknowledged her

methamphetamine addiction, instead unsuccessfully challenging the validity of the

sweat-patch test results through a less-than-persuasive expert witness. Absent

acknowledgement of her addiction, we are not convinced the mother has

meaningfully treated it, and the hazards methamphetamine addiction poses to the

children persist. And even if she could maintain sobriety, continuing her

relationship with H.W.’s father indicates, as the GAL put it, that the mother

essentially “picked [her relationship with H.W.’s father] over her children.” 8

The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of H.W.’s father under

section 232.116(1)(f). He also urges the child could be safely returned as of trial,

though even in his appellate briefing he continues to deny that he has a

methamphetamine addiction despite testing positive for the substance within about

six months of trial—and throughout the life of the case. His child could not return

to his care for the same reasons we have already discussed with regard to the

mother, with the addition of this father’s more-recent relapse.

In short, we commend both of these parents for their periods of sobriety.

But the relapsing nature of their methamphetamine addiction remains unresolved,

and they were not safe custodians for the children as of trial. Cf. W.M., 957 N.W.2d

at 313 (affirming termination where a parent “engaged in a cycle of abusing drugs,

getting clean, relapsing, seeking treatment, and again abusing drugs”).

B. Reasonable Efforts

Although the mother complains about reasonable efforts in her petition on

appeal, we doubt she preserved error on such a claim below. But even if she did,

it is not entirely clear to us what additional efforts she believes HHS should have

provided beyond scheduling more visits sooner. We take as undisputed for

purposes of this analysis that the mother attended nearly all of her available visits

with the children and that they went well. But more visits would not have changed

the course of this termination proceeding; the mother’s deficiencies related

primarily to substance abuse, not visit attendance. And, in any event, we do not

fault HHS for taking a cautious approach to increasing visits and decreasing

supervision, given the mother’s substance-abuse history and that of H.W.’s father

(so long as he continued to live with the mother). 9

As for D.D.’s father, we understand his claim to urge that HHS should have

done more to rebuild his relationship with the child. But the record provides ample

evidence that, despite HHS encouraging D.D. to have contact with his father, the

child was unwilling, sometimes violently resisting. This was evidenced by the child

repeatedly shutting down when asked about the father and the child’s therapist

opining it would not be a net positive for the father to participate in counseling

sessions. HHS is not required to increase contact between a parent and a child

when doing so is contrary to the child’s best interest. See In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d

343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he nature and extent of visitation is always

controlled by the best interests of the child. This standard may warrant limited

parental visitation.” (citation omitted)). And, like the mother, more visitations would

not have changed the outcome of D.D.’s father’s case given his substance-abuse

problems and general nonengagement with services.

C. Best Interests

In its responsive brief, the State urges that all three parents have failed to

adequately brief a best-interests issue for our court to resolve on appeal. We

assume without deciding that the issue was adequately presented and address the

merits.

In evaluating best interests, we give “primary consideration to the child’s

safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of

the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the

child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Under this framework, we agree with the juvenile

court that removal of both children and termination of all three parents’ rights is in

the children’s best interests. They deserve stability and permanency, in a home 10

with sober and dependable caregivers—like the foster placement with whom they

now reside. None of the three parents is a suitable custodian, and D.D.’s father

has virtually no relationship with the child, in large part as a consequence of his

own actions (including incarceration and inappropriate behavior related to phone

calls). We affirm the juvenile court’s best-interests determination.

D. Permissive Exceptions1

The mother and H.W.’s father both urge on appeal that termination should

be thwarted by the permissive bond exception codified at Iowa Code

section 232.116(3)(c). The State contests error preservation, noting the parents

did not urge the application of this exception below. We assume without deciding

error was preserved, and we affirm the juvenile court’s decision not to prevent

termination on this basis. While we agree there is evidence of both of these

parents’ bond with the children, the need for permanency and stability outweigh

any detriment that flows from termination, especially considering the cyclical nature

of the parents’ addiction. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting

we consider the parent-child bond in the context of a case’s unique circumstances

and the child’s best interests).

E. Expert Testimony

The mother argues the district court’s exclusion of a portion of Dr. Bobst’s

testimony was an abuse of discretion and violated her due process rights under

the state and federal constitutions. But the mother did not make any argument

1 The mother’s petition also includes a cursory reference to placement in a guardianship. We conclude this claim is both unpreserved and inadequately briefed, and we address it no further. 11

regarding either constitution below, so no constitutional issue is before us on

appeal. At most, we are left with a challenge under the Iowa Rules of Evidence,

which we review for abuse of discretion.

Iowa generally follows a liberal standard for the admissibility of expert

testimony. E.g., Ranes v. Adams Lab’ys, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa 2010).

But this approach also grants broad discretion to the district court in ruling on

admissibility. Id. We reverse “only when the record shows the court exercised its

discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly

unreasonable,” meaning the ground or reason “is not supported by substantial

evidence or . . . is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (cleaned up).

Against this highly deferential standard, we find the mother’s claim fails.

As noted above, only a tiny fraction of Dr. Bobst’s testimony was excluded—

the part particular to the reliability of sweat-patch testing. The district court found

that his general expertise in toxicology did not extend to the sweat patches here in

part because he lacked familiarity with the manufacturer and laboratory at issue.

This is a reasonable concern about the foundation underlying that aspect of Dr.

Bobst’s testimony. And while some courts may have found that concern went more

toward weight than admissibility, we do not find the juvenile court abused its

discretion in finding that portion of the proffered testimony inadmissible.

Last, even if we found the juvenile court should have considered the

excluded portion, we would find any resulting error harmless, given Dr. Bobst’s

lack of familiarity with the laboratory and manufacturer and his admission that his

opinions were all consistent with the results being valid depictions of these parents’

ongoing methamphetamine use. 12

III. Disposition

We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling in all respects.

AFFIRMED ON ALL THREE APPEALS.