in the Interest of G.R. and T.R.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 14, 2015·No. 09-14-00513-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

NO. 09-14-00513-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF G.R. AND T.R.

On Appeal from the 418th District Court Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 13-10-10830 CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant (the Father) appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to G.R. and T.R. 1 The Father raises four issues on appeal. In his first three issues, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he violated subsections (D), (E), and (O) of section 161.001(1) of the Family Code. In his fourth issue, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that

1 To protect the identity of the minors, we have not used the names of the children, parents, or other family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.

termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 2 Burden of Proof and Standards of Review Parental rights can be terminated upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed an act prohibited by section 161.001(1) of the Family Code, and termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (West 2014); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Due to the severity and permanency of the termination of parental rights, the burden of proof is heightened to the clear and convincing evidence standard. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002). “Clear and convincing evidence” means “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2014). This is an intermediate standard and falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings. State

v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 630 2 G.R. and T.R.’s mother (the Mother) signed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing her rights to G.R. and T.R. The trial court accepted the Mother’s affidavit and terminated the Mother’s parental rights to G.R. and T.R. The Mother has not appealed that determination.

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). Therefore, the proof must be more than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence, but need not be unequivocal or undisputed. Addington, 588 S.W.2d at 570. This heightened burden of proof results in a heightened standard of review. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case, we “give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must determine “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). “If, in light of the entire record, the

disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 109.

Factual and Procedural Background The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) first became involved in this case when it received multiple allegations of sexual abuse and drug abuse in the home of G.R. and T.R. At the time of trial, G.R. was six years old and T.R. was four years old. In response to the allegations, Child Protective Services (CPS) assigned Crystal Houts to investigate the allegations. Houts testified that G.R. reported observing domestic violence between the Mother and the Father—G.R. recalled seeing the Father throw the Mother down a flight of stairs.

Houts’ investigation resulted in a finding that CPS had reason to believe the Mother had engaged in physical abuse and neglectful supervision. Because Houts

believed G.R. and T.R. were in conditions that endangered them, she removed them from the Mother’s home.

Houts also investigated an allegation that the Father had sexually abused the Father’s stepdaughter, I.K. Houts was unable to locate the Father during her investigation to speak to him about this allegation. Houts testified that her investigation led her to believe that I.K. made a valid outcry of sexual abuse against the Father, describing vaginal penetration. However, based on the information available during her investigation and the fact that she had been unable to locate and speak to the Father, the Department ultimately found it was unable to determine whether sexual abuse had actually occurred.

Houts testified that she found the Mother to be very inconsistent in her reporting to the Department. Houts explained that she spoke to the Mother several times about whether the Mother believed the Father hurt I.K., and the Mother provided multiple different responses. Notwithstanding the Mother’s apparent dishonesty, Houts testified that Houts believed I.K.’s outcry to be credible. Houts testified there remains an ongoing criminal investigation of the Father concerning his alleged sexual abuse of I.K.

The Mother testified that she and the Father separated in December of 2012 when the Father became intoxicated and tried to wrap his hands around her neck

and kill her. The Mother testified that there had been other incidents of domestic violence. The Mother testified that the Father not only abused her, but also physically abused the children. She testified she came home multiple times to find bruises on the children. She testified that the Father was a “spanker” and would use his hands, a belt, a shoe, or anything else he could get his hands on to spank the children. The Mother was of the opinion that the Father would continue this behavior if he were granted custody of them. The Mother denied that she personally used corporal punishment on the children, denied that she assaulted the Father, and denied that she had a bad temper. When questioned about bruising that appeared on the children after the Father had left the home, the Mother testified that her babysitter had caused those bruises. The Mother did not let the Father see the children from December 23, 2012 to the time CPS removed G.R. and T.R. from her on October 7, 2013.

The Mother admitted to taking pills while caring for the children and testified that the Father also knew she was taking pills. The Mother testified that while she was struggling with drug abuse, the children were in a dangerous environment. According to the Mother, the Father never tried to remove the children from her because of her drug problem.

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