In the Interest of H.G., F.G., and P.G., Minor Children
This text of In the Interest of H.G., F.G., and P.G., Minor Children (In the Interest of H.G., F.G., and P.G., Minor Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1399 Filed December 15, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF H.G., F.G., and P.G., Minor Children,
K.G., Mother, Appellant,
P.G., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Stephanie Forker
Parry, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to three children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Molly Vakulskas Joly of Vakulskas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant
mother.
John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Diane Murphy Smith, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Joseph Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ. 2
TABOR, Judge.
Just before the birth of their third child, H.G., parents Phillip and Kimberly
received a reprieve. The juvenile court granted their requests for six more months
to reunify with their older children, F.G. and P.G. But in the juvenile court’s view,
the parents “frittered away” that opportunity by continuing to abuse substances and
by hiding that fact from social workers. Now Phillip and Kimberly appeal the court’s
termination of their parental rights. They both contest the statutory grounds for
termination and contend it was not in their children’s best interests. Because the
State proved that the children could not be safely returned to either parent, we
affirm both terminations.
Our decision to affirm follows our de novo review of the juvenile court
record. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We give that court’s fact
findings “respectful consideration,” but are not bound by them. Id. The findings of
fact about this family are extensive—spanning twenty-nine pages and detailing two
years of services. But the essence is evident. Both Phillip and Kimberly have
severe substance-abuse issues that prevent them from safely parenting their three
children—who are now one, five, and six years old. Both parents also have
struggled with their mental health. And both parents have engaged in domestic
violence.
Against that backdrop, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (for F.G. and P.G.), (h) (for H.G.), and (l)
(2021) (for all three children). On the statutory grounds issue, we look for clear
and convincing evidence from the State. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa
2016). To satisfy that standard, the State’s proof must leave us with no “serious 3
or substantial doubts” about the correctness of the juvenile court’s conclusions of
law. Id. When, as here, the court rests its decision on more than one paragraph
under section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any supported ground. In re D.W.,
791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We will address paragraphs (f) and (h), and,
in particular, their common element challenged by both Phillip and Kimberly—that
the children could not be safely reunited with the parents at the time of the
termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4).
Phillip claims the State did not prove that element because (1) he completed
in-patient substance-abuse treatment, (2) he has a residence for the children, and
(3) he has a history of being employed, though not a current job. None of those
assertions undermine the State’s case. First, Phillip’s recent sobriety, while
encouraging, did not erase his long history of alcohol and substance abuse. Even
after the juvenile court approved a trial-home placement in November 2020, Phillip
relapsed several times. For example, during an unannounced drop-in in January
2021, a social worker found him passed out with four-month-old H.G. lying beside
him. Then in March, Phillip was arrested for public intoxication and criminal
mischief. The next month, a social worker cancelled a visitation because Phillip
was impaired by alcohol. True, Phillip successfully discharged from an in-patient
treatment program in June 2021. But by the date of the July termination trial he
had not started outpatient services or participated in AA meetings. Second, he did
not have independent housing, instead he and Kimberly were staying with a cousin
who had once asked them to move out. And third, he lacked employment and
transportation. Phillip’s minimal progress was too nascent to risk a return of the
children. 4
Similarly, Kimberly argues the children could be returned to her care. She
asserts that she was attending her mental-health appointments, taking prescribed
medications, and had an appropriate residence for the children to live. But like
Phillip, her positive steps toward stability came late in the case. As recently as
January 2021, she was hospitalized for a drug overdose. In February, she and
Phillip were arrested for assaulting each other. In March, a police officer found her
“highly intoxicated” in a local bar. Her mental-health counselor reported that her
attendance at therapy was inconsistent in early 2021. Then in May, she did
successfully complete an inpatient substance-abuse treatment program. Yet we
are concerned that she has not pursued outpatient services or embraced a
recovery community, testifying that she can maintain sobriety on her own. Like the
juvenile court, we are “not convinced she can wipe away years of use in only a
couple of months.” And contrary to her assertion, neither she nor Phillip had stable
housing. So we find the State presented clear and convincing evidence to
terminate the rights of both parents under paragraphs (f) and (h).
Turning to the best-interests challenges, we give primary consideration to
the children’s safety, to the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing
and growth, and to their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See
In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010) (discussing section 232.116(2)). Phillip
makes a cryptic argument that termination is not in the children’s best interests
because he has a bond with them. Likewise, Kimberly contends that she shares
a strong connection with the children and can provide excellent care for them “so
long as her mental health and substance abuse issues are in check.” Indeed, the
record supports the parents’ claims that they have close relationships with the 5
children. But unfortunately, Kimberly’s proviso is true too. Neither the children’s
safety nor their long-term growth are advanced by hoping that Kimberly and Phillip
can rise above their addictions and mental-health struggles to be dependable
parents. See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 2002) (noting child was
bonded with parents but finding stability presented by termination was in her best
interests).
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