IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1545 Filed December 3, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF E.P., Minor Child,
D.P., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Ashley West-Joons,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
William T. Early, Harlan, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Karen L. Mailander of Mailander Law, PLC, Anita, attorney and guardian ad
litem, for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and
Langholz, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Presiding Judge.
A mother1 appeals the termination of her parental rights. She argues
(1) termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best interests and (2) the
juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to preclude termination.
Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) after the mother was arrested and charged with drug-
related criminal offenses in February 2024. That same month, the State filed a
petition alleging the child to be a child in need of assistance under Iowa Code
section 232.96A(3)(b) and (14) (2024). The child was removed from the mother’s
custody and placed in foster care.
The juvenile court ordered the mother to complete mental-health and
substance-use evaluations and treatment and participate in random drug testing.
The mother was engaged in in-patient treatment in Omaha, Nebraska for
approximately two months before returning to Iowa and engaging in outpatient
treatment.
In February 2025, concerns arose relating to the mother’s accountability
and for the child. The mother had minimal contact with the child, and there was
not a strong bond between them. The mother moved back to Omaha.
In May, the mother moved from Omaha to Des Moines. At this point, the
mother began to miss drug testing and was not having consistent communication
1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this
appeal. 3
with HHS. The mother was unsuccessfully discharged from family treatment court
and admitted to a relapse. The juvenile court ordered the State to file a petition to
terminate the parental rights of the mother and unknown father.
The State filed the petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The
petition alleged grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d),
(e), and (h) (2025). After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition and
terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re W.M.,
957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). While not binding on us, we give weight to the
juvenile court’s fact findings, “particularly with respect to credibility determinations.”
Id.
III. Discussion
“Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232
is a three-step analysis.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we
determine “whether any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established.” Id. If we conclude affirmatively, we next “determine whether the
best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination
of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20. If we conclude section 232.116(2) supports
termination, “we consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to
preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 220. However, “[w]e do not address
any steps not raised by a parent.” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App.
2025) (en banc). 4
Here the mother does not contest the statutory grounds for termination have
been met, so we do not discuss them. Instead, we focus our review on whether
(1) termination was in the child’s best interest and (2) a permissive exception in
section 232.116(3) precludes termination.
a. Best Interests
The mother first argues that termination was not in the child’s best interest.
In considering that question, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety,
to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2). The mother’s primary argument is that she has made progress
towards recovery from drug addiction. While we are sympathetic to the mother’s
progress, we “cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent
and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
112 (Iowa 2014) (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010)).
Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that termination is in the
child’s best interest. The juvenile court ordered the mother engage with
reunification services offered by HHS including mental-health evaluation and
treatment, substance-use-evaluation and treatment, drug screenings, family
centered services, supervised interactions, and family treatment court. The mother
was offered approximately nine different substance-use treatment programs. As
the juvenile court found, she engaged with many of them—but completed none.
As a result, HHS’s primary concern remains unaddressed. See In re H.R.K., 433
N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he requirement that the parents 5
acknowledge and recognize the abuse before any meaningful change can occur
is essential in meeting the child’s needs.”). Because the mother’s needs remain
and she has made no meaningful effort to address them, we find the child cannot
be safely returned to the mother’s custody. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 533 (finding
termination was appropriate where the “mother has not made sustained progress
with her substance-use problems”).
Additionally, there are concerns about the mother’s ability to provide a safe
and permanent home for the child. During the course of this case, the mother has
had ten different residences. These concerns raise questions about whether the
child can be safely returned to the mother’s custody now or in the foreseeable
future. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (stating the defining
elements of a child’s best interests are safety and need for a permanent home).
Accordingly, we find termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests.
b. Permissive Exception
Next, the mother argues the juvenile court erred by not applying a
permissive exception to termination. She argues that the permissive exception in
Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) applies because there is a close parent-child
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1545 Filed December 3, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF E.P., Minor Child,
D.P., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Ashley West-Joons,
Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
William T. Early, Harlan, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Karen L. Mailander of Mailander Law, PLC, Anita, attorney and guardian ad
litem, for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and
Langholz, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Presiding Judge.
A mother1 appeals the termination of her parental rights. She argues
(1) termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best interests and (2) the
juvenile court should have applied a permissive exception to preclude termination.
Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) after the mother was arrested and charged with drug-
related criminal offenses in February 2024. That same month, the State filed a
petition alleging the child to be a child in need of assistance under Iowa Code
section 232.96A(3)(b) and (14) (2024). The child was removed from the mother’s
custody and placed in foster care.
The juvenile court ordered the mother to complete mental-health and
substance-use evaluations and treatment and participate in random drug testing.
The mother was engaged in in-patient treatment in Omaha, Nebraska for
approximately two months before returning to Iowa and engaging in outpatient
treatment.
In February 2025, concerns arose relating to the mother’s accountability
and for the child. The mother had minimal contact with the child, and there was
not a strong bond between them. The mother moved back to Omaha.
In May, the mother moved from Omaha to Des Moines. At this point, the
mother began to miss drug testing and was not having consistent communication
1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this
appeal. 3
with HHS. The mother was unsuccessfully discharged from family treatment court
and admitted to a relapse. The juvenile court ordered the State to file a petition to
terminate the parental rights of the mother and unknown father.
The State filed the petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The
petition alleged grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d),
(e), and (h) (2025). After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition and
terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re W.M.,
957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). While not binding on us, we give weight to the
juvenile court’s fact findings, “particularly with respect to credibility determinations.”
Id.
III. Discussion
“Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232
is a three-step analysis.” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we
determine “whether any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established.” Id. If we conclude affirmatively, we next “determine whether the
best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination
of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20. If we conclude section 232.116(2) supports
termination, “we consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to
preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 220. However, “[w]e do not address
any steps not raised by a parent.” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App.
2025) (en banc). 4
Here the mother does not contest the statutory grounds for termination have
been met, so we do not discuss them. Instead, we focus our review on whether
(1) termination was in the child’s best interest and (2) a permissive exception in
section 232.116(3) precludes termination.
a. Best Interests
The mother first argues that termination was not in the child’s best interest.
In considering that question, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety,
to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2). The mother’s primary argument is that she has made progress
towards recovery from drug addiction. While we are sympathetic to the mother’s
progress, we “cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent
and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
112 (Iowa 2014) (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010)).
Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that termination is in the
child’s best interest. The juvenile court ordered the mother engage with
reunification services offered by HHS including mental-health evaluation and
treatment, substance-use-evaluation and treatment, drug screenings, family
centered services, supervised interactions, and family treatment court. The mother
was offered approximately nine different substance-use treatment programs. As
the juvenile court found, she engaged with many of them—but completed none.
As a result, HHS’s primary concern remains unaddressed. See In re H.R.K., 433
N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he requirement that the parents 5
acknowledge and recognize the abuse before any meaningful change can occur
is essential in meeting the child’s needs.”). Because the mother’s needs remain
and she has made no meaningful effort to address them, we find the child cannot
be safely returned to the mother’s custody. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 533 (finding
termination was appropriate where the “mother has not made sustained progress
with her substance-use problems”).
Additionally, there are concerns about the mother’s ability to provide a safe
and permanent home for the child. During the course of this case, the mother has
had ten different residences. These concerns raise questions about whether the
child can be safely returned to the mother’s custody now or in the foreseeable
future. See In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (stating the defining
elements of a child’s best interests are safety and need for a permanent home).
Accordingly, we find termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests.
b. Permissive Exception
Next, the mother argues the juvenile court erred by not applying a
permissive exception to termination. She argues that the permissive exception in
Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) applies because there is a close parent-child
relationship between the mother and child. But the mother never requested the
juvenile court apply this exception, so we decline to reach the merits of this
argument because the mother has not preserved error on this claim. See In re
J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (requiring a parent
seeking application of an exception under section 232.116(3) to raise the argument
before the juvenile court before the parent may raise it on appeal). 6
Even if we reached the merits, we would not apply a permissive exception
here. The parent claiming the exception has the burden to prove it should apply.
In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). Our review of the record shows that
as of the time of trial, the child had been out of the mother’s care for seventeen
months, that HHS had genuine concerns that the mother was not making an effort
during her visits with the child, and that there was not a strong bond forming
between her and the child. That is sufficient evidence to find the mother has not
proven that the permissive exception in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) should
apply.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
IV. Conclusion
Because we find termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s
best interests and the mother failed to preserve her claim on the application of a
permissive exception for our review, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.