In the Interest of H.B.R. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 09-26-00077-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-26-00077-CV ________________

IN THE INTEREST OF H.B.R. ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 88th District Court Hardin County, Texas Trial Cause No. 65701 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his minor child,

“Hank.” 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds exist for termination of Father’s, G.S.R., parental rights and that termination

of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (2).2

1 To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, but she is not a party to this appeal. 1 Father’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there

are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);

In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (noting

Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents the

attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable

grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the

Court that she gave Father a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Father of his

right to file a pro se brief, and provided copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records.

The Court likewise notified Father of his right to file a pro se response, and the

deadline for doing so. Father did not file a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Father’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)

(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,

no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would

arguably support an appeal and agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.

See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and

reviewed the record for arguable error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346

2 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new

counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Should

Father decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, his counsel’s

obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for

an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (citations

omitted).

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice

Submitted on June 10, 2026 Opinion Delivered July 9, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.