in the Interest of G.F., a Child

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided February 22, 2022·No. 02-21-00267-CV·Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-21-00267-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF G.F., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 16th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 19-4964-367

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother––the only parent to challenge this judgment terminating parent–child

relationships––claims that the Department of Family and Protective Services failed to

prove that she endangered her daughter Susan1 and that termination is in Susan’s best

interest. Mother contends primarily that the evidence supporting the Department’s

reason for removing Susan from her custody––suspected Munchausen’s by proxy2––

shows nothing more than that she appropriately sought care for Susan’s behavioral

and mental-health problems, leaving her in a safe place, and that Mother––perhaps

wrongfully––skeptically questioned and criticized the provided care. But the

Department’s evidence at trial showed much more: Mother’s long-term alcoholism

and drug use in the face of chronic mental-health issues––which contributed to

Mother’s criminal history and an unstable and chaotic home life for Susan––along

with Mother’s denial of and inability to effectively manage Susan’s unique mental-

health and behavioral needs, endangered Susan. Accordingly, we affirm.

A. Brief background

The Department removed Susan from Mother’s care after Child Protective

Services, a Department division, received a referral for “neglectful supervision,

1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the child. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 Munchausen syndrome by proxy, also known as pediatric-condition- falsification disorder, is a form of medical child abuse. See, e.g., In re A.G.K., No. 04- 16-00315-CV, 2016 WL 6775590, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2 specifically Munchausen by proxy.” At the time, Susan had been an inpatient at a

Houston children’s hospital for a little over three months. Although Susan’s treating

neuropsychiatrist had initiated the referral within two weeks after her admission, the

Department did not file its removal petition until the hospital threatened to discharge

Susan because of Mother’s behavior.

In the nine months before her admission to the Houston hospital, eight-year-

old Susan had been hospitalized seven times, and had participated in two hospital

outpatient programs, for mental-health and behavioral issues. During that time and

before, Susan and Mother had lived in various places: in housing for single mothers,

at Safe Haven, in a home with Mother’s friend, in an apartment, and off and on with

Susan’s maternal grandmother.

Susan’s neuropsychiatrist was concerned that although Mother had attributed

Susan’s psychiatric symptoms to a five-year-old traumatic brain injury, he did not

believe that Susan’s behavioral problems arose from that injury; rather, he believed

that her problems resulted from Mother’s inability to effectively parent Susan with her

unique mental-health needs. Additionally, because the hospital staff noted that

Mother’s speech was sometimes slurred and that she had behaved erratically, they

were concerned that Mother might have been taking Susan’s prescribed medication.

Mother refused to talk to CPS about the referral, but she told the caseworker

during the investigation that “all the medication that [Susan] ha[d] been put on in the

past” and “all of the hospital stays” had “not helped her at all.” In the removal-

3 petition affidavit, the caseworker opined that Mother had subjected Susan to

unnecessary medical care, was “using [Susan’s] health as a way to get her needs met,”

and was “again abusing substances” and engaging in erratic behavior.

After the trial court awarded the Department temporary managing

conservatorship, the parties agreed to a temporary order under which Mother agreed

to “refrain from all criminal activity,” “from alcohol use and/or consumption,” and

“from the misuse of prescription medication.” The trial court also ordered Mother to

“inform the Department of any use of alcohol, illegal substances[,] and prescriptions.”

After Susan’s discharge from the children’s hospital, she lived with her

maternal grandfather and his wife for almost a year and a half. She was not

hospitalized during that time.

But Maternal Grandfather could no longer care for Susan after December

2020. So Susan went to live with her former stepfather, his wife, and Susan’s half-

sister––Stepfather’s child with Mother. After a little over a month, Susan ended up

back in the hospital because she had attempted to choke and threatened to kill her

younger sister. The hospital released Susan after about a week, and CPS placed her in

a therapeutic foster home.

After four extensions of the suit’s dismissal deadline,3 the Department tried the

case to the court, who not only heard from several witnesses but also admitted into

3 The parties agreed to the first six-month extension before the one-year anniversary of the trial court’s first temporary order appointing the Department

4 evidence voluminous medical records for Susan and Mother. The trial court found

that Mother had placed Susan in or allowed her to remain in endangering conditions

or surroundings, that Mother had endangered Susan or knowingly placed her with

people who endangered her, and that Mother had failed to comply with a court order

setting the conditions for Susan’s return to her custody. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). 4 The trial court further found that terminating

Mother and Susan’s parent–child relationship was in Susan’s best interest.

Id. § 161.001(b)(2).

On appeal, Mother claims that the Department failed to prove the Section

161.001 termination elements. Although she does not specify the sufficiency-challenge

type, she asks alternatively for rendition and remand. We will therefore review the

evidentiary sufficiency under both legal- and factual-sufficiency standards. See In re

D.S.W., No. 10-10-00108-CV, 2010 WL 5419014, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.––Waco Dec.

29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Susan’s managing conservator, and the trial court signed each remaining extension order before the previously extended date and within the extension date provided in the then-effective Texas Supreme Court’s COVID-19 emergency orders. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a), (b); Thirty-sixth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 21-9026 (Tex. Mar. 5, 2021); Thirty- third Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 21-9004 (Tex. Jan. 14, 2021); Twenty-ninth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 20-9135 (Tex. Nov. 11, 2020).

Father voluntarily signed an affidavit of relinquishment. See Tex. Fam. Code 4

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K).

5 B. Applicable law and standard of review

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the Department must

prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions

satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that

termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

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