IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0887 Filed August 20, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF E.S., Minor Child,
J.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County,
Shawna L. Ditsworth, Judge.
A father challenges the termination of his parental rights to his daughter.
AFFIRMED.
Kevin J. Huyser of Rensink, Pluim, Vogel & Huyser, Orange City, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Alexandria Celli-Smith of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Sandy, J., takes no part. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
James, father of E.S., appeals the order terminating his parental rights to
the ten-month-old child. Reviewing the issues that he preserved and raised on
appeal, we find termination of his rights is appropriate and affirm the juvenile court. 1
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
E.S. has never lived with either of her parents. When she was born in May
2024, she tested positive for methamphetamines, as did her mother and father. 2
The juvenile court removed her from parental custody and adjudicated her as a
child in need of assistance (CINA). Over the next eight months, E.S. lived in foster
care. When her foster family was unable to continue in that role, the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services placed her with the adoptive parents
of a half-sibling. About one month later, the department moved her again to her
maternal uncle Alex’s home. Although born seriously underweight, the placements
helped E.S. develop into a healthy baby with no significant health concerns. The
department social worker and the guardian ad litem reported E.S. is safe and
stable in her uncle’s home.
Meanwhile, safety concerns about her father persisted. James didn’t
complete ordered mental-health or substance-use treatment, unsuccessfully
discharging from two programs for failure to attend. He tested positive for
1 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them respectful consideration, especially on witness credibility. Id. 2 The juvenile court also terminated her mother’s parental rights. The mother does
not appeal. 3
methamphetamine throughout the CINA case, despite denying use. Sometimes
he refused to cooperate with testing requests. He was charged with possession
of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances following a probation officer’s
search of his home. And he refused to allow service providers and department
workers into his home to assess its safety for a toddler.
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights, and the juvenile court held
hearings in late spring 2025. On the father’s motion, the court reopened the record
a month later for more testimony. Ultimately the court terminated his rights under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e), (h), and (l) (2025). James
appeals.3
II. Analysis
We review termination cases in three steps. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,
294 (Iowa 2021). First, we assess whether the State has proven a statutory ground
for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we examine
whether termination is in the child’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id.
And third, we decide whether a permissive factor under section 232.116(3) should
apply to preclude termination. Id. We need not address a step that the parent
does not dispute. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). And despite the
expedited nature of juvenile appeals, failure to adequately develop an argument,
to cite supporting authority, or to cite the available record may waive an argument.
See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate
3 We take no position on the other matters the juvenile court heard at the same
time as the termination trial: motions to intervene by E.S.’s paternal grandfather and the first foster family. James does not raise those issues in his appeal. 4
on the arguments [the appellant] might have made and then search for legal
authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); see also
Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d), 6.1401–Form 5.
James does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that the State proved
the statutory grounds for terminating his rights. Instead, he argues termination of
his parental rights was not in the child’s best interests, citing section 232.116(2)
(best interests at step two) and section 232.116(3) (statutory exceptions at step
three). But the substance of his argument does not address the best-interests
standard, so we limit the analysis to the statutory exceptions at step three.
It is difficult to pin down which statutory exception James relies on. He cites
paragraph (d) (when it is necessary to place a child in a hospital, facility, or
institution), which doesn’t apply here. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(d). But his
argument pertains to both paragraph (a) (when a relative has legal custody) and
paragraph (c) (if it would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the
parent-child relationship). See id. § 232.116(3)(a), (c). Paragraph (a) is also
inapplicable because Alex has placement of E.S., not legal custody. See In re
A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Iowa 2021).
Mainly James complains about the department’s tardiness in placing E.S.
with Alex. That wait, according to James, deprived him of visitation and bonding
time. Still, he does not raise the delay as a reasonable-efforts challenge. See In
re S.O., 967 N.W.2d 198, 209 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (“[The department] must make
every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible
consistent with the best interests of the child.” (cleaned up)); In re A.A.G., 708
N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (noting the parent has an obligation, equal to 5
the department’s, to request reasonable services before the permanency hearing).
James cites no legal authority. So he has waived this argument. See Hyler, 548
N.W.2d at 876.
Alternatively, James proposes that E.S. be placed in a guardianship with
Alex or her paternal grandfather. He asserts either relative would provide a safe
home while preserving the bond between him and E.S. The paternal grandfather
already has custody of E.S.’s brother, so they could be in the same home. But, as
a starting point, a guardianship is not legally preferred to termination. In re L.A.,
20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). And again, James cites no authority to
support his proposal. In particular, he doesn’t contend with section 232.104(4)(a),
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0887 Filed August 20, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF E.S., Minor Child,
J.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County,
Shawna L. Ditsworth, Judge.
A father challenges the termination of his parental rights to his daughter.
AFFIRMED.
Kevin J. Huyser of Rensink, Pluim, Vogel & Huyser, Orange City, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Alexandria Celli-Smith of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Sandy, J., takes no part. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
James, father of E.S., appeals the order terminating his parental rights to
the ten-month-old child. Reviewing the issues that he preserved and raised on
appeal, we find termination of his rights is appropriate and affirm the juvenile court. 1
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
E.S. has never lived with either of her parents. When she was born in May
2024, she tested positive for methamphetamines, as did her mother and father. 2
The juvenile court removed her from parental custody and adjudicated her as a
child in need of assistance (CINA). Over the next eight months, E.S. lived in foster
care. When her foster family was unable to continue in that role, the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services placed her with the adoptive parents
of a half-sibling. About one month later, the department moved her again to her
maternal uncle Alex’s home. Although born seriously underweight, the placements
helped E.S. develop into a healthy baby with no significant health concerns. The
department social worker and the guardian ad litem reported E.S. is safe and
stable in her uncle’s home.
Meanwhile, safety concerns about her father persisted. James didn’t
complete ordered mental-health or substance-use treatment, unsuccessfully
discharging from two programs for failure to attend. He tested positive for
1 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them respectful consideration, especially on witness credibility. Id. 2 The juvenile court also terminated her mother’s parental rights. The mother does
not appeal. 3
methamphetamine throughout the CINA case, despite denying use. Sometimes
he refused to cooperate with testing requests. He was charged with possession
of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances following a probation officer’s
search of his home. And he refused to allow service providers and department
workers into his home to assess its safety for a toddler.
The State petitioned to terminate parental rights, and the juvenile court held
hearings in late spring 2025. On the father’s motion, the court reopened the record
a month later for more testimony. Ultimately the court terminated his rights under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e), (h), and (l) (2025). James
appeals.3
II. Analysis
We review termination cases in three steps. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,
294 (Iowa 2021). First, we assess whether the State has proven a statutory ground
for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we examine
whether termination is in the child’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id.
And third, we decide whether a permissive factor under section 232.116(3) should
apply to preclude termination. Id. We need not address a step that the parent
does not dispute. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). And despite the
expedited nature of juvenile appeals, failure to adequately develop an argument,
to cite supporting authority, or to cite the available record may waive an argument.
See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate
3 We take no position on the other matters the juvenile court heard at the same
time as the termination trial: motions to intervene by E.S.’s paternal grandfather and the first foster family. James does not raise those issues in his appeal. 4
on the arguments [the appellant] might have made and then search for legal
authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); see also
Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d), 6.1401–Form 5.
James does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that the State proved
the statutory grounds for terminating his rights. Instead, he argues termination of
his parental rights was not in the child’s best interests, citing section 232.116(2)
(best interests at step two) and section 232.116(3) (statutory exceptions at step
three). But the substance of his argument does not address the best-interests
standard, so we limit the analysis to the statutory exceptions at step three.
It is difficult to pin down which statutory exception James relies on. He cites
paragraph (d) (when it is necessary to place a child in a hospital, facility, or
institution), which doesn’t apply here. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(d). But his
argument pertains to both paragraph (a) (when a relative has legal custody) and
paragraph (c) (if it would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the
parent-child relationship). See id. § 232.116(3)(a), (c). Paragraph (a) is also
inapplicable because Alex has placement of E.S., not legal custody. See In re
A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Iowa 2021).
Mainly James complains about the department’s tardiness in placing E.S.
with Alex. That wait, according to James, deprived him of visitation and bonding
time. Still, he does not raise the delay as a reasonable-efforts challenge. See In
re S.O., 967 N.W.2d 198, 209 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (“[The department] must make
every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible
consistent with the best interests of the child.” (cleaned up)); In re A.A.G., 708
N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (noting the parent has an obligation, equal to 5
the department’s, to request reasonable services before the permanency hearing).
James cites no legal authority. So he has waived this argument. See Hyler, 548
N.W.2d at 876.
Alternatively, James proposes that E.S. be placed in a guardianship with
Alex or her paternal grandfather. He asserts either relative would provide a safe
home while preserving the bond between him and E.S. The paternal grandfather
already has custody of E.S.’s brother, so they could be in the same home. But, as
a starting point, a guardianship is not legally preferred to termination. In re L.A.,
20 N.W.3d 529, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). And again, James cites no authority to
support his proposal. In particular, he doesn’t contend with section 232.104(4)(a),
which requires proof that termination of the parental relationship would not be in
the child’s best interests before ordering a guardianship. So James waived the
guardianship argument. See Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 876.
James also argues for six more months to work toward reunification, a path
he thinks is smoother now because E.S. is with a relative. As with his other claims,
James offers no supporting authority, nor does he address the proof needed to
delay permanency. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). So he has waived that
argument as well. See Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 876.
The only argument not waived in his petition on appeal is James’s
invocation of section 232.116(3)(c). Yet the State alleges James failed to preserve
error by not invoking a statutory exception in the juvenile court. See In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the
burden to establish an exception to termination. . . .”). Because the juvenile court 6
found he failed to prove the exception in paragraph (c), we assume without
deciding error was preserved and address that claim.
Section 232.116(3)(c) allows the court to forgo termination when “[t]here is
clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the
child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” The
exception is “permissive, not mandatory.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa
2016) (quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014)). We weigh “whether
the child will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage
overcomes” the father’s parenting deficiencies. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709
(Iowa 2010).
Although James argues his visits with E.S. are appropriate and his
attendance is consistent, he does not point to evidence suggesting termination of
his rights would distress E.S. Nor does he argue that the harm of termination
would outweigh the disadvantage of delaying permanency or returning his toddler
to his care while he is using drugs. Like the juvenile court, we decline to apply this
exception to preserve his parental rights.