IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1221 Filed October 1, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF G.H.-T., Minor Child,
P.T.-R., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son.
AFFIRMED.
Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Myia E. Steines of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and
Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
A baby was removed from his mother’s custody in July 2024 after he tested
positive for cocaine at birth.1 The mother has a long history of substance-use
issues, including the earlier removal of her older children from her custody.
Although she was an attentive and caring mother during visits and attended many
of her son’s appointments for his developmental delays and physical ailments, she
made essentially no progress in addressing her substance-use problem. And so,
the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to the son a year after his birth.
On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. Termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the son’s best interest given that he is flourishing in
his foster home and the mother still struggles with her chronic substance use. We
do not doubt the mother loves her son. But unfortunately, that is not enough—the
son needs a permanent, safe home free from dangerous substances. And her
lack of progress addressing her substance use means we cannot find the son
could be returned to her even with more time. We thus affirm.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings
In July 2024, the mother gave birth to a son.2 She had no prenatal care
during her pregnancy and tested positive for cocaine. The son also tested positive
for cocaine at birth, was removed from the mother’s custody, and placed with a
foster family. At the time, the mother already had an open case with the Iowa
1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25. 2 The father’s identity is unknown. Due to notice issues, the rights of any putative
father were not addressed at the termination hearing. 3
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding an older child, with
allegations of cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana use in the home. Many of her older
children have been removed from her care and permanently placed with relatives.
And her parental rights were terminated as to two of the older children.
The son suffers from some developmental delays and physical impairments
requiring regular occupational and physical therapy appointments and medical
examinations. The foster mother schedules most appointments relating to the
son’s medical needs, in part to accommodate her schedule and in part because
the mother “has not been able to schedule them or refused to.”
The mother was “very engaged” with the son at her visits, provided for the
son’s needs at visits, and completed a parenting program. Her interactions with
the son were appropriate in terms of his medical diagnoses. The mother attended
the medical appointments she could arrange transportation to, often riding with the
foster mother. The mother has appropriate housing, with an adult child living with
her and two of her teenage children visiting regularly. But she has not maintained
stable employment and was not working at the time of the termination hearing and
did not have reliable transportation.
The primary concern—as it has been since the son’s birth—is the mother’s
substance use. She began an outpatient treatment program twice, but she was
unsuccessfully discharged both times for failing to attend appointments. She only
sporadically attended substance-use tests, and tested positive for cocaine in some
tests, including one in the weeks before the termination hearing. The mother
believes she does not need substance-use treatment. And while she had the
option to increase visits by completing two negative drug tests in a row, she was 4
unable to do so in the ten months between removal and the termination hearing.
At the time of the hearing, she was attending AA meetings online.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under
paragraphs “g,” “h,” and “l” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2025). The court
acknowledged the mother’s “progress in almost all areas including being
cooperative with services, consistently making her interactions, demonstrating
appropriate parenting skills during those interactions, having the necessary
supplies, and demonstrating a clear bond with the child.” But she did not make
progress with her substance use—the cause for the removal—and the court
determined it could not find the need for removal would no longer exist at the end
of an extension of time. The court concluded termination of the mother’s parental
rights was in the son’s best interest. The mother appeals.
II. The Son’s Best Interest
Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-
step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must
prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And finally, the parent bears the
burden to show whether a discretionary exception applies that should preclude
termination. Id. We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful
consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on
credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).
The mother does not dispute the grounds for termination, so we need not
address that issue. She instead challenges the second step—whether it is in the
son’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. She mainly focuses on the 5
strong bond she shares with her son, emphasizing “her ability to nurture her son
by providing for him during visits and maintaining a stable, appropriate residence.” 3
The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination
proceeding.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We consider both the
child’s long-range and immediate best interest. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170,
172 (Iowa 1997). And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016).
We agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the son’s best interest.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1221 Filed October 1, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF G.H.-T., Minor Child,
P.T.-R., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son.
AFFIRMED.
Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque, for appellant
mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Myia E. Steines of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and
Langholz, JJ. 2
LANGHOLZ, Judge.
A baby was removed from his mother’s custody in July 2024 after he tested
positive for cocaine at birth.1 The mother has a long history of substance-use
issues, including the earlier removal of her older children from her custody.
Although she was an attentive and caring mother during visits and attended many
of her son’s appointments for his developmental delays and physical ailments, she
made essentially no progress in addressing her substance-use problem. And so,
the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to the son a year after his birth.
On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. Termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the son’s best interest given that he is flourishing in
his foster home and the mother still struggles with her chronic substance use. We
do not doubt the mother loves her son. But unfortunately, that is not enough—the
son needs a permanent, safe home free from dangerous substances. And her
lack of progress addressing her substance use means we cannot find the son
could be returned to her even with more time. We thus affirm.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings
In July 2024, the mother gave birth to a son.2 She had no prenatal care
during her pregnancy and tested positive for cocaine. The son also tested positive
for cocaine at birth, was removed from the mother’s custody, and placed with a
foster family. At the time, the mother already had an open case with the Iowa
1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25. 2 The father’s identity is unknown. Due to notice issues, the rights of any putative
father were not addressed at the termination hearing. 3
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding an older child, with
allegations of cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana use in the home. Many of her older
children have been removed from her care and permanently placed with relatives.
And her parental rights were terminated as to two of the older children.
The son suffers from some developmental delays and physical impairments
requiring regular occupational and physical therapy appointments and medical
examinations. The foster mother schedules most appointments relating to the
son’s medical needs, in part to accommodate her schedule and in part because
the mother “has not been able to schedule them or refused to.”
The mother was “very engaged” with the son at her visits, provided for the
son’s needs at visits, and completed a parenting program. Her interactions with
the son were appropriate in terms of his medical diagnoses. The mother attended
the medical appointments she could arrange transportation to, often riding with the
foster mother. The mother has appropriate housing, with an adult child living with
her and two of her teenage children visiting regularly. But she has not maintained
stable employment and was not working at the time of the termination hearing and
did not have reliable transportation.
The primary concern—as it has been since the son’s birth—is the mother’s
substance use. She began an outpatient treatment program twice, but she was
unsuccessfully discharged both times for failing to attend appointments. She only
sporadically attended substance-use tests, and tested positive for cocaine in some
tests, including one in the weeks before the termination hearing. The mother
believes she does not need substance-use treatment. And while she had the
option to increase visits by completing two negative drug tests in a row, she was 4
unable to do so in the ten months between removal and the termination hearing.
At the time of the hearing, she was attending AA meetings online.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under
paragraphs “g,” “h,” and “l” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2025). The court
acknowledged the mother’s “progress in almost all areas including being
cooperative with services, consistently making her interactions, demonstrating
appropriate parenting skills during those interactions, having the necessary
supplies, and demonstrating a clear bond with the child.” But she did not make
progress with her substance use—the cause for the removal—and the court
determined it could not find the need for removal would no longer exist at the end
of an extension of time. The court concluded termination of the mother’s parental
rights was in the son’s best interest. The mother appeals.
II. The Son’s Best Interest
Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-
step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must
prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And finally, the parent bears the
burden to show whether a discretionary exception applies that should preclude
termination. Id. We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful
consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on
credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).
The mother does not dispute the grounds for termination, so we need not
address that issue. She instead challenges the second step—whether it is in the
son’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. She mainly focuses on the 5
strong bond she shares with her son, emphasizing “her ability to nurture her son
by providing for him during visits and maintaining a stable, appropriate residence.” 3
The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination
proceeding.” In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). We consider both the
child’s long-range and immediate best interest. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170,
172 (Iowa 1997). And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016).
We agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the son’s best interest.
HHS, the son’s guardian ad litem, and the court-appointed special advocate all
recommended termination citing the mother’s lack of progress addressing her
substance use and her transportation and employment instability. As the family-
support worker who supervised visits observed at the termination hearing, “They
do have a bond, but [the mother] has not addressed why the case opened.” And
we do not think their bond is at a level that termination would be detrimental to the
son. The son has thrived in his foster placement, getting the consistent medical
and therapeutic help he needs to address his needs. He has integrated into the
foster family, and they are willing to adopt him. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b).
Considering the son’s need for a safe, nurturing, and stable home, we find
termination of the mother’s parental rights to be in the son’s best interest.
3 Because the mother did not separately enumerate the permissive parent-child
bond exception to termination as one of her two claimed issues on appeal, we consider her argument about the parent-child bond only as a best-interest challenge. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). 6
III. Additional Time for Reunification
The mother also asserts the juvenile court should have granted her an
extension of time given her progress and the necessity for a second termination
hearing for putative fathers scheduled for August 2025. See Iowa Code
§§ 232.117(5), 232.104(2)(b); In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021). In
her closing argument below, the mother argued an extension would allow more
frequent drug testing and allow her to reenter substance-use treatment.
While sympathetic to this position, we agree with the family-support worker
that the mother is unlikely to change—even if given more time. “[W]e cannot
deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination
under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41
(Iowa 2010).
The mother’s substance use has been a problem for many years. She has
had three children test positive for cocaine at birth in 2017, 2021, and 2024, and
those other children have all been removed from her home. During this case, she
started and abandoned treatment twice, relapsing less than a month before the
termination hearing. To grant an extension, the court must be able to “enumerate
the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” for removal to no
longer be needed at the end of the extension. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). The
removal here was based on the mother’s substance use, and we cannot find it
would no longer exist after six more months. And so, we affirm the juvenile court.