J-S70028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.L.R.B., III, A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: H.R., FATHER
No. 365 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree December 18, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000106-2015 CP-51-DP-0001940-2013 FID#51-FN-002630-2011
BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 01, 2016
H.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered December 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily
terminated his parental rights to his minor son, H.L.R.B., III (“Child”), born
in July of 2013.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows.
____________________________________________
1 Child’s mother, A.B. (“Mother”), executed a consent to adoption form on June 24, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the trial court entered a decree confirming Mother’s consent and terminating her parental rights to Child. Mother has not filed a brief in connection with this appeal, nor has she filed her own separate appeal. J-S70028-16
The family in this case became known to [the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)] when DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report on March 18, 2010[,] that Father and [Mother] were using drugs, that there was ongoing domestic abuse between Father and Mother, and that Mother was not able to keep her children safe from Father. Mother had obtained a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) order, but Father continued to threaten Mother. This report was substantiated. DHS removed Mother’s two other children pursuant to an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) on June 1, 2011. On January 29, 2013, Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to these two other children were voluntarily terminated.
Mother gave birth to Child, her third child, on July 24, 2013. On July 25, 2013, DHS received a GPS report that Mother was unable to care for Child, and had tested positive for benzodiazepines. Child was diagnosed with Intra-Uterine Growth Retardation and Gastroschisis, and was transferred to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, where he remained until September 23, 2013. On July 27, 2013, DHS conducted a home assessment of the home where Mother and Father lived. Father was under the influence of an unknown substance and was unable to hold a conversation. Father appeared to be under the influence of unknown substances again during an August 12, 2013, hospital visit to see Child. Father engaged in an argument with Mother and was escorted from the hospital by security officers. The next day, Mother obtained a PFA for herself and Child against Father. Father did not maintain contact with DHS. When Child was discharged on September 23, 2013, DHS obtained an OPC and placed Child with his maternal great- cousins, Y.M. and J.M. (“Foster Parents”). At a September 25, 2013, shelter care hearing, the OPC was lifted and temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand. Father was given supervised visitation at the agency, and was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a forthwith drug screen. Father denied paternity of Child.
Child was adjudicated dependent on October 4, 2013, and fully committed to DHS custody. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2016, at 1-2.
-2- J-S70028-16
On February 18, 2015, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Father’s parental rights to Child. The trial court held a termination hearing
on June 5, 2015, August 21, 2015, and December 18, 2015. Following the
final day of the hearing, the court entered a decree terminating Father’s
parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on January 19, 2016,
along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.2
Father now raises the following claims for our review.
1. Did the court below err in finding that grounds for termination of parental rights had been proven by “clear and convincing evidence”?
2. Did the court below err in finding that [DHS] had met its burden in proving grounds under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§2511(a)(1),(2),(5) and (8)?
3. Did the court below err in finding that DHS had met its burden to prove that termination would be in the child’s best interests, under §2511(b)?
4. Did the court below err in denying Due Process and Equal Protection of Law to Appellant H.R., Father, as guaranteed by
2 We note that Father had thirty days to appeal the trial court’s termination decree, meaning that his notice of appeal would normally be due by January 17, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”). Because January 17, 2016, was a Sunday, and because court was closed on January 18, 2016, for Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Father’s notice of appeal was timely filed on January 19, 2016. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.”).
-3- J-S70028-16
the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?
Father’s brief at 4 (trial court answers omitted).
We consider Father’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of
review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
-4- J-S70028-16
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1) (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here,
we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(2) and
(b), which provide as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
-5- J-S70028-16
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted)). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super.
2002) (citations omitted).
Instantly, the trial court found that Father’s repeated and continued
parental incapacity has caused Child to be without essential parental care,
control, or subsistence, and that Father cannot, or will not, remedy the
conditions and causes of this incapacity. The court reasoned that Father has
failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment and refuses to submit random
drug screens. Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2016, at 9-10. In addition, the court
emphasized that Father has failed to remedy his domestic violence and
-6- J-S70028-16
anger management issues. Id. at 10. Finally, the court expressed concern
regarding the quality of Father’s visits with Child. Id. The court observed
that Father often brings other individuals with him to visits, and leaves visits
up to an hour early. Id.
Father argues that DHS failed to prove that his parental rights should
be terminated by clear and convincing evidence. Father’s brief at 11-12.
Father acknowledges that he failed to comply when asked to submit random
drug screens, but contends that he completed all of his other objectives. Id.
at 11-12, 15. Father insists that his failure to comply with drug screens
should not be held against him, because there was “absolutely no evidence,
at any time throughout the course of this case,” that he has a drug problem,
other than “a mere allegation – made anonymously[.]” Id. at 15. Father
further claims that he was not specifically ordered to provide “random” drug
screens prior to August 21, 2015. Id. Father suggests that he may not
have understood “exactly what he would need to do, in order for his screens
to be considered ‘random,’” and that he was not able to submit to random
screens because of his work schedule. Id. at 15-16.
After carefully examining the record in this matter, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating
Father’s parental rights to Child. During the termination hearing, DHS
presented the testimony of Community Umbrella Agency case manager,
Jared Burr. Mr. Burr testified that Father’s Single Case Plan objectives
included attending drug screens and complying with recommendations;
-7- J-S70028-16
continuing with outpatient drug and alcohol treatment; completing a mental
health evaluation and complying with recommendations; signing
authorization and consent forms; addressing his parenting, anger
management, and domestic violence issues; and complying with supervised
visitation. N.T., 6/5/2015, at 10-11. Concerning Father’s compliance with
these objectives, Mr. Burr reported that Father completed a mental health
evaluation, and that no treatment was recommended. Id. at 13. Father
also completed a parenting program, and signed at least one consent form.
Id. at 14-15, 39.
With respect to Father’s drug and alcohol issues, Mr. Burr testified that
Father completed an intensive outpatient treatment program on April 7,
2015. Id. at 12, 48. Father did not remain in treatment after completing
the intensive outpatient program. Id. at 12. According to Mr. Burr, Father
“was due to drop down to out-patient [sic] and he just never continued.”
Id. Father finally recommenced drug and alcohol treatment on or about
December 17, 2015, only one day before the conclusion of the termination
hearing. N.T., 12/18/2015, at 10.
Mr. Burr further testified that Father failed to comply when asked to
submit random drug screens. Father was asked to submit screens on March
6, 2015, March 22, 2015, April 23, 2015, May 22, 2015, June 8, 2015, June
15, 2015, July 2, 2015, September 3, 2015, October 5, 2015, October 9,
2015, October 20, 2015, November 5, 2015, November 19, 2015, and
December 3, 2015. Id. at 13; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 12; N.T., 12/18/2015, at
-8- J-S70028-16
9. Father did not submit any of the requested screens. N.T., 6/5/2015, at
13; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 12; N.T., 12/18/2015, at 9. Instead, Father
appeared on other dates and submitted screens at his convenience. N.T.,
6/5/2015, at 13; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 13. Mr. Burr acknowledged that all of
Father’s screens have been negative. N.T., 6/5/2015, at 13, 51-52; N.T.,
8/21/2015, at 13, 39.
With respect to anger management and domestic violence issues, Mr.
Burr testified that Father completed both anger management and domestic
violence programs. N.T., 6/5/2015, at 15; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 19. Mr. Burr
remained concerned that Father was failing to apply the skills that he
learned in these programs. N.T., 8/21/2015, at 18. For example, Mr. Burr
described an incident that took place on June 11, 2015, when Father arrived
for a visit with Child. Id. at 16. According to Mr. Burr, Father mistakenly
believed that he was entitled to an unsupervised community visit. Id. Mr.
Burr endeavored to explain to Father that he was not entitled to such a visit.
Id. Father then “went on a profan[ity-]laced verbal tirade throughout our
agency in front of other mothers and children and we had to get him into
one of my supervisor’s office[s] to get him to calm down. This took like
around forty-five minutes. The child was crying uncontrollably.” Id. Mr.
Burr also described two alleged incidents of criminal behavior on the part of
Father, both of which resulted in the filing of police reports. Id. at 16-17.
In the first incident, on June 11, 2015, Father “spit into the resource
parent[’]s face.” Id. at 17. In the second incident, on June 15, 2015,
-9- J-S70028-16
Father “abused mom at a Dollar Store.”3 Id. at 17, 68. On the third day of
the termination hearing, December 18, 2015, Mr. Burr reported that Father
is now “very respectful,” and that his relationship with Father had “greatly
improved.” N.T., 12/18/2015, at 9.
Concerning visitation, Mr. Burr testified on June 5, 2015, and August
21, 2015, that Father attends his visits with Child consistently. N.T.,
6/5/2015, at 17; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 13. However, Mr. Burr related that
Father always brings family members with him to visits. N.T., 8/21/2015, at
33-34. As a result, the trial court directed that Father must attend his visits
alone. Id. at 79-80. Despite this directive, Mr. Burr testified on December
18, 2015, that Father once again brought an individual with him to sit in on
a visit. N.T., 12/28/2015, at 11. Mr. Burr also reported that Father often
leaves his visits early. Id. at 11-12. On October 22, 2015, for example,
Father left his two-hour visit after only an hour. Id.
Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Father is
incapable of parenting Child, and that Father cannot, or will not, remedy his
parental incapacity. At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been
in foster care for over two years. During Child’s time in foster care, Father
failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment, and failed repeatedly to ____________________________________________
3 Father was incarcerated at the time Mr. Burr was assigned to this case in July of 2014, due to “[d]omestic violence against mom.” N.T., 6/5/2015, at 24, 28. Father remained incarcerated until November 18, 2014. N.T., 12/18/2015, at 48-49.
- 10 - J-S70028-16
comply with drug screens. While Father made some progress by completing
anger management and domestic violence programs, he remained either
unwilling or incapable of controlling his violent behaviors for the majority of
Child’s dependency. Father also has been leaving his visits with Child early,
and he refused to comply when ordered not to bring anyone else with him to
visits. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims
of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
With respect to Father’s claim that there is no evidence that he has a
drug problem, the certified record on appeal belies this assertion. Most
notably, the record contains a copy of Child’s October 4, 2013 Order of
Adjudication and Disposition. The order indicates that the court adjudicating
Child dependent found as a fact the “[a]llegations in [the] Dependen[cy]
Petition.” Order Adjudication and Disposition, 10/4/2013, at 1. In its
dependency petition, DHS alleged that it conducted an assessment of
Father’s home on July 27, 2013, and that Father “appeared to be under the
influence of an unknown substance and was unable to hold a conversation.”
Dependency Petition, 9/26/2013, Statement of Facts at ¶ m. On August 12,
2013, Father “appeared to be under the influence of an unknown substance”
during a visit with Child at the hospital. Id. at ¶ n. DHS further alleged that
- 11 - J-S70028-16
Father was “found guilty of drug-related charges on September 14, 2007[,]
and July 14, 2010.” Id. at ¶ r. Thus, the record is replete with evidence to
support the trial court’s belief that Father engages, or has engaged, in illegal
drug use.
Moreover, while Father now suggests on appeal that he did not know
that he had to submit random drug screens, and that he believed he was
permitted to show up for drug screens whenever he felt like it, Father did
not claim that this was the case during the termination hearing. Instead,
Father claimed that he could not submit random drug screens because of his
work schedule. N.T., 12/18/2015, at 38-39. Even if Father had claimed
during the hearing that he did not know that he had to submit random drug
screens, and that he did not know what a random drug screen is, the trial
court would have been well within its discretion to reject Father’s
explanation as incredible. Concerning Father’s claim that he could not
submit random drug screens because of his work schedule, the record
reveals that Father failed to submit random drug screens even after leaving
his job in October of 2015. See id. at 45. This claim also fails.
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
- 12 - J-S70028-16
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best- interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Here, the trial court found that terminating Father’s parental rights
would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/2016,
at 15. The court reasoned that Child does not share a parent/child bond
with Father, and that Child instead is bonded with his foster parents. Id. at
13-14. The court concluded that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if
Father’s parental rights are terminated. Id. at 14.
Father argues that the trial court relied erroneously on the testimony
of Mr. Burr and Child’s foster mother when determining that termination
would serve Child’s needs and welfare. Father’s brief at 24. Father stresses
that Mr. Burr did not supervise Father’s visits with Child, and that Mr. Burr
- 13 - J-S70028-16
presented contradictory testimony as to whether Father and Child share a
parent/child bond. Id. at 24-25. Father also suggests that the court should
have viewed the foster mother’s testimony “with some degree of
skepticism,” since foster mother made it clear that she would like to adopt
Child. Id. at 24.
Relatedly, Father contends that “a number of rulings by the trial court”
violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Father’s brief at 26-27. Father first
challenges the portion of Section 2511(b) providing that, “[w]ith respect to
any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Father insists that applying
this provision makes it “potentially impossible” for parents to overcome their
prior bad behavior, and denies parents a “meaningful” termination hearing.
Father’s brief at 27-28. Father also claims that the trial court allowed
inadmissible hearsay during the termination hearing, and that he was denied
“adequate and meaningful notice” of the termination hearing. Id. at 28.
We again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Admittedly, Mr. Burr’s assessment of the relationship between Father and
Child changed somewhat as the termination proceedings progressed. On
June 5, 2015, Mr. Burr stated that he did not believe that there is a bond
between Father and Child, because it is “very early in the process still.
- 14 - J-S70028-16
During visitation, . . . the child is more worried about where the resource
parent is.” N.T., 6/5/2015, at 22. Mr. Burr opined that Child would not
suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated, as Child is
“completely bonded with the resource parent.” Id. at 22. On August 21,
2015, Mr. Burr opined that Child has a “limited” bond with Father, and he
agreed that Child’s bond with Father is a parent/child bond. N.T.,
8/21/2015, at 21. Mr. Burr repeated his previous assessment that Child
would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated,
because Child has such a strong bond with his foster mother. Id. at 21-22.
On December 18, 2015, Mr. Burr described Child’s relationship with Father
as an uncle/child bond, rather than a parent/child bond. N.T., 12/18/2015,
at 21.
However, Mr. Burr testified consistently concerning the quality of
Father’s visits with Child. Mr. Burr explained that he does not observe
Father’s visits with Child, but that he reviews reports prepared by a
visitation coach.4 N.T., 6/5/2015, at 18-19. Based on his review of these
reports, Mr. Burr related that that Child frequently struggles at the start of
visits, and cries uncontrollably for five to twenty minutes upon being left
with Father. Id. at 21; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 19, 71; N.T., 12/18/2015, at 12,
19. Father eventually is able to console Child, and they engage in activities
4 Mr. Burr testified on December 18, 2015, that he did monitor a single visit between Father and Child. N.T., 12/18/2015, at 19.
- 15 - J-S70028-16
together. N.T., 6/5/2015, at 21; N.T., 8/21/2015, at 71; N.T., 12/18/2015,
at 12, 19. During visits, Child asks for his “mommy” or “mom,” meaning his
foster mother. N.T., 6/5/2015, at 21; N.T., 12/18/2015, at 12, 19.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the trial court that Child will
not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated, and
that termination will best serve Child’s needs and welfare. At the time the
trial court entered the subject termination decree, Child was about two and a
half years old, and had resided with his foster mother since being released
from the hospital approximately two months after his birth in September of
2013. Child has never lived with Father, and when Child visits with Father
he cries uncontrollably up to twenty minutes and asks for his “mommy,”
meaning his foster mother. Given this evidence, it is clear that Child does
not share a parent/child bond with Father. While Father complains that the
trial court should not have credited the testimony of Mr. Burr and Child’s
foster mother when reaching its decision, we are bound by the court’s
credibility determinations where those determinations are supported by the
record. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Further, we need not consider Father’s constitutional challenge to the
portion of Section 2511(b) prohibiting courts from considering “any efforts
by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first
initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The relevant provision applies only to Sections
2511(a)(1), (6), and (8). Here, we have determined that the record
- 16 - J-S70028-16
supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), and this provision is not applicable.
Nonetheless, we observe that a panel of this Court recently rejected a
similar constitutional challenge and held that Section 2511(b) did not violate
an appellant mother’s right to due process or equal protection. See In re
Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1055-1057 (Pa. Super. 2015). Even if
the relevant provision of Section 2511(b) did apply in the instant matter,
Father would not be entitled to relief.
With regard to Father’s claim that the trial court violated his
constitutional rights by allowing hearsay testimony during the termination
hearing, Father fails completely to develop this claim in his brief. As a
result, it is waived. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884,
897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.”’).
Finally, Father also has waived his claim that he did not have notice of
the termination proceedings. As observed by the trial court, both Father and
his counsel appeared at all three days of the termination hearing, and did
not raise any objection with respect to insufficient notice. See In re
Adoption of W.C.K., 748 A.2d 223, 228 (Pa. Super. 2000), overruled on
other grounds, In re Adoption of Z.S.H.G., 34 A.3d 1283, 1288–1289 (Pa.
- 17 - J-S70028-16
Super. 2011) (“[T]he entry of appearance by [the appellant’s] attorney and
her subsequent participation in the termination hearing without objection to
sufficiency of notice waived any claim personal to [the appellant] on this
issue.”).
Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child, we
affirm the decree of the trial court.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/1/2016
- 18 -