In the Interest Of: F. A. G. R., a Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: July 9, 2014
• Docket: A14A0429
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MILLER and DILLARD, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

July 9, 2014

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A14A0429. In the Interest of F. A. G. R., a child. DO-024

DOYLE , Presiding Judge.

The custodians of F. A. G. R. (“Petitioners”), appeal from a juvenile court order

declining to endorse their petition alleging F. A. G. R. ‘s deprivation and seeking to

invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The record shows that the Petitioners filed a petition in the juvenile court

seeking a determination that F. A. G. R. was a deprived child. The petition alleged

that F. A. G. R.’s date of birth was June 22, 1995, making him approximately two

months shy of his 18th birthday on the date the petition was filed. The petition

outlined F. A. G. R.’s history as a juvenile born in Honduras, who was allegedly

forced by his parents to leave home as a 17-year-old and come to the United States

to seek work. Along the journey, F. A. G. R. endured a kidnapping and other abuse before he was eventually apprehended by United States customs and border agents

at the United States border in January 2013. Federal authorities placed F. A. G. R. in

the custody of the U. S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, which ultimately contacted

the Petitioners, one of whom is F. A. G. R.’s older cousin, and placed F. A. G. R. into

their care in Hall County in March 2013.

The Petitioners further alleged that F. A. G. R. had enrolled in school, they

were providing for his needs, and at least one of the Petitioners had authorization to

work in the United States. Due to the circumstances of F. A. G. R.’s removal from his

home and journey to the United States, the Petitioners alleged that F. A. G. R. was a

deprived child, and they requested the juvenile court to exercise its jurisdiction over

the petition. The juvenile court issued an order concluding that the petition lacked

allegations sufficient for the court to exercise its jurisdiction, thereby declining to

endorse the petition pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-37 (2013).1 The Petitioners now

appeal, requesting this Court to reverse the juvenile court’s failure to endorse the

petition and direct the juvenile court to hear the merits and issue a decision nunc pro

tunc to the date of the original 2013 order.

1 Former OCGA § 15-11-37 was repealed and reenacted by an Act effective on January 1, 2014, and applicable to proceedings commenced on or after that date. See Ga. L. 2013, p. 514, § 5-1. Accordingly, we apply the Code section in effect in 2013.

2 We note that F. A. G. R. is no longer a minor. Seeking a deprivation order valid

at the time F. A. G. R. was a juvenile, the Petitioners argue that they could use the

deprivation findings in a back-dated order to obtain relief pursuant to the Special

Immigrant Juvenile program under Federal immigration law. “[T]he general rule is

that appellate courts do not consider moot questions. Mootness is a question of court

policy based on the theory that courts do not give opinions on abstract propositions

of law that do not involve an actual controversy between parties.” 2 Pretermitting

whether the Petitioners are correct and their appeal is therefore not mooted by F. A.

G. R.’s age, we conclude that the appeal is without merit.3

OCGA § 15-11-37 (2013) provided as follows: “A petition alleging

delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness of a child shall not be filed unless the court

or a person authorized by the court has determined and endorsed upon the petition

that the filing of the petition is in the best interest of the public and the child.”4 The

endorsement requirement provides the juvenile court with “discretion as to the filing

2 In the Interest of T. H., 319 Ga. App. 216, 218 (735 SE2d 287) (2012). 3 See generally Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 342, n. 7 (638 SE2d 299) (2006) (pretermitting mootness question); Hinely v. State, 275 Ga. 777, 783 (3) (573 SE2d 66) (2002) (same). 4 (Emphasis supplied.)

3 of petitions in that court,” and is consistent with the “basic philosophy that [juvenile]

matters shall be handled informally, if at all possible.”5 “Treatment as a juvenile is not

an inherent right, but one granted by the General Assembly; therefore, the General

Assembly may restrict or qualify that right as it” did in enacting the endorsement

requirement.6

Here, the juvenile court noted that the petition for a finding of deprivation

alleged that the Petitioners were meeting F. A. G. R.’s needs, he was enrolled in and

attending school, and he was suffering no neglect or abuse in any way while in their

care. Thus, the court found no current or likely future deprivation in F. A. G. R.’s

case.

Further, the juvenile court found that F. A. G. R. was two months from being

18 years old, and a hearing on the petition could not be set for several weeks. Thus,

the court correctly noted that any temporary custody order would have an effective

duration of only two or three weeks “at best.”7 Citing all of these circumstances, the

5 (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Lane v. Jones, 244 Ga. 17, 19 (3) (257 SE2d 525) (1979). 6 Id. 7 See OCGA § 15-11-2 (2) (C) (2013) (defining “child” in the deprivation context to be any individual under the age of 18 years). By definition, a “deprived

4 juvenile court found that F. A. G. R. had no present need for its intervention to

support F. A. G. R.’s physical, mental, or emotional health, nor would the best

interest of the public require endorsement of the petition.

Based on the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the

juvenile court. It is clear that F. A. G. R. was not currently suffering from a lack of

care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health or morals, nor

was he without a custodian. Further, in light of the timing of the petition so close to

F. A. G. R.’s eighteenth birthday, at which time any custody or deprivation order

would expire, the juvenile court’s decision not to exercise its jurisdiction as a matter

of public interest was not an abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed. Miller and Dillard, JJ., concur.

child” must be a “child.” See OCGA § 15-11-2 (8).