In the Interest of G.J., a Child v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided February 6, 2025·No. 02-24-00368-CV·Published

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

No. 02-24-00368-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF G.J., A CHILD

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Parker County, Texas

Trial Court No. CIV-23-0529

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Drug use, family violence, and the parents’ dishonesty led the trial court to terminate the parental rights of I.G. (Mother) and T.J. (Father) to their fourteen- month-old baby G.J. (Max),1 see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2)(D), (E), (2), despite their having supposedly become “clean” during the case and despite each parent’s having completed a service plan provided by the Department of Family and Protective Services to help them reunite with the child.

At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court acknowledged the case’s difficulty and remarked,

Trials are decided by truth and credibility. And when witnesses can only remember what’s convenient to them or what their counsel remind them of, and when witnesses are inconsistent from day one to day three, and when witnesses admit that they lied throughout the proceedings, it’s --

puts all of their testimony in question.

The trial court was specifically concerned with Mother’s and Father’s inconsistent testimonies during the trial, with Father’s having taken the batterer’s intervention program multiple times before but having “only figured out last year that you’re supposed to respect your paramour and walk away from a fight,” with Father’s family- violence conviction and willful bond-condition violations, with Father’s batterers

1 In a termination-of-parental-rights case, we use aliases for the names of the children and their parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

intervention class instructor’s difficulty recalling details, and with Mother’s failing to recall “all the times that [she] went to the hospital and why.”2 Mother and Father have both appealed, challenging the trial court’s finding that termination was in Max’s best interest.3 We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the best-interest finding and will affirm.

Discussion

Mother and Father each claim that the trial court’s best-interest finding was not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

2 The child’s ad litem attorney, who recommended terminating the parents’

rights, noted, “[A]s we’ve seen over the last few days, we have very inconsistent testimony from Monday to today regarding drug use, regarding domestic violence” and that “it’s very, very abnormal to see this overnight change.”

3 In her brief’s table of contents, Mother also states that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support “that a predicate ground occurred.” However, she does not identify which predicate ground, and in the issue and arguments section of her brief, she challenges only the best-interest finding. We thus read Mother’s brief as challenging only the best-interest finding. But regardless, most of the evidence that supports best-interest also supports the endangerment finding. As discussed below, the trial court had undisputed evidence that Father used drugs at the home while Mother was pregnant, that both parents used drugs after Max’s birth, and that there were multiple incidents of violence between the parents, both during Mother’s pregnancy and after Max’s birth. See In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (noting that a parent’s drug use or violence may make the child’s environment endangering for purposes of Section 161.001(b)(1)(D)); In re M.S., 662 S.W.3d 620, 630 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, pet. denied) (noting that domestic violence may be considered evidence of endangerment under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), even if the child was not present and was not injured); see also In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022) (discussing parents’ endangering use of controlled substances during pregnancy).

I. Standard of Review For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking termination—here, the Department—must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions satisfy at least one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a best- interest finding, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. We assume that the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. Id. We consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). If we determine that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the Department proved that the termination of the parent–child relationship would be in the child’s best interest, then the evidence is legally insufficient. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); see Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.

Under a factual sufficiency review, on the other hand, we review the entire record to decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved the finding. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b);

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. But if a factfinder reasonably could not—because the disputed evidence that could not reasonably support the finding is too significant—then the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. Under either standard, the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009). II. Best-Interest Factors Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We consider the evidence in light of the statutory factors that apply in a best-interest determination and the nonexclusive factors set out in Holley v. Adams. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b) (setting out thirteen factors that trial court and Department should consider in determining whether child’s parents are willing and able to provide child with safe environment); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted) (setting out nine best-interest factors); see In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013).

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In the Interest of G.J., a Child v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

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