IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 08–1483
Filed October 30, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.C., Minor Child,
STATE OF IOWA, Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol S. Egly,
District Associate Judge.
Minor child seeks further review of court of appeals’ decision
reversing juvenile court’s denial of the State’s motion to waive
jurisdiction over the child to permit prosecution as an adult. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin
Brownell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
M. Kathryn Miller, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for
appellee minor child. 2
PER CURIAM.
Over a few days in August 2008, seventeen-year-old E.L.C. made a
series of poor decisions resulting in the death of another person in a
traffic accident. A delinquency petition was filed, but the State sought to
have the juvenile court waive jurisdiction so E.L.C. could be prosecuted
as an adult. After the juvenile court denied the State’s motion, this court
granted the State’s application for interlocutory appeal. The matter was
transferred to the court of appeals, where a divided court concluded the
juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the State had failed to
establish grounds for waiver of jurisdiction. We granted E.L.C.’s
application for further review. Upon our review of the record, controlling
law, and the parties’ arguments, we vacate the court of appeals’ decision
and affirm the decision of the district court denying the State’s motion.
Although we typically review decisions of the juvenile court
de novo, when the legislature has granted the juvenile court discretion,
as in the decision to waive jurisdiction, we review for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2005). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on grounds or
reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. In assessing
the court’s exercise of discretion, we give weight to the court’s factual
determinations, particularly with respect to witness credibility, but we
are not bound by them. Id.
In addition to other prerequisites not challenged here, before
waiving jurisdiction, the juvenile court must determine
that the state has established there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver of the court’s jurisdiction over the child for the alleged 3 commission of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and the community.
Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c) (2007). In making this determination, the
juvenile court must consider the following factors, but is not limited to
these considerations:
a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances under which it was committed. b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts. c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.
Id. § 232.45(8)(a)–(c).
The State contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
retaining jurisdiction because that decision “deprived [E.L.C.] of the best
available option for her rehabilitation: the Polk County Attorney’s
Youthful Offender Pretrial Intervention Program.” The district court
found, however, that E.L.C. had no need for rehabilitation. We turn now
to the facts.
The delinquent acts giving rise to this case began when E.L.C.
struck another vehicle while driving without a license. A second accident
occurred when E.L.C. drove away from the scene of the first accident, ran
a red light, and struck a motorcyclist, causing his death. E.L.C. then
attempted to walk away from the scene of the second collision, but was
stopped by two bystanders. Based on these events, E.L.C. was charged
with two counts of failure to give information and aid (one a simple
misdemeanor and one a class “D” felony) and with one count of vehicular
homicide (a class “C” felony). 4
A juvenile court officer (JCO) assigned to the case reported that
E.L.C. was “a personable young woman who is aware of the seriousness
of this situation.” According to the JCO, E.L.C. had a happy home life,
but at the time of the accidents was driving against her parents’ express
instructions to the contrary. He concluded “she panicked from the start
of this series of events.”
E.L.C. had no prior involvement with the court system. Although
she had had some previous problems at school, there had been no “office
referrals” for three years, and she was on schedule to graduate from high
school. A school counselor testified that E.L.C. was “a model student,”
“very studious,” and very respectful at school, had no “behavior problems
. . . at all,” and had “very good” attendance. E.L.C. held two part-time
jobs, and the day before the accidents in question, she had enlisted in
the National Guard. She had no history of substance abuse or
psychological problems.
At the time of the alleged delinquent acts, E.L.C. was just two
weeks shy of eighteen. The JCO reported that “[s]he is willing to
cooperate with whatever services that would be offered and required of
her if she remains in Juvenile Court.” Nonetheless, the JCO
recommended that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction. Although he did
not necessarily think it was in E.L.C.’s best interest to be waived to adult
court, he concluded if she were left in juvenile court, she “could never be
held accountable for violations of her probation without first being found
in contempt of court.” Based on “the seriousness of the charge combined
with [E.L.C.’s] age at the time of the offense,” he concluded he was “left
with only one option”—waiver.
At the hearing on the State’s motion, the JCO testified consistently
with his report. Pertinent to the State’s argument on appeal that the 5
juvenile court deprived E.L.C. of the opportunities for rehabilitation
offered by adult court, the JCO stated: “I didn’t find any information
that [E.L.C.] was in need of rehabilitation. As serious as this offense is, it
seemed to me to be an isolated incident.”
A psychologist who had examined E.L.C. testified that E.L.C. had
no “rehabilitation needs” from a mental health standpoint. This witness
testified that, other than punishment and retribution, there was no
benefit to the community from prosecuting E.L.C. in the adult system.
The psychologist believed that E.L.C. posed a minimal risk to the
community and was unlikely to commit future crimes. Moreover, in the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 08–1483
Filed October 30, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.C., Minor Child,
STATE OF IOWA, Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol S. Egly,
District Associate Judge.
Minor child seeks further review of court of appeals’ decision
reversing juvenile court’s denial of the State’s motion to waive
jurisdiction over the child to permit prosecution as an adult. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin
Brownell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
M. Kathryn Miller, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for
appellee minor child. 2
PER CURIAM.
Over a few days in August 2008, seventeen-year-old E.L.C. made a
series of poor decisions resulting in the death of another person in a
traffic accident. A delinquency petition was filed, but the State sought to
have the juvenile court waive jurisdiction so E.L.C. could be prosecuted
as an adult. After the juvenile court denied the State’s motion, this court
granted the State’s application for interlocutory appeal. The matter was
transferred to the court of appeals, where a divided court concluded the
juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the State had failed to
establish grounds for waiver of jurisdiction. We granted E.L.C.’s
application for further review. Upon our review of the record, controlling
law, and the parties’ arguments, we vacate the court of appeals’ decision
and affirm the decision of the district court denying the State’s motion.
Although we typically review decisions of the juvenile court
de novo, when the legislature has granted the juvenile court discretion,
as in the decision to waive jurisdiction, we review for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2005). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on grounds or
reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. In assessing
the court’s exercise of discretion, we give weight to the court’s factual
determinations, particularly with respect to witness credibility, but we
are not bound by them. Id.
In addition to other prerequisites not challenged here, before
waiving jurisdiction, the juvenile court must determine
that the state has established there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver of the court’s jurisdiction over the child for the alleged 3 commission of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and the community.
Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c) (2007). In making this determination, the
juvenile court must consider the following factors, but is not limited to
these considerations:
a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances under which it was committed. b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts. c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.
Id. § 232.45(8)(a)–(c).
The State contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
retaining jurisdiction because that decision “deprived [E.L.C.] of the best
available option for her rehabilitation: the Polk County Attorney’s
Youthful Offender Pretrial Intervention Program.” The district court
found, however, that E.L.C. had no need for rehabilitation. We turn now
to the facts.
The delinquent acts giving rise to this case began when E.L.C.
struck another vehicle while driving without a license. A second accident
occurred when E.L.C. drove away from the scene of the first accident, ran
a red light, and struck a motorcyclist, causing his death. E.L.C. then
attempted to walk away from the scene of the second collision, but was
stopped by two bystanders. Based on these events, E.L.C. was charged
with two counts of failure to give information and aid (one a simple
misdemeanor and one a class “D” felony) and with one count of vehicular
homicide (a class “C” felony). 4
A juvenile court officer (JCO) assigned to the case reported that
E.L.C. was “a personable young woman who is aware of the seriousness
of this situation.” According to the JCO, E.L.C. had a happy home life,
but at the time of the accidents was driving against her parents’ express
instructions to the contrary. He concluded “she panicked from the start
of this series of events.”
E.L.C. had no prior involvement with the court system. Although
she had had some previous problems at school, there had been no “office
referrals” for three years, and she was on schedule to graduate from high
school. A school counselor testified that E.L.C. was “a model student,”
“very studious,” and very respectful at school, had no “behavior problems
. . . at all,” and had “very good” attendance. E.L.C. held two part-time
jobs, and the day before the accidents in question, she had enlisted in
the National Guard. She had no history of substance abuse or
psychological problems.
At the time of the alleged delinquent acts, E.L.C. was just two
weeks shy of eighteen. The JCO reported that “[s]he is willing to
cooperate with whatever services that would be offered and required of
her if she remains in Juvenile Court.” Nonetheless, the JCO
recommended that the juvenile court waive jurisdiction. Although he did
not necessarily think it was in E.L.C.’s best interest to be waived to adult
court, he concluded if she were left in juvenile court, she “could never be
held accountable for violations of her probation without first being found
in contempt of court.” Based on “the seriousness of the charge combined
with [E.L.C.’s] age at the time of the offense,” he concluded he was “left
with only one option”—waiver.
At the hearing on the State’s motion, the JCO testified consistently
with his report. Pertinent to the State’s argument on appeal that the 5
juvenile court deprived E.L.C. of the opportunities for rehabilitation
offered by adult court, the JCO stated: “I didn’t find any information
that [E.L.C.] was in need of rehabilitation. As serious as this offense is, it
seemed to me to be an isolated incident.”
A psychologist who had examined E.L.C. testified that E.L.C. had
no “rehabilitation needs” from a mental health standpoint. This witness
testified that, other than punishment and retribution, there was no
benefit to the community from prosecuting E.L.C. in the adult system.
The psychologist believed that E.L.C. posed a minimal risk to the
community and was unlikely to commit future crimes. Moreover, in the
witness’s opinion, E.L.C.’s prosecution as an adult might have a
detrimental impact on E.L.C. The psychologist testified: “[P]rior to this
for all practical purposes [E.L.C.] was on her way to becoming a
contributing adult, and the adult system can sometimes impact that in a
negative manner.”
In denying the State’s motion, the juvenile court concluded the
State had not met its burden to prove it was in E.L.C.’s and the
community’s best interests for the court to waive jurisdiction. The court
noted E.L.C. needed no rehabilitation. It concluded E.L.C.’s poor
decisions were “errors of maturity” and that, during the eighteen months
the juvenile court would have supervision of E.L.C., there could be “a
tremendous amount” of maturing. See generally Iowa Code § 232.53(2)
(allowing juvenile court to maintain jurisdiction until the child reaches
nineteen and one-half years of age when dispositional order entered after
child attains age of seventeen). Rejecting an argument that there were
no consequences in juvenile court, the court pointed out that, if E.L.C.
violated her juvenile probation, she could be held in contempt and jailed
for up to six months. We think the juvenile court’s rationale for 6
concluding it was not in E.L.C.’s best interest, nor in the community’s
best interest, to prosecute E.L.C. as an adult, was not unreasonable or
untenable.
The juvenile court’s factual finding that E.L.C. had no
rehabilitative needs enjoys abundant support in the record, and on our
review, we make the same finding. This finding renders insignificant the
fact that adult court “has more options” than juvenile court and would
provide E.L.C. “with the best option for rehabilitation,” the Youthful
Offender Program, as urged by the State.
We also find unpersuasive the State’s argument that the juvenile
court’s failure to follow the recommendation of an experienced JCO
indicates an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case.
The JCO was clearly dissatisfied with both options: juvenile court and
adult court. In fact, even the JCO acknowledged in his written report
that he was not “comfortable stating that it is in [E.L.C.’s] best interest to
be waived to the Adult Court.” Perhaps the most direct response to the
State’s argument, however, is simply that it is the judge, not the JCO,
who is obligated to make the decision as to whether the requirements for
waiver have been met. While there may have been room for a difference
of opinion in this case, that alone, or in combination with the other
arguments made by the State, is not a basis to conclude the juvenile
court abused its discretion.
Finally, the State expresses concern that the prospect of E.L.C.’s
incarceration if jurisdiction were waived “received undue emphasis from
the juvenile court.” We disagree that this prospect received any
“emphasis” by the juvenile court. The court simply recognized the
possibility of incarceration, while acknowledging “that it’s very unlikely.”
Surely this potential outcome, should E.L.C. be prosecuted as an adult, 7
is a relevant circumstance in determining whether it is in E.L.C.’s best
interest to waive jurisdiction. Therefore, the juvenile court’s proper
consideration of this option does not support a conclusion the court
abused its discretion.
In summary, we hold the juvenile court’s decision was not
unreasonable or untenable. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing the State’s request that the juvenile court waive
jurisdiction over E.L.C. We vacate the court of appeals’ contrary
decision, affirm the decision of the district court, and remand this case
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. DISTRICT
COURT DECISION AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Cady, J., who takes no part.
This opinion shall not be published.