IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-21-00040-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF H.H. & C.H., CHILDREN
From the 82nd District Court Robertson County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-06-21059-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Amanda T. appeals from a judgment that terminated her parental rights to her
children, H.H. and C.H. Although Amanda's rights were terminated based on the trial
court's findings that she committed the predicate acts in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),
and (P), Amanda complains solely that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) only and asks that those grounds be deleted
from the judgment. 1 She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the other
1 Although only one ground is necessary to support the termination of parental rights, because of the concern of collateral consequences in the future, we are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if raised on appeal. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination); see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining that an appellate court must address issues raised challenging the trial court's finding as to subsections (D) or (E) because termination pursuant to those subsections may have implications for a parent's parental rights to other children). two grounds or that termination was in the children's best interest. Because we find that
the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to have found that she committed the
predicate act in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its
entirety.
To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we
review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence
is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on
the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the
truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). The
trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437
S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).
FAMILY CODE SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(E)
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows termination of parental rights if the trial court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly
placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical
or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
"Endanger" means "to expose a child to loss or injury, or to jeopardize a child's emotional
or mental health." In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). An
endangerment finding often involves physical endangerment, but it is not necessary to
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 2 show that the parent's conduct was directed at the children or that the children suffered
actual injury. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). "Rather,
the specific danger to the children's well-being may be inferred from the parent's
misconduct alone." Id. In our endangerment analysis pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E),
we may consider conduct both before and after the Department removed the children
from their parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied).
A parent's mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent engaged
in a course of conduct that endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being. In re
T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) Evidence of
domestic violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E).
In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Evidence of a
parent's drug usage, or evidence that another parent allowed a child to be around a parent
or other persons using drugs, is evidence of endangerment. Dupree v. Texas Dep't of Prot.
& Reg. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84-86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). In general, a parent's
conduct that subjects children to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of those children. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 531.
The children, ages 16 and 17 at the beginning of these proceedings, were residing
with other caregivers because Amanda, by her own admission, was unable to care for
them due to her mental health issues, illegal drug use, and lack of a residence with
electricity and running water. However, at the time this proceeding was initiated,
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 3 Amanda was threatening to remove both of them from their placements, neither of whom
had the legal right to possession of the children. H.H.'s caregiver did have a medical and
educational power of attorney for H.H.
While living with their parents, the children had been exposed to domestic
violence between Amanda and her husband at least one time according to one of the
children. Amanda told the caseworker that her husband was arrested on a blue warrant
after a domestic violence incident at their residence. The children had also been forced to
provide urine samples for Amanda and others to use to pass drug tests when needed.
There was a no-contact order entered during the proceedings due to messages from
Amanda which were emotionally harmful that had been relayed to H.H. by an older
sibling who was over 18 but attended the same high school as H.H. and C.H.
Amanda told the caseworker more than once that she did not want the children
returned to her and would not participate in any services to attempt to have the children
returned to her. She also informed the caseworker a month prior to the final trial that she
was still using illegal drugs and did not have a home with running water or electricity
for the children if they were returned to her. During these proceedings, Amanda also did
not attempt to address the mental health issues that led her to believe that the children
were not safe in her home, even though those services were offered by the Department.
Amanda did not attend the final hearing and no controverting evidence was presented
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-21-00040-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF H.H. & C.H., CHILDREN
From the 82nd District Court Robertson County, Texas Trial Court No. 20-06-21059-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Amanda T. appeals from a judgment that terminated her parental rights to her
children, H.H. and C.H. Although Amanda's rights were terminated based on the trial
court's findings that she committed the predicate acts in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),
and (P), Amanda complains solely that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) only and asks that those grounds be deleted
from the judgment. 1 She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the other
1 Although only one ground is necessary to support the termination of parental rights, because of the concern of collateral consequences in the future, we are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if raised on appeal. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination); see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining that an appellate court must address issues raised challenging the trial court's finding as to subsections (D) or (E) because termination pursuant to those subsections may have implications for a parent's parental rights to other children). two grounds or that termination was in the children's best interest. Because we find that
the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to have found that she committed the
predicate act in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its
entirety.
To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we
review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence
is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on
the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the
truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). The
trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437
S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).
FAMILY CODE SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(E)
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows termination of parental rights if the trial court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly
placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical
or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
"Endanger" means "to expose a child to loss or injury, or to jeopardize a child's emotional
or mental health." In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). An
endangerment finding often involves physical endangerment, but it is not necessary to
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 2 show that the parent's conduct was directed at the children or that the children suffered
actual injury. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). "Rather,
the specific danger to the children's well-being may be inferred from the parent's
misconduct alone." Id. In our endangerment analysis pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E),
we may consider conduct both before and after the Department removed the children
from their parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied).
A parent's mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent engaged
in a course of conduct that endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being. In re
T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) Evidence of
domestic violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E).
In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Evidence of a
parent's drug usage, or evidence that another parent allowed a child to be around a parent
or other persons using drugs, is evidence of endangerment. Dupree v. Texas Dep't of Prot.
& Reg. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84-86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). In general, a parent's
conduct that subjects children to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of those children. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 531.
The children, ages 16 and 17 at the beginning of these proceedings, were residing
with other caregivers because Amanda, by her own admission, was unable to care for
them due to her mental health issues, illegal drug use, and lack of a residence with
electricity and running water. However, at the time this proceeding was initiated,
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 3 Amanda was threatening to remove both of them from their placements, neither of whom
had the legal right to possession of the children. H.H.'s caregiver did have a medical and
educational power of attorney for H.H.
While living with their parents, the children had been exposed to domestic
violence between Amanda and her husband at least one time according to one of the
children. Amanda told the caseworker that her husband was arrested on a blue warrant
after a domestic violence incident at their residence. The children had also been forced to
provide urine samples for Amanda and others to use to pass drug tests when needed.
There was a no-contact order entered during the proceedings due to messages from
Amanda which were emotionally harmful that had been relayed to H.H. by an older
sibling who was over 18 but attended the same high school as H.H. and C.H.
Amanda told the caseworker more than once that she did not want the children
returned to her and would not participate in any services to attempt to have the children
returned to her. She also informed the caseworker a month prior to the final trial that she
was still using illegal drugs and did not have a home with running water or electricity
for the children if they were returned to her. During these proceedings, Amanda also did
not attempt to address the mental health issues that led her to believe that the children
were not safe in her home, even though those services were offered by the Department.
Amanda did not attend the final hearing and no controverting evidence was presented
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 4 to refute any of the Department's allegations. 2 H.H. and C.H. both requested that their
parent's rights be terminated. We find that, while the Department could have presented
more evidence regarding these issues, the evidence was still legally and factually
sufficient for the trial court to have found that Amanda "engaged in conduct … which
endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We overrule Amanda's second issue. Because we have found the
evidence sufficient pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), we do not address Amanda's first
issue.
CONCLUSION
Having found no error that requires an alteration of the judgment, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Neill, and Justice Johnson Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed May 27, 2021 [CV06]
2Amanda argues that although the trial court took judicial notice of all of the contents of its file, it was not allowed to consider it for the truth of the matters asserted in the contents of the file and cites to this Court's opinion in Davis v. State, 293 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) as support of its proposition. However, Amanda's counsel specifically stated, "No objection" when the trial court asked the parties if they objected to the trial court taking judicial notice of "all of the contents" of its file. Because Amanda did not object to the trial court's taking judicial notice, the scope of the trial court's judicial notice was not limited, and Amanda has waived any complaint to the trial court's determination. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 5