in the Interest of H.M.B. and B.E.B.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 16, 2006
Docket09-05-00179-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of H.M.B. and B.E.B. (in the Interest of H.M.B. and B.E.B.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of H.M.B. and B.E.B., (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

In The



Court of Appeals



Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont



____________________


NO. 09-05-179 CV
____________________


IN THE INTEREST OF H.M.B. and B.E.B.



On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. PC03170



MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se appellant Mary VanSchoonhoven appeals the trial court's judgment denying her access to her maternal grandchildren H.M.B. and B.E.B. Because we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual Background Geri Tanner, the children's paternal grandmother, is the children's sole managing conservator. Stephanie Keller, the children's mother, and appellee John Bartee, the children's father, are the children's possessory conservators. VanSchoonhoven is the children's maternal grandmother. H.M.B., a female, was born May 20, 1998. B.E.B., a female, was born February 9, 1996.

Tanner filed a petition to establish parentage and the parent-child relationship, and the trial court entered temporary orders in the suit to establish parentage and parent-child relationship that appointed Tanner as the children's temporary sole managing conservator and Keller and Bartee as temporary possessory conservators. Bartee was given possession of the children and Keller was granted supervised visitation.

The trial court entered a "Final Order in Suit to Establish Parentage and to Establish Parent-Child Relationship," appointing Tanner as the sole managing conservator and Keller and Bartee as parent possessory conservators. Keller was granted limited visitation, supervised by VanSchoonhoven and Keller's maternal grandparents. Bartee was granted primary possession of the children.

Keller, appearing pro se, filed a "Motion to Modify in Suit Affecting the Parent & Child Relationship," contending she and VanSchoonhoven had no enforceable visitation rights and requesting custody of the children. Keller filed a first amended motion to modify, requesting custody of the children. Appellees Tanner and Bartee filed a "Counter-Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship," requesting the court to appoint Tanner and Bartee as joint managing conservators and appoint Keller as possessory conservator. Tanner and Bartee also requested that the court grant temporary orders to enjoin Keller from engaging in various acts. The trial court granted a mutual temporary restraining order enjoining all the parties from engaging in various acts.

While Keller's and the appellees' motions to modify were still pending, VanSchoonhoven, appearing pro se, filed a "Petition in Intervention of Grandparents in Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship," and requested access to the children. The trial court entered a temporary order suspending VanSchoonhoven's visitation rights and enjoining VanSchoonhoven from visiting the children at their school. The trial court ordered that the "Final Order in Suit to Establish Parentage and to Establish Parent-Child Relationship" remain in full force and effect. The court also suspended the prior orders of visitation by Keller and VanSchoonhoven.

At the trial on VanSchoonhoven's intervention petition, the court denied the petition in intervention and ruled that it was not in the best interests of the children for VanSchoonhoven to have grandparent access. The trial court entered a "Final Order on Intervenor's Petition for Grandparent Access." The court enjoined VanSchoonhoven from various acts, including discussing the legal proceedings involving the children with the children, showing the children legal documents or court orders affecting the children, and enjoined VanSchoonhoven from visiting the children's school. The trial court "[ordered] that the FINAL ORDER IN SUIT TO ESTABLISH PARENTAGE AND TO ESTABLISH PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP, rendered on March 21, 2003, shall continue in full force and effect, except as otherwise provided herein." VanSchoonhoven filed her notice of appeal. (1)

In her pro se brief, VanSchoonhoven failed to properly present issues for review, failed to include clear and concise arguments with appropriate citations to authorities as to how the trial court erred, and failed generally to comply with the other requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Appellees Tanner and Bartee interpret the issue presented as a challenge to the trial court's discretion in denying grandparent access. Rather than requiring that VanSchoonhoven amend her brief pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.9, we will adopt the appellees' interpretation of the issue presented and proceed accordingly.

Standard of Review

The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child in family law matters. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); Lilley v. Lilley, 43 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex. App.--Austin 2001, no pet.). We reverse the trial court's judgment only if it appears from the entire record that the trial court has abused its discretion. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at 451. The trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding principles. Lilley, 43 S.W.3d at 705. If the trial court's order is supported by sufficient, competent evidence there is no abuse of discretion. Id. As the fact finder, the trial court resolves conflicts in the evidence and determines the weight and credibility to give witness testimony. Id. The trial court's decision on conflicts in evidence is generally viewed as conclusive. Id. at 705-06.

Standard of Proof

A biological grandparent may request access to a grandchild by filing an original suit or a suit for modification. Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, sec. 153.432, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 157 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.432 (Vernon Supp. 2005)). A trial court shall order reasonable access to a grandchild by a grandparent if, at the time relief is requested, at least one biological parent of the child has not had his or her parental rights terminated, access is in the best interests of the child, and at least one of a set of other facts is present. Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1397, § 1, sec. 153.433, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 5250 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2005)).

VanSchoonhoven's "Petition in Intervention of Grandparents in Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship" was filed on November 4, 2004. Although this petition was filed under the same cause number as the suit to establish parent-child relationship, we consider VanSchoonhoven's petition to be an original suit and not a suit for modification.

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Related

Lilley v. Lilley
43 S.W.3d 703 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Gillespie v. Gillespie
644 S.W.2d 449 (Texas Supreme Court, 1982)

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