In the Interest of H.M., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00135-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00135-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF H.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 231-663945-19, Honorable Jesus Nevarez, Presiding

October 20, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Appellant, paternal Grandmother, appeals the trial court’s order modifying the

parent-child relationship.2 In her sole issue, Grandmother contends that the trial court

abused its discretion by modifying the original order which removed her as a possessory

conservator, terminated her rights and duties, and eliminated her periods of possession

and access. We affirm the trial court’s modification order.

1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court

by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to the appellant paternal grandmother as

“Grandmother,” the appellees as “Mother” and “Father,” and the child as “H.M.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d). BACKGROUND

In February of 2022, the trial court signed an original suit affecting parent-child

relationship order that appointed Mother and Father joint managing conservators of their

three-year-old daughter, H.M., and Grandmother as possessory conservator.

Grandmother was awarded possession of H.M. on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each

month from 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 a.m. the following Sunday. Father had possession

following Grandmother, from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on each Sunday following the first,

third, and fifth Friday of each month and a modified Thursday and holiday schedule. All

of Father’s possession was to be supervised by a person agreed to by Father and

Grandmother. In August of 2023, Mother filed her petition to modify possession and

access requesting that Father be awarded an expanded standard possession schedule.

She also requested that Grandmother be removed as a possessory conservator and her

access and possession and rights and duties as to H.M. terminated. Father, acting pro

se, filed a general denial. The suit was tried to the bench on September 25, 2024. At

trial, Father stated his agreement with Mother’s proposed modification. After hearing

testimony from Mother and Grandmother, the trial court entered an order that modified

the prior order by terminating Grandmother’s possessory conservatorship and attendant

rights and duties and gave Father a standard possession schedule. Grandmother timely

filed this appeal.

APPLICABLE LAW

A trial court has broad discretion to decide the best interest of a child in family law

matters such as custody, visitation, and possession. In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied). Accordingly, we review a decision to modify 2 conservatorship and possession of or access to the child for an abuse of discretion. In

re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

A trial court may modify an order establishing conservatorship or possession and access

if modification would be in the best interest of the child and the circumstances of the child,

a conservator, or another party affected by the order have materially and substantially

changed since the date of the rendition of the prior order. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 156.101(a)(1)(A).3 We will not disturb a trial court’s decision in a modification case

unless the complaining party shows a clear abuse of discretion, meaning the trial court

acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner or without reference to guiding principles.

Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). In our review of a modification order under an

abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the evidence are

not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial

court abused its discretion. In re J.E.P, 49 S.W.3d 380, 386 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000,

no pet.). An appellate court applies a two-prong analysis when it determines whether

legal or factual insufficiency has resulted in an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the trial

court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) whether the

trial court erred in applying its discretion. In re C.F., 576 S.W.3d 761, 773 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2019, no pet.). The sufficiency review is related to the first inquiry. If it is

revealed in the first inquiry that there was sufficient evidence, then we must determine

whether the trial court made a reasonable decision, and that involves a conclusion that

the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Id. The trial court’s

3 Further references to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section __” or

“§ __.”

3 exercise of discretion will withstand appellate scrutiny unless clearly abused. In re A.D.T.,

588 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).

Because of the fact-intensive nature of reviewing custody issues, an appellate

court must afford great deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor

because the child’s and parents’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed

through words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the record.

Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet).

In determining conservatorship and possession issues, the best interest of the

child shall always be the primary consideration. § 153.002(a). We review a trial court’s

best-interest finding by using the well-established Holley factors. See Holley v. Adams,

544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).4

ANALYSIS

In her sole issue, Grandmother contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in modifying the prior order because there is legally and factually insufficient evidence of

a material and substantial change in circumstances or best interest. Grandmother also

challenges various aspects of the modification order, including whether any change in

circumstances was contemplated, whether the modification was connected to her rights

and possession, and whether Father requested that he be given Grandmother’s

4 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and

physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See id. In the context of a custody modification, other factors to consider include the child’s need for stability and the need to prevent constant litigation. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).

4 possession. We discuss Grandmother’s arguments in turn and conclude that the trial

court was within its discretion in making the modifications requested.

Circumstances at the Time of the 2022 Order

The evidence sufficiently shows the circumstances of H.M., Mother, Father, and

Grandmother, at the time of the 2022 order, our starting point. The trial court heard

testimony that there was a no-contact order between Mother and Father due to Father’s

pending criminal case. Father was unemployed, and had limited, supervised visitation

with H.M. Grandmother was appointed a possessory conservator and determined who

would supervise Father’s possession. Grandmother was given specified rights and

duties, such as the right of access to medical and school records, and to take H.M. to the

doctor in the event of an emergency. She was awarded visitation on the first, third, and

fifth weekends. Father and Mother had “very minimal communication,” and Mother

described their relationship at the time as “hostile.” H.M. was three years old and had not

begun school.

Evidence of a Material and Substantial Change in Circumstances

At the time of trial, Father’s criminal charges were resolved, and he was employed

by State Farm. Mother testified that H.M. was now five years old, attending kindergarten,

and Father had been exercising unsupervised visitation with H.M. since Father’s Day.

Mother allowed Father to take H.M. to school and have weekday visitation when he

requested it. One of the most significant changes was the drastic improvement in

Mother’s and Father’s relationship and their improved communication skills. These

changes impacted H.M., Mother, and Father. According to Mother, her and Father’s

5 relationship is currently “healthy.” They are able to schedule visitation in a mutual and

respectful way. Mother sees the relationship that H.M. now has with Father: “[H.M.’s]

happy, and whenever she comes back, she’s grounded. So I feel very comfortable

sending her off with him during his times when he comes to pick her up . . . .” Father and

Mother are able to discuss H.M.’s health and doctor visits. Mother and Father have a

cordial relationship and have put behind them the problems they had when the 2022 order

was entered. “It’s the best co-parenting [Mother] could have imagined.” Moreover, it is

beneficial to H.M. to see her parents collaborating and working together. The relationship

between Father and H.M. has “blossomed” this past year.

Other significant changes were evident in the relationship between Grandmother,

Father, and Mother. Grandmother testified that she did not believe either parent was fit

to raise H.M. She is opposed to Father having a standard visitation schedule because

he is “hostile” and “volatile,” and H.M. does not need to be alone with him. Grandmother

described her relationship with Father as “toxic” and admitted that she has not supervised

Father’s visitation “in a long time.”

Mother pointed to H.M.’s doctor visits and school-related issues as an indication

that a change in Grandmother’s status and rights was warranted. Mother testified that

Mother, Mother’s husband, Father, and Grandmother attend H.M.’s doctor visits.

According to Mother, Grandmother asks too many questions and “it just takes away from

the parental questions that we have.” Mother also cited a difference in opinion between

her and Grandmother concerning H.M.’s need for oral surgery. On one occasion, during

Grandmother’s visitation with H.M., Grandmother took H.M. to an urgent care facility

because H.M. had injured her toe. Mother thought it would be traumatizing to H.M. for

6 Mother to show up at the urgent care because she would have to leave without H.M. since

it was during Grandmother’s visitation. Mother testified that Grandmother does not need

access to H.M.’s medical records because “that’s too much power” for a grandparent to

have when there are two parents involved who are fully capable of making medical

decisions. Grandmother testified that her access to medical records is “the only way that

[she] know[s] anything’s going on.” Mother also mentioned the interaction when H.M.

arrives at school. Mother prefers for H.M. to walk into the classroom on her own, while

Grandmother “holds” H.M. and goes to her desk with her. Mother describes Grandmother

as “overly involved.” According to Mother, this interaction affects H.M.’s independence.

Further, Mother complained that Grandmother is excessive in her text communication to

the point of being “overbearing.” Before H.M. started school, Grandmother would contact

Mother by text messaging twice a day, “just to check on her.” In Mother’s view,

Grandmother is becoming a “helicopter parent” who is overly involved with raising H.M.

Mother testified that she was asking the judge to remove Grandmother as a

possessory conservator and return the parents to a “normal” parent-child relationship

because “[she] and [Father] are almost thirty years old, and [they] are very capable of

raising [H.M.] by [themselves]. [Mother doesn’t] need to be monitored by [Grandmother].”

Best Interest

The trial court heard evidence that H.M. benefitted emotionally by spending more

time with Father. Mother testified to a positive difference in H.M. because of Father’s

increased and unsupervised possession and access. H.M. is happy to see Father, and

when he returns her, she is “grounded.” H.M. is “more confident.” Mother testified that it

was in H.M.’s best interest to have one-on-one time with Father and that there was no 7 need for supervision going forward because she has seen how H.M. and Father interact

with each other. H.M. is more talkative and happier when she sees Mother and Father

communicating. Father has demonstrated consistency in picking up H.M. for school or

after school and returning her timely to transition to her bedtime routine at Mother’s home.

Mother testified that it is better for H.M. to have both parents participating in raising H.M.

Mother and Father have resolved their differences and are working collaboratively to

discuss H.M.’s educational and medical needs. These changes provide a foundation to

ensure H.M.’s future emotional health and stability. The trial court also heard evidence

of the deterioration in the relationship between Father and Grandmother and the friction

that existed because of Grandmother’s specified rights to attend medical appointments

and school activities. This evidence supported a change to Grandmother’s continued

involvement as a conservator with specific periods of possession and as the person

responsible for approving Father’s visitation supervisors because it suggested that her

court-appointed role was no longer proper or appropriate.

Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility and weight of the

evidence, we conclude that the record includes sufficient evidence from which the trial

court could have reasonably concluded a material and substantial change of

circumstances had occurred since the 2022 order, and that the modification was in the

best interest of H.M. See § 156.101(a)(1); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

Other Challenges to the Modification Order

Grandmother lodges three additional complaints concerning the modification

order. We first address Grandmother’s contention that even if a change in circumstances

exists, that change was contemplated at the time of the 2022 order. In her opening 8 statement, Mother’s counsel reminded the judge that at the time of his 2022 ruling, he

told the parents, “Well, y’all get your things together and y’all can come back in a few

years and we’ll see about just letting you guys raise the child.” According to Grandmother,

since Mother and Father were not fit parents at the time of the 2022 order, they are

precluded from “improving their lives or ability to parent [H.M.]” because that change was

contemplated at the time of the prior proceeding. When a change in circumstance is

anticipated and factored into the original decree, the eventuality of the change does not

constitute a material and substantial change of circumstances. Smith v. Karanja, 546

S.W.3d 734, 740–42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (trial court erred by

modifying conservatorship terms of decree because need to renew daughter’s passport

was circumstance already contemplated at time of divorce). We do not interpret the trial

court’s statements here to prevent a future modification. There is no possession plan in

the 2022 order by which Father could eventually have unsupervised possession, and it

does not take into account H.M.’s increased age or any corresponding change in the

relationship between Father and H.M.

Next, Grandmother argues that any change in circumstances was unconnected to

her rights and possession. We disagree. In addition to testimony outlined in our analysis

above, the trial court heard testimony that Mother and Father had matured and were able

to put aside their previous animosity. They were communicating and making shared

decisions as H.M.’s joint managing conservators. In stark contrast, Grandmother

described her relationship with Father as toxic and maintained that both Mother and

Father were unfit. It has been more than a year since Grandmother supervised Father’s

possession. This testimony supports the trial court’s exercise of discretion in modifying

Grandmother’s rights and possession. Appellate courts give wide latitude to trial courts’ 9 determinations on possession and visitation issues. See In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911,

930 n.31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644

S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982)). We defer to the trial court, which was in the best position

to evaluate the testimony of Mother and Grandmother.

Grandmother next challenges the possession order awarded to Father because

he did not have any request for affirmative relief on file. She contends that “no one asked

that Father’s possession be unsupervised” and his possession take the place of

Grandmother’s possession. According to Grandmother, Mother did not have standing to

request any relief on Father’s behalf, citing to Jackson v. Fontaine’s Clinics, Inc., 499

S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1973) and In re T.N., 142 S.W.3d 522, 524–25 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2004, no pet.). Jackson and In re T.N. enunciate the well-established proposition

that an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect her or that

merely affect the rights of others. As a parent and the joint managing conservator with

the right to designate the primary residence of H.M., Mother had standing to bring the

modification suit. See §§ 102.003, 156.101(a). Further, Mother’s and Father’s interests

were aligned, and Father announced his agreement to Mother’s requested relief. The

modification suit did not solely benefit Father. To the contrary, the requested modification

affected H.M.’s ability to spend more quality time with Father, and Mother and Father

could raise H.M. without Grandmother’s interference or oversight. As to Grandmother’s

contention that there was no request for unsupervised possession, it is without merit. We

note that Mother’s pleading requested that Father be awarded an “Expanded Standard

Possession” schedule. A standard possession order is presumed to provide reasonable

minimum possession of a child for a parent named as a possessory or joint managing

conservator and is in the best interest of the child. See § 153.252. A standard possession 10 order does not inherently require parental supervision during possession unless specific

circumstances warrant such restrictions, as deviations from the standard possession

order must be justified by evidence showing that the standard terms are not in the child’s

best interest. See § 153.193.

CONCLUSION

Having considered the record before us and affording the deference to be given to

the trial court’s resolution of underlying facts and credibility determinations that may have

affected its decision, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by modifying

the conservatorship, terms and conditions, and possession and access provisions of the

2022 order. We overrule Grandmother’s appellate issues and affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice