In the Interest of E.G.A. and G.S.A., Children v. the Department of Family and Protective Services

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 27, 2024
• Docket: 01-24-00204-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00204-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF E.G.A. AND G.S.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 310th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-32404

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First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00206-CV ——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.A., N.X.A., N.A.A., AND A.J.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 310th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2016-25607

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In two related appeals, V.L.H. (Mother) challenges the decrees signed by the

trial court following a bench trial terminating the parent-child relationship between

her and six of her minor children.1 Mother raises the same issues in each appeal.

Among those issues, she contends that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s statutory predicate findings that she

“knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or

surroundings which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the

children” and that she “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-

being of the children.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering

1 The decree terminating Mother’s parental rights in trial court cause number 2022- 32404 to two of her children corresponds to appellate cause number 01-24-00204- CV. The decree terminating Mother’s parental rights in trial court cause number 2016-25607 to four of her children corresponds to appellate cause number 01-24- 00206-CV.

2 environment), (E) (endangering conduct). Mother also challenges the trial court’s

findings that termination was in the children’s best interests. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

Because we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to

support the endangerment and best-interest findings, we affirm the trial court’s

decrees of termination.

Background

Mother is the biological mother of seven children: (1) Ida (born June 2013),

Aaron (born December 2014), (3) Norm (born January 2016), (4) twins Ned and

Angela (born June 2017), and (5) twins Ethan and Gina (born September 2019).2

The youngest six children have the same biological father, M.A.A (Marty). The

oldest child, Ida, has a different father.

In 2016, Mother moved into an apartment with Ida, Aaron, and Norm, and

Marty soon moved in with them. At trial, Mother testified that, while living at the

apartment, Marty physically abused her, stating that Marty “always hit her” and gave

her a black eye. He “banged [her] head against the wall multiple times to where [she]

couldn’t even get up and walk.” She called the police when Marty was abusive, but,

when they arrived, she would tell them that “everything was okay . . . because if

[she] didn’t, [Marty would] beat on [her] more.” Mother recounted that Marty was

2 We will refer to the children by aliases and to their family members by their relationships to the children or by aliases. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8. 3 taken to jail for one incident, stating that he “got charged for criminal mischief for

kicking in my front door.” She explained that “he was hitting [her] inside [the

apartment]—the kids walked in and seen it—and [he] pulled a knife out on [her]”

before kicking down her door. She was evicted from her apartment because of the

incident. She moved to another apartment and allowed Marty to move back in.

Mother gave birth to twins Ned and Angela in June 2017. Around that time,

the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) received a report that

Marty had sexually abused then-four-year-old Ida. During a forensic interview, Ida

disclosed that Marty told her “[to] lick his weenie” and that he had touched her

vagina with his hand. However, after making the outcry, Ida recanted, stating that

“it didn’t happen because she didn’t want to talk about.” DFPS concluded that there

was “reason to believe” the sexual-abuse allegations. Mother completed family-

based safety services, and Ida was provided therapy.

After the sexual abuse, Ida went to live with her maternal grandmother

(Grandmother). Mother testified that she believed that Marty had sexually abused

Ida, but she nonetheless allowed Marty to continue residing with her, Aaron, Norm,

Ned, and Angela. Mother acknowledged that Ida saw Marty “a few times” after the

sexual abuse “but not by herself.”

Mother also testified that Marty used illegal drugs. After twins Ned and

Angela were born in June 2017—but before twins Ethan and Gina were born in

4 September 2019—Marty introduced her to cocaine and Ecstasy, and Mother started

using those drugs. Marty moved out “for the last time” two weeks after Ethan and

Gina were born. She claimed that Marty was no longer around the children after that.

Mother testified that, in 2020 or 2021, she moved all of her children to

Grandmother’s house and placed the children in Grandmother’s care. Mother

continued to live in her own apartment and “would go back and forth” to

Grandmother’s house to help care for the children. Mother acknowledged that she

would “go [to Grandmother’s house] when [she] wanted to” and “leave when [she]

wanted to.” Mother testified that, after the children began living with Grandmother,

she began using methamphetamine.

In November 2021, DFPS received a report that Marty was engaging in

inappropriate communications with Ida. In the removal affidavit—a copy of which

was admitted into evidence at trial—DFPS investigator Kyra Thomas testified that

Ida “made an outcry on TikTok stating that [Marty sent] her pictures of girls kissing

and dressed inappropriately.” Thomas stated, “There are concerns that [Marty] ha[d]

been stalking the home and may still have contact with the children.”

DFPS caseworker, Alicia Balfour, sought to talk to the children, but Mother

told her that she could not speak to the children without a court order. DFPS

caseworker Makayla Gorden spoke to Ida’s father, who said that he been trying to

see Ida, but Mother had “denied [him] access to the child.” Ida’s father told the

5 caseworker that he was “concerned for [Ida’s] safety as [Marty] was stalking the

children and was sending inappropriate messages to [Ida].” He also told Gorden that

“[Marty] indecently exposed himself to the children.”

Gorden continued her efforts to interview the children without success. She

contacted the Harris County Sheriff’s Department to conduct a welfare check on the

children, and Deputy Hudson was dispatched to the home. On January 28, 2022,

Deputy Hudson called Gorden. He said that the visit was unsuccessful because

Mother would not open the door for him.

On February 14, 2022, DFPS received a report that the children were “left

unattended and [were] underweight for their age.” According to the report, Mother

“does not care about her children and [leaves] them to fend for themselves.”

In April 2022, Mother moved from her apartment to Grandmother’s house to

live with her children. That same month, DFPS received a report from law

enforcement that Mother had “let the children run around” outside between 3 a.m.

and 4 a.m. “breaking windows.” According to the report, the children were “covered

in marks and bruises on theirs arms and legs.”

On May 7, 2022, DFPS received a report that two-year-old Ethan was

“running around the street and running through the yard with no supervision.” Law

enforcement was dispatched and found Ethan “to have no clothes or diaper on” when

they arrived. Ten days later, DFPS received a report of “physical neglect.” When

6 law enforcement arrived, they found the home in a “deplorable” condition “due to

flies, maggots, and gnats.” There was “garbage, rotten food, and clutter all over the

home.” The following week DFPS received a report that the home was “unlivable

due to [urine] on the floor, holes in the wall, and fecal matter on the walls.” The next

day, DFPS received a report the children did not have clean clothes to wear and that

the home was “unsanitary due to trash, flies, roaches, [and] clutter.” The report stated

that Mother was “an intravenous drug user and that she is rarely home to care for the

children, so they are left with . . . their elderly grandmother.”

On May 27, 2022, DFPS received another report of physical neglect for the

children describing unsanitary conditions in the home, including that the floor was

“covered with toys, trash, food, [and] feces both from the dog and human.” That

same day, DFPS investigator Thomas went to the residence. Mother was not home,

but Grandmother permitted Thomas to enter to conduct a home assessment.

Grandmother escorted Thomas to the kitchen and turned on the light. In the

removal affidavit, Thomas testified that she observed “roaches scattering on the floor

and countertops, old food containers scattered on the floor and counters, [and] dirty

dishes overflowing out of the sink.” There were “flies and gnats on the dishes piled

in the sink.” She also saw dirty dishes in the bathroom sink. Thomas observed “eight

or nine bags of garbage next to the kitchen” and garbage in other areas of the home.

There were “more old food containers throughout the home” as well as piles of

7 clothes and other items. There “were red stains and holes in the walls throughout the

home,” and the home “smelled of urine, trash, and mold.”

Law enforcement officers were also present during the assessment, including

Deputy J. Guajardo with the Harris County Constable’s Office. Deputy Guajardo

told Investigator Thomas that he was familiar with Mother because he had responded

to emergency calls at her apartment. Deputy Guajardo conveyed that, when Mother

“consume[d] drugs,” she “would “hallucinate” about men “trying to attack her,” and

she would call the police. When police responded, the calls would be determined to

be unfounded. Deputy Guajardo stated the Mother had recently moved into

Grandmother’s home.

Deputy Guajardo also told Thomas that he had responded to calls at

Grandmother’s home. He said that, one month earlier, Grandmother called the police

“because the children would not go to bed.” Grandmother had allowed Deputy

Guajardo to enter the home where he observed “dog and cat feces, old diapers, and

old food.” He said that the Grandmother needed help with the children, stating that

“the children get out of the home at all hours of the night.” He conveyed that “the

children [had] pushed the a/c unit out of their bedroom window, went next door, and

busted out the neighbor’s bedroom windows.”

During the home assessment, Thomas was able to speak with Mother. Thomas

asked Mother for the names of relatives with whom the children could be placed, but

8 none of the relatives identified by Mother could take the children. Mother told

Thomas that Marty was the father of her six youngest children but said that he was

“not in the picture” because he had “molest[ed] and rap[ed]” Ida.

Thomas also spoke to Ida’s father, who said that he “ha[d] been trying to get

his daughter from [Mother], but she would not allow him to.” He also stated that he

was “willing to care for [Ida], but not the other children.”

Thomas testified in the removal affidavit that she removed the children from

the home after concluding that they were in immediate danger. Ida was picked up by

her father, and the six younger children were placed in foster care.

On May 31, 2022, DFPS filed a petition in intervention in a suit that was

initiated in 2016 by the Texas Attorney General’s Office against Marty, which

sought child support from him for Aaron, Norm, Ned, and Angela. In the

intervention petition, DFPS sought temporary sole managing conservatorship of the

four children. DFPS also sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights if reunification

could not be achieved. That same day, DFPS initiated a separate suit, seeking

termination of Mother’s parental right to the youngest twins—Ethan and Gina.3 In

both suits, the trial court appointed DFPS as the children’s temporary sole managing

3 DFPS also sought to terminate Marty’s parental rights to the children, but he is not a party to either appeal.

9 conservator. Ida was picked up by her father, and DFPS did not include her in the

termination suits.

On July 19, 2022, the trial court approved DFPS’s family service plan for

Mother. The service plan listed tasks and services that Mother needed to complete

for reunification with her six children. Among these tasks and services, Mother was

required to (1) maintain legal and verifiable employment and provide her caseworker

with her most recent pay stubs, (2) maintain a safe, stable, and livable home for a

period of six months, (3) attend all court hearings, visits, and permanency meetings,

(4) participate in parenting classes, (5) submit to random drug testing, (6) complete

a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, including inpatient

care, (7) complete a psychological assessment, (8) complete individual counseling,

and (9) complete a victim domestic violence course.

After Mother failed to complete the family service plan, DFPS pursued the

termination of Mother’s parental rights to her six children. The 2016 and 2022 cases

were tried together to the bench. Before trial, Marty signed affidavits relinquishing

his parental rights to the six children.

Trial commenced in November 2023. After one day of testimony, trial was

recessed. Trial resumed in January 2024 and concluded after three days of testimony.

Among DFPS’s admitted trial exhibits were Thomas’s removal affidavit,

photographs of the interior of Grandmother’s home taken by Thomas, Mother’s

10 family service plan, and Mother’s drug-test results. DFPS’s first witness was Bruce

Jeffries, a drug-testing expert. He testified that Mother’s hair follicle test from June

2, 2022 was positive for methamphetamine and Xanax. Mother’s urine test from that

same day was also positive for methamphetamine and Xanax. Jeffries testified that

the life span for methamphetamine in urine is one to three days. He agreed that,

because the children were removed on May 31, it was possible that Mother used

methamphetamine on the day of removal. Jeffries testified that the positive hair

follicle test would indicate drug use “back to February 22, 2022,” meaning that

Mother used methamphetamine between June 2 and February 22, 2022.

Mother also submitted to an ethyl glucuronide (ETG) test on June 2, which

tests for alcohol consumption within the last 80 hours. Jeffries explained that Mother

tested positive for “a very high level of alcohol.” He stated, “It’s a level we don’t

see every day. That’s for sure.”

On August 5, 2022, Mother submitted to a urine test, which Jeffries confirmed

was positive for methamphetamine and Xanax, and he confirmed that on August 21,

2022, Mother’s hair follicle test was positive for methamphetamine and

hydrocodone. Jeffries testified that Mother’s hair follicle test for September 21,

2022, showed that her methamphetamine level had tripled since June 2.

Mother was again tested on October 28, 2022. The urinalysis showed that

Mother’s ETG level was 46,900, which Jeffries testified was “reaching a tier or

11 echelon of heavy alcohol intake.” Jeffries stated that Mother’s urine also tested

positive for methamphetamine, Xanax, and nordazepam, which “can be Valium.”

Jeffries testified that, from the drug-testing documentation, he could tell that Mother

did not have prescriptions for Xanax or nordazepam.

Jeffries also testified about Mother’s March 21, 2023 hair follicle test. He

stated that, while her methamphetamine levels had dropped, Mother tested positive

for cocaine—a “new drug” for Mother. Finally, Jeffries testified that Mother’s hair

follicle test on November 8, 2023—one week before trial commenced—was positive

for methamphetamine, cocaine, and tramadol.

DFPS next called Deputy Guajardo to testify. He testified that he first met

Mother in 2021 when he began responding to her emergency calls. He said that

Mother would call the dispatcher “frantic” claiming that someone was breaking into

her apartment. But, when law enforcement responded to her home, there would be

no sign of what Mother had reported. Deputy Guajardo stated that, in a nine-month

period, law enforcement responded to almost 100 calls at Mother’s apartment. He

confirmed that the children were not there when he responded to the calls. He

explained that he had taken Mother to the hospital ten to fifteen times under

emergency detention orders for psychological evaluations because he had been

concerned about Mother’s “abnormal behavioral pattern.” He further explained that

that Mother would “put herself in harm’s way by hitting people, by yelling at people,

12 numerous neighbors would call in and say, Hey, there’s a lady out here screaming at

the top of her lungs at us and [we have] no idea why.” Deputy Guajardo testified

that, once the psychological evaluation was completed, the hospital would release

Mother, and they would be “back to square one” with her calling the police with

false reports.

Deputy Guajardo testified that Mother had a drug and alcohol addiction and

appeared intoxicated “[m]ost of the time.” When asked whether Mother’s family

members tried to help her, Deputy Guajardo named Mother’s brother, Doug, who

was present “90 percent of the time” at Mother’s residence.

Deputy Guajardo also responded to calls at Grandmother’s home about ten

times where he observed the children living in the home. Deputy Guajardo described

the home as “a one-story wood frame structure with a brick facia, unkept lawn front

and back, [and] inhumane living conditions in the interior of the home.” There,

Deputy Guajardo “saw dogs, cats, dog feces, cat feces on the floor, piles of clothing

and boxes everywhere, just deplorable living conditions.” He stated that it was

difficult to enter the house because “things [were] blocking the door and just stuff

everywhere in the house.” He could enter only two or three feet inside the house and

noted that “the smell was unbearable.” He testified that, every time he saw the

children, they were “ unclean, unhygienic, not groomed, not kept” and “needed

attention.”

13 DFPS called Thomas to testify about the children’s removal from the home.

Her trial testimony was similar to her testimony in the removal affidavit. At trial,

Thomas described the interior of Grandmother’s home where the children were

living. She testified that the conditions in the home were “deplorable.” She saw bags

of trash in the kitchen along with “old food containers, old food, [and] dirty dishes.”

When Grandmother turned on the lights, “there were roaches everywhere.” Thomas

referenced one of the photos admitted into evidence, pointing to what she called a

“roach nest” near the kitchen sink. Thomas testified that there were dirty dishes and

trash in the bathroom. The bathroom flooring had been removed, and there were

holes in the walls. Thomas found four of the children sleeping in a bedroom. The

bedroom was filed with piles of clothing and trash. Three of the children were asleep

in the bed and a fourth child was asleep “on the floor, on the clothing and trash piles.”

Thomas testified that an unknown substance was “splattered” on the walls of the

home, and her testimony indicated that there was trash, piles of clothing, old

furniture, and other clutter throughout the home. She testified that the odor in the

home “was a mix of like urine and like feces.” While she testified, Thomas was

shown photographs that she had taken of the home on the day of removal. The

photographs corroborated her testimony describing the “deplorable conditions.”

Thomas testified that she removed the children from the home because they were in

“immediate danger” due to the home’s condition. The children were taken to the

14 hospital for a medical evaluation. Thomas testified that she observed “small bites”

on the children’s bodies, which the medical evaluation determined to be from bed

bugs.

DFPS also called the conservatorship caseworker, Andrea Johnson, to testify.

Johnson was assigned to the case in October 2022. She verified that she had reviewed

the family service plan with Mother. Johnson confirmed that Mother had completed

parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, individual counseling, a substance

abuse assessment, and substance abuse classes. The substance abuse assessment

recommended that Mother attend inpatient treatment. Johnson testified that Mother

would not agree to attend inpatient therapy, but she had agreed to attend a “detox

program.” Mother finished the detox program in January 2023 but continued to test

positive for illegal drugs after she completed the program. In March 2023, Mother’s

hair tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. Mother completed outpatient

drug treatment in August 2023, but her hair tested positive for methamphetamine

and cocaine in November 2023. Mother never completed the recommended inpatient

treatment and never told Johnson why she did not complete it.

Johnson testified that Mother was ordered by the trial court to submit to drug

testing at least seven times but only submitted to three court-ordered drug tests.

Johnson testified that, under the terms of the family service plan, a missed drug test

was considered a positive test. In addition to court-ordered drug tests, Mother was

15 required to submit to random drug tests requested by Johnson. Johnson testified that,

for a period of at least eight months, Mother missed the requested random drug tests.

In January 2023, Mother told Johnson that there was “no point” for her to take the

drug test because it would be positive.

Johnson testified that Mother had also failed to maintain employment.

Johnson explained to Mother that the family service plan required her to provide pay

stubs to show that she was employed. Mother told Johnson that she had received job

offers but did not take the jobs because she did not have adequate transportation.

Johnson testified that she did not know how Mother was supporting herself.

When asked whether Mother had a suitable place to live, Johnson testified that

Mother was “living with someone,” but Johnson did not know “about the living

conditions of the home.” The family service plan required Mother to demonstrate

appropriate housing “by providing a copy of a lease agreement and through home

visits by the caseworker.” Johnson testified that Mother had not asked her to visit

the home and had not provided a lease to her. Mother had “only provided a letter

from the person that she is living with to say that . . . she currently live[d] with them.”

Johnson testified that Mother had two monthly scheduled visitations with the

children. Mother was late to about 80 percent of the visits, but “she [was]

appropriate” during the visits. Johnson said that Mother tried “to engage” with the

16 children both together and individually and that Mother would bring games, snacks,

and educational materials to the visits.

The six children were placed in three separate foster homes. The oldest two

children—Aaron and Norm—were together in a foster home. The older twins—Ned

and Angela—were in a second foster home, and the youngest twins—Ethan and

Gina—were in a third foster home.

Johnson testified that Aaron (age nine) and Norm (age seven) arrived in their

current foster placement in March 2023. They lived with their foster mother, her

biological son, and another male foster child. Johnson testified that the foster mother

wants to adopt Aaron and Norm. Johnson described the foster home as providing

structure for the children because the family follows a morning and afternoon

routine. For instance, after school the children do homework and engage in activities

as a family, such as playing games or watching movies.

Johnson stated that, when they were removed from Mother’s home, Aaron—

then age seven—and Norm—then age six—had not been attending school and could

not read. Johnson stated that, “[a]t the beginning of the case,” Aaron received Fs in

every subject in school. Since being with his foster mother, Aaron has “made great

improvement” and was receiving Bs in all subjects. Johnson said that Aaron still had

some anger issues, but she had been working with him on those issues. She testified

that Aaron and Norm both received therapy after their removal from Mother.

17 Johnson testified that Norm “struggled” after the removal “but not as much as

[Aaron].” She said that Norm went from receiving Fs to being on the A and B honor

roll during the current school year. The foster mother and the children attend church,

and Norm “likes that a lot.”

Johnson next addressed six-year-old twins Ned and Angela. She testified that

they live in an adoptive placement with a foster mom, foster dad, and nine-year-old

foster brother. Johnson confirmed that they have been in the placement since their

removal from Mother.

When asked about Ned and Angela’s daily routine, Johnson testified that in

the morning the children get dressed, make their beds, have breakfast, and go to

school. They are involved in afterschool sports activities, such as golf and tennis.

The children then come home, do homework, eat dinner, take a bath, and go to bed.

The children attend family gatherings with the foster parents’ extended family and

call the foster mother’s father “papa.” Johnson testified that Ned and Angela are in

first grade. They required “tutorials to get on track” in kindergarten and were

currently doing well in school. She said that the foster mother “was really good with

doing activities with [Ned and Angela]” to help with their reading.

Regarding the youngest twins—four-year-old Ethan and Gina—Johnson

testified that they have been in the same adoptive placement since their removal.

They live with a foster mother and foster father are the only children in the home.

18 Ethan and Gina attend preschool five days a week, which they like, and are

“very, very smart.” She testified that the foster parents are teaching them colors,

shapes, and letters, both in Spanish and in English. She remarked that the twins “are

very advanced for their age.” Johnson stated that the twins interact with the foster

parents’ extended family and “been on trips a few times” to visit family.

Because their foster homes are part of the same foster care agency, Johnson

testified that of Ned, Angela, Ethan, and Gina have visited each other outside of their

scheduled visitations with Mother. She said that Aaron and Norm’s foster parents

were open to discussing visitation with the younger four siblings.

When asked why DFPS sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights, Johnson

testified, “Due to how the children came into care and the current circumstances, if

they are put back in that same situation, it would not be healthy mentally, physically

for the children.” She pointed out that Mother “does not have stable housing or

employment to take care of the children.” She noted that Mother was using drugs

when the children were removed and that Mother’s drug use continued throughout

the case. Johnson stated that Mother had not been parenting her children, noting that

Mother had “basically given” them to Grandmother. Johnson testified that, at the

time of removal, the children’s needs were not being met. When asked how, Johnson

testified, “Hygiene for one, education for another. . . . They were missing meals, not

eating as they should be.” When asked how she knew that the children missed meals,

19 Johnson explained that the younger children were underweight. She also stated that,

once in their foster placements, the children “hoard[ed] food,” indicating that

“previously they had to go without food.”

DFPS also called Ned and Angela’s foster mother (Foster Mom) to testify.

Foster Mom confirmed that the twins had been living with her since removal. Foster

Mom testified that, when they first came to her home, the two children were

underweight for their age. Ned was 21 pounds, Angela was 23 pounds, and both

wore size 18-month clothing despite being almost five years old. Foster Mom stated

that Angela had severe tooth decay that “caused her a lot of pain eating and

drinking.” Since their placement with her, the twins had almost doubled in weight

and had received dental care.

Foster Mom testified that, initially, Ned and Angela “would eat anything” and

would “hide food consistently.” She found food “under couches, under beds, [and]

in the bathroom.” The twins “would want to eat from a can directly” instead of from

a plate. Other than chips and candy, Ned and Angela did not know the names of

foods. For example, when Foster Mom asked them if they liked cheeseburgers or

spaghetti, they “didn’t know what any of that was.”

Foster Mom testified that, when the children initially arrived, they had bed

bug bites, scars, and scratches “everywhere” on their bodies. She explained that she

had “to fill out an intake form showing the marks on their bod[ies] when we got

20 them, and there were so many that I didn’t know how to notate them all on the sheet.

There were just so many.” She added that the children “had not had a bath or brushed

their hair for . . . for some time.”

Foster Mom testified that Ned and Angela did not understand routine when

they arrived. She explained that they did not understand day or night, days of the

week, or when to wake up or go to bed. She described how she established a

consistent routine with the children but stated that it was “very difficult” because

they “would get overstimulated and tired.”

When asked how Ned and Angela are doing in school, Foster Mom stated,

“Beautifully.” She explained that “[t]hey were behind at first, even just going into

kindergarten” because they “didn’t know letters or numbers or words or. . . just

schedule.” Foster Mom stated that she initially placed them in a pre-K program and

then provided them with a tutor while they were in kindergarten. She stated that she

reads with them at least 20 minutes every night and that they excel in school.

Mother confirmed that she was committed to adopting Ned and Angela if

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. When asked if she would allow Ned and

Angela to maintain contact with their siblings, Foster Mom testified that they already

meet with their siblings and would “love to” maintain that relationship.

Foster Mom also testified that Ned and Angela made outcries of abuse to her.

Angela told Foster Mom that Mother made her and Ned put cigarettes in their mouths

21 and smoke. Angela told Foster Mom that it made her sick and that it was

“disgusting.” Foster Mom said that Ned confirmed what Angela said.

Angela also told Foster Mom that, when they would “get in trouble,”

Grandmother would call Mother and Mother’s brother Doug to come to the house.

Angela and Ned referred to Doug as “the punisher” and disclosed that Doug would

“Tase them with a Taser” as punishment. Foster Mom testified that Angela had

scarring that “matched up with Taser marks.” The children also disclosed that Doug

would “hit them with hangers” and “would point a gun at them and pull the trigger.”

In addition, the children told Foster Mom that Mother and Grandmother had

forced them to drink alcohol, including beer and mixed drinks with liquor. Ned told

Foster Mom that drinking the alcohol made him feel sick. He also told Foster Mom

about an incident during which Grandmother became angry with Angela for eating

her younger sibling’s snack and slammed Angela’s face into a closet door, causing

her nose to bleed. Foster Mom said that Angela confirmed that the incident had

occurred. Angela also told Foster Mom that Grandmother “had a gun and she would

use the gun to shoot rats and that she would hold the gun to their heads and pull the

trigger.” Foster Mom testified that, since the outcries, Ned and Angela began

therapy, which they attend twice a month.

Foster Mother testified that she had taken Ned and Angela to parent-child

visits with Mother throughout the case. She testified that the children would ask her

22 every week whether they had to go to the visits. She added that they “start worrying

about it early on” before the visit. Foster Mother stated that the children become

“very nervous” and “sometimes they cry, sometimes they’re mad and don’t want to

go.” She said that on the way to the visits the children will get headaches. Sometimes

the children would “start talking about memories of abuse” and would become “very

nervous.” When they arrive at the visits, Foster Mom said that Ned and Angela have

“nervous excitement,” meaning that they have “a lot of anxiety” that they “don’t

know what to do with it.” They would tell Foster Mom that they wanted her to stay

or that they did not want to see Mother.

Foster Mom testified that Ned’s and Angela’s reaction to each visit depended

on whether it was “a good visit or a bad visit.” Foster Mom stated that, if it was “a

good visit,” the children would “get in the car, maybe share a couple of things and

then they crash[ed].” She said that, by the time they arrived home, the children would

be “back to normal.” But, if it was a “bad visit,” then Ned would experience night

terrors and wet the bed. She said that the children would have a “bad visit” about

once per month. Foster Mom described a bad visit as one where Mother told the

children that she was fighting to get them back. She said that would “send the

children [into] a panic.” Also, if Mother brought her brother Doug or Grandmother

to a visit, or if the children saw them outside in the car, that would “trigger a bad

visit.” Foster Mom testified that she saw Doug at two visits and that sometimes

23 Mother drove Doug’s car to the visits. The children would recognize the car and “be

in fear that he [was] there.” Foster Mom testified that Mother brought Grandmother

to two or three visits. She said that, when the children saw Grandmother, they would

“get right in between my legs, in between my arms and they will not leave my side.”

Mother explained that the effect of a bad visit would last “[a] good next 24 hours,”

and she would need to give the children’s teachers “a heads-up that it didn’t go well.”

Foster Mom described a visit she attended on November 7, 2023, that

concerned her. While she was in the waiting room, Ned and Angela came out of the

visitation room panicked because Mother told them that she was “going to take

[them] away” from Foster Mom. Mother told Ned and Angela that she would get a

dog for them and take them to a hotel so that they can go live with her. The children

told Foster Mom that they wanted to stay with her and not go with Mother. Foster

Mom testified that, after that visit, Ned had night terrors for a week and a week or

two of bed wetting. When asked whether she thought the visits with Mother were

good for Ned and Angela, Foster Mother testified that the children dread the visits

and had not wanted to attend them since the beginning. She said that the visits were

disruptive to children’s progress and to their lives and that the children were

“pull[ed] backwards every time [they had] one of those visits.”

DFPS also called Dorothy Florian-Lacy, a licensed therapist who had treated

Aaron, Norm, Ned, and Angela. She had provided individual counseling for Aaron

24 and Norm twice each month from May 2023 to December 2023. She began working

with Ned and Angela in February 2023 and continued to provide services to them.

Florian-Lacy testified that she observed two visits between Mother and the

children to understand the sibling dynamics and their attachment to Mother. She

observed that Aaron appeared to be bonded to Mother in “a superficial way,” but

agreed that Aaron was happy to see Mother. Florian-Lacy testified that Norm “was

[a] little bit more glued to [Mother’s] phone and playing games on the phone,” but

he also seemed happy to see Mother. Florian-Lacy testified that Ned and Angela

showed more affection toward Mother than the other children.

Florian-Lacy’s overall observation about the two visits was that Mother

“wanted to convey that reunification [with the children] was a possibility.” Florian-

Lacy recalled that Mother asked the children if they wanted to come live with her.

When the answer was not an immediate “yes,” Mother “made it be known [to the

children] that her feelings were hurt” and asked the children why they did not want

to live with her when she had “things set up.” When asked whether Mother’s remarks

were appropriate, Florian-Lacy testified that she believes that it is “not kind” to

promise children “things that we can’t deliver.”

From her therapy sessions with the children, Florian-Lacy learned that the

children “realized that [Mother] can want things but it doesn’t necessarily come to

fruition.” She testified that Aaron “still wants to believe” Mother and “still holds out

25 hope” for reunification, but the younger children “have more of a reality-based

experience.” Florian-Lacy explained that Aaron’s willingness to believe Mother’s

promises had caused some “friction” between Aaron and Norm.

Florian-Lacy also testified that, because he hoped to reunify with Mother,

Aaron felt like he did not need “to really attach or follow the routines in [the] foster

home.” She said that Aaron’s behavior when he arrived at the foster home was “was

consistent with a pattern of dysfunction.” Initially, Aaron gave “a lot of pushback”

and did not want to bathe every day or clean his room. Florian-Lacy testified that

she had worked with Aaron on those issues and explained that Aaron needed

consistency to thrive. She said that the foster family provided that. When asked what

evidence of trauma she saw, Florian-Lacy testified that Aaron had “clear emotional

dysregulation.” She described Aaron as “emotionally fragile,” explaining that he

would cry, scream, and become upset “when he doesn’t get his own way.” She stated

that was “[n]ot typical of children his same age.” In her opinion, returning Aaron to

Mother would “retraumatize him.”

Similarly, when she began working with Norm, it “appeared that structure and

routine were . . . being introduced for the first time.” She explained that the “foster

family does a lot in the way of proactive structuring and reward systems.” She stated

that Aaron and Norm had “gravitated to that structure very nicely.”

26 Florian-Lacy testified that, initially, Ned and Angela’s issues involved

improper verbalizations, such as calling each other “stupid or ugly,” but they had

learned to talk in a more considerate fashion. She stated that Ned and Angela had

made progress in their interactions with each other, their siblings, and the foster

family. She agreed that their foster home was a “healthy environment,” explaining

that Ned’s and Angela’s foster parents “went [to] great lengths to implement just

routines and structure with a lot of positive reinforcement.” She testified that, in her

opinion, reunification with Mother would “retraumatize” Ned and Angela.

Wendy Schroeder, a CASA volunteer, testified that she worked primarily with

the four youngest children—Ned, Angela, Ethan, and Gina. Schroeder explained that

she saw the children once or twice a month, both at the family visitations with

Mother and outside those visits. She stated that she had attended at least 24 family

visitations between Mother and the children.

Schroeder recommended that Mother’s parental rights to the four youngest

children be terminated. She explained that all of the children had expressed to her

that they did not want to see Mother, and she had observed the children being

reluctant to attend the family visits. She said that, at times, she had to hold the

children’s hands and “lead them into the visitation room just to get them in there.”

Schroeder also “witnessed whenever [the children] go out to use the restroom”

during the family visits, they did not want to return to the visitation room with

27 Mother. And she would “have to sometimes pull them away from the foster mother

to get them to go back into the room.”

Schroeder testified that she had visited Ethan’s and Gina’s foster home around

17 times. She said that the foster parents were “very interactive with the children”

and that the foster mom was “very engaged.” Before they started pre-K, the foster

mother stayed at home all day with the Ethan and Gina. Now that they are in pre-K,

the foster mother volunteers at their school. Schroeder said that, when the foster dad

comes home, “the kids are very excited and they dance with him, they turn on music

on the TV.” Schroeder stated that the children are “well taken care of” and “well

groomed.” She described the foster home as “a very loving environment” and

described Ethan and Gina as “happy.”

Schroeder further testified that Ned and Angela’s foster home was “a very,

very good environment” and that the children were “very happy and they [were]

progressing so well.” She added, “The house is a family.”

The other CASA volunteer, Jan Farrel, also testified. She worked primarily

with the oldest two children—Aaron and Norm. Like Schroeder, Ferrell

recommended that Mother’s parental rights to the children be terminated. She stated

that termination would “give the children an opportunity to progress, stay where they

are, [and] be adopted.” She testified that, during the pendency of the case, the oldest

child, Aaron, had changed his mind about reunifying with Mother. She noted, that

28 during the family visitations with Mother, she observed Aaron sitting on the couch

playing with a phone or playing with his siblings, but he rarely interacted with

Mother. Ferrell stated that Aaron’s current desire not to return to Mother was in his

best interest.

Mother’s attorney called her to testify. In addition to her testimony discussed

above, Mother testified that she lived with a friend and her mother. She described

the residence as a four bedroom, two bath house. She said that she paid $500 in rent

for two of the bedrooms where she and the children could live. When asked how she

made money, Mother responded that she babysat or “did odd jobs or whatever.” She

also worked “as needed” at a security job where she was paid in cash. And

sometimes her family helped her pay rent. Mother admitted that she had not provided

the required proof of employment to DFPS. She testified that she had applied for

jobs, but her lack of transportation made it difficult to maintain one.

When asked why her older children had not attended school, she said it was

because of Covid. She stated that she was unable to obtain the laptop computers

needed for the children to engage in remote learning.

When asked to explain the unsanitary condition of Grandmother’s home,

Mother testified that, because she “wasn’t there all the time,” she could not explain

how it happened.” But, in an attempt to address the home’s condition, Mother said

that the children had a food fight on the day that they were removed. Mother also

29 said that she had moved her belongings to the home in boxes and that the children

had gotten into the boxes.

Mother completed the individual counseling required by her family service

plan, and she testified that from the counseling she had learned to hold herself

accountable for her past conduct and mistakes. When asked for an example of a

mistake that she made, Mother stated, “Doing drugs in the first place.” Mother

testified that she was no longer using drugs. She said that she had been attending AA

meetings for about two months and went to the meetings once a week.

Mother testified that she wanted her children returned to her because she loved

them and did not “want to miss out on any more than what [she] already ha[d] missed

out on.” She explained that her children would benefit from being returned to her

because she is their mother, and nobody would care for them the way that she would.

On cross-examination, Mother admitted that, a couple of months before their

removal, the children told her that Doug “put the Taser” on Ned’s leg and had

“whooped all the kids with [a] belt.” Mother claimed that she had contacted the

police about the incidents and told Grandmother not to allow Doug around the

children. But she acknowledged that Grandmother continued to allow Doug in the

home and that he continued to be around the children.

At the end of trial, the trial court granted DFPS’s request in both cases to

terminate the parent-child relationship between Mother and her children. The trial

30 court signed decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to her six youngest

children, finding that termination was in the children’s best interest and that Mother

had engaged in the predicate acts listed in Family Code subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). Specifically, the trial court found that clear and

convincing evidence showed that (1) Mother knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger their

physical or emotional well-being (subsection (D)); (2) Mother engaged in conduct

or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that

endangered their physical or emotional well-being (subsection (E)); (3) Mother

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the

actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children (subsection (O)); and

(4) Mother used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or

safety of the children and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse

treatment program, or she continued to abuse a controlled substance after completing

such a program (subsection (P)). The trial court also appointed DFPS as the

children’s sole managing conservator.

Mother appealed the decree in each case.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In each appeal, Mother presents the same three issues addressing the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights.

31 A. Standard of Review

A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if DFPS

proves, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the statutory predicate grounds for

termination and proves that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the

child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex.

2012) (recognizing that federal due process clause and Family Code both mandate

“heightened” standard of review of clear and convincing evidence in parental-rights

termination cases). The Family Code defines “clear and convincing evidence” as

“the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”

TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. The standard for reviewing legal and factual sufficiency

of the evidence to support these findings reflect the elevated burden of proof. See In

re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018).

“In conducting a legal-sufficiency review, the reviewing court cannot ignore

undisputed evidence contrary to the finding, but must otherwise assume the

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding.” Id. at 630–31. “Evidence

is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder

could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631.

32 Reviewing the factual sufficiency of evidence “requires weighing disputed

evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” Id. In

so doing, we “must consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable

factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id. “Evidence is

factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant

that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding

was true.” Id. We give due deference to the fact finder’s findings, and we cannot

substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d

105, 108 (Tex. 2006); see In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024)

(“Reviewing courts . . . must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and

logical inferences from the evidence.”).

B. Endangerment Findings

“To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one

termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—

even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” In re N.G.,

577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)).

Nevertheless, due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an

appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under

33 subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E)—the so-called endangerment grounds—when

the trial court’s order of termination contains findings on those grounds. Id. at 237;

In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022). Terminations under subsections

(D) and (E) have special significance because they “may justify termination of

parental rights to other children under subsection (M).” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at

279; see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M).

In her second issue, Mother concedes that, “because she did not go to inpatient

treatment as recommended by her substance abuse assessment,” the evidence was

sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate findings under subsection (O).

However, in her first issue, Mother presents challenges to the legal and factual

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under

subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)—challenges we must address. See In re

R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237.

1. Legal Principles

Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights

if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “knowingly placed

or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which

endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights

if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in

34 conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which

endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of

Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); see In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d

268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (holding that “endanger” means to expose child to loss or

injury or to jeopardize child’s emotional or physical health). A finding of

endangerment requires more than the threat of metaphysical injury or possible ill

effects from a less-than-ideal family environment, but DFPS does not have to prove

that the conduct was directed at the child or that the child suffered an actual injury.

In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803.

While both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ

regarding the source and proof of endangerment. In re J.I.G., No. 01-18-00023-CV,

2018 WL 3233874, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2008, pet. denied)). Subsection (D) “focuses on the child’s environment and may be

utilized as a ground for termination when the parent has ‘knowingly placed or

knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger

the physical or emotional well-being of the child.’” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749

(quoting TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D)); see In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,

125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding, in context of subsection (D)’s

35 focus on child’s living environment, that parental conduct is relevant to child’s

environment). The child’s “environment” encompasses the suitability of the child’s

living conditions and the conduct of parents or others in the home. In re S.R., 452

S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by a parent or other persons who live in

the children’s home can create an environment that endangers the physical and

emotional well-being of children as required for termination under subsection (D).

In re E.J., No. 14-23-00387-CV, 2023 WL 8043686, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Nov. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d

494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)). “As a general rule, conduct that

subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and

emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2004, pet. denied). A single act or omission may support termination under

subsection (D). In re E.J., 2023 WL 8043686, at *9 (citing Jordan v. Dossey, 325

S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)).

Subsection (E) requires evidence that the endangerment was the result of the

parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d

at 360; In re J.I.G., 2018 WL 3233874, at *8; In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.

Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or

omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of

36 conduct by the parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360. “While endangerment often

involves physical endangerment, the statute does not require that conduct be directed

at a child or that the child actually suffers injury; rather, the specific danger to the

child’s well-being may be inferred from parents’ misconduct alone.” Id. (citing

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).

A court may consider actions and inactions occurring both before and after a

child’s birth to establish a “course of conduct.” In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 331

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). A parent’s past endangering

conduct may create an inference that the past conduct may recur and further

jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional well-being. See In re

S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 367; In re M.T.R., 579 S.W.3d 548, 568–69 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

2. Analysis4

Parental neglect “can be just as dangerous to the well-being of a child as direct

physical abuse.” In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 270. Here, the evidence showed that

Mother knowingly allowed her children to reside in unsanitary conditions at

Grandmother’s house. See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at

4 Because both subsection (D) and (E) concern endangerment and the evidence relevant to each subsection may overlap, as it does here, we discuss the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the predicate findings under those subsections together. See In re D.D.D., No. 01-23-00078-CV, 2023 WL 4872399, at *6 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) 37 *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(“Allowing children to live in unsanitary conditions can support a finding that a

parent has endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being.”); In re

P.E.W., 105 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (“[A] child’s

exposure to continually unsanitary living conditions . . . may prove endangerment.”).

Deputy Guajardo testified that Grandmother’s home had “inhumane living

conditions.” Mother attempted to explain the conditions by stating that the children

had a food fight the day they were removed and that the children had gotten into the

boxes containing her belongings. However, Mother’s explanation did not address

the scope of what Deputy Guajardo described inside the home. He testified that he

“saw dogs, cats, dog feces, cat feces on the floor, piles of clothing and boxes

everywhere, just deplorable living conditions.” It was difficult to enter the house

because “things [were] blocking the door and just stuff everywhere in the house,”

and “the smell was unbearable.”

Similarly, DFPS investigator Thomas testified about the “deplorable

conditions” in the home. She stated that she saw bags of trash in the kitchen along

with “old food containers, old food, [and] dirty dishes.” When Grandmother turned

on the lights, “there were roaches everywhere.” Discussing a photograph she had

taken of the kitchen, Thomas pointed to what she described as a “roach nest” near

the sink. She testified that there were dirty dishes and trash in the bathroom. The

38 bathroom flooring had been removed, and there were holes in the walls. One child

was found asleep “on the floor, on the clothing and trash piles.” There was trash,

piles of clothing, old furniture, and other clutter throughout the home and an

unknown substance splattered on the walls. Thomas described the odor as a mixture

of urine and feces. See In re A.T., 406 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,

pet. denied) (holding that evidence of unsanitary conditions in child’s residence—

including dirty clothes, animal feces, and odor of smoke, mold, urine, and feces—

was sufficient to show endangerment); In re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (upholding finding of termination based on evidence

of dirty diapers, trash, feces on the wall, and dirty clothing mingled on floor).

The evidence also indicated that the children’s physical needs were not being

met. The children’s bodies were covered in bed bug bites, and they suffered from

poor hygiene. Deputy Guajardo testified that the children always appeared “unclean,

unhygienic, not groomed, [and] not kept.” Foster Mom testified that Ned and Angela

“had not had a bath or brushed their hair for . . . for some time.” See In re K.S.O.B.,

No. 01-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 1246348, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Mar. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he children’s own uncleanliness constitutes

indicia which may prove endangerment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re

D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (concluding

39 that evidence of home’s unsanitary conditions and child being dirty and covered in

bug bites was sufficient to show endangerment).

Other evidence supported a reasonable inference that the children were not

being properly fed. The younger children, including Ned and Angela, were

underweight for their ages. Several witnesses testified that, once in foster care, the

children hoarded food. Caseworker Johnson testified that the behavior indicated that

the children had been previously deprived of food. See In re L.W., No. 02-18-00107-

CV, 2018 WL 3385694, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (concluding that parent’s failure to provide food for children constituted

voluntary conduct that endangered children). Foster Mom stated that Angela had

severe tooth decay that “caused her a lot of pain eating and drinking.” See In re N.P.,

No. 09-20-00218-CV, 2021 WL 203339, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 21,

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (upholding endangerment finding when record

contained evidence of child’s unaddressed dental issues).

Mother also knowingly allowed the children to reside where she knew they

were exposed to physical, domestic, and sexual abuse. “Sexual abuse is conduct that

endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801,

809 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.); see In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 775 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (“It is beyond question that sexual abuse is

conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.”). Mother

40 testified that Marty sexually abused Ida in 2017 when he was living with her and her

children. Despite her knowledge of the sexual abuse and completing family-based

safety services as a result of the abuse, Mother continued to allow Marty to live with

her and her children—except Ida who lived with Grandmother. Mother had two

more children—Ethan and Gina—with Marty in 2019. Evidence of abuse committed

against one child can support a finding of endangerment against other children who

might later discover the abuse or be abused themselves, even if the other children

were not yet born at the time of the abuse. See In re T.L.E., 579 S.W.3d 616, 625

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); see also In re L.J.H., No. 05-

21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 4260769, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 20, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“[P]redatory or harmful conduct directed at one child will support

termination of parental rights as to a different child, because all children at risk for

the same conduct by the same predator are endangered.”).

“Texas courts have also determined that evidence of a child’s exposure to

domestic violence is supportive of an endangerment finding.” In re M.M.M., No. 01-

17-00980-CV, 2018 WL 1954178, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 26,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see, e.g., In re K.S.O.B., 2019 WL 1246348, at *16

([T]he fact that the children witness violence directed at another member of the

household supports a finding of endangerment.”); In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 350

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (“[A] child can suffer emotional abuse when

41 witnessing domestic violence in the home.”); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (considering fact that mother “exposed her children

to domestic violence,” including incident during which mother was “smacked” in

front of child, as evidence of endangerment). Domestic violence may constitute

endangerment, even if the violence is not directed at the child. In re M.M.M., 2018

WL 1954178, at *12; see In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland

2010, pet. denied) (“Domestic violence may be considered evidence of

endangerment. . . . If a parent abuses or neglects the other parent or other children,

that conduct can be used to support a finding of endangerment even against a child

who was not yet born at the time of the conduct.”).

Mother testified that Marty “always hit her” and had given her a black eye.

She stated that he “banged [her] head against the wall multiple times to where [she]

couldn’t even get up and walk.” She called the police when Marty was abusive, but,

when they arrived, she would tell them that “everything was okay . . . because if

[she] didn’t, [Marty would] beat on [her] more.” Mother recounted that Marty was

taken to jail for one incident. She stated that he “got charged for criminal mischief

for kicking in my front door because he was hitting on me inside—the kids walked

in and seen it—and [he] pulled a knife out on me.” Marty then kicked down the door

to her apartment. Mother and the children were evicted from the apartment because

of the incident. Mother moved to a new apartment and allowed Marty to move in

42 again. See In re S.Z., No. 04-18-00095-CV, 2018 WL 3129442, at *2, *6 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio June 27, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that

evidence was sufficient to support finding that parent placed or allowed child to

remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical and emotional

well-being where parent admitted to history of domestic violence).

In addition, “[d]irect physical abuse is clearly conduct that endangers a child.”

In re G.P., No. 01-16-00346-CV, 2016 WL 6216192, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at

*14 (“[A]busive conduct by a parent or other person in the children’s home may

produce an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the

children.”). “Acts of violence or abuse directed toward one child can endanger other

children who are not the direct victims of the conduct and support termination of

parental rights to the other children.” In re M.F.M., No. 14-23-00974-CV, 2024 WL

3156150, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)

Foster Mom testified that Ned and Angela made an outcry that Mother’s

brother, Doug, had physically abused them. Foster Mom testified that Angela told

her that, when they would “get in trouble,” Grandmother would call Doug to come

to the house. Angela and Ned referred to Doug as “the punisher” and disclosed that

Doug would “Tase them with a Taser” as punishment. Foster Mom testified that

Angela had scarring that “matched up with Taser marks.” The children also

43 disclosed that Doug would “hit them with hangers” and “would point a gun at them

and pull the trigger.”

Mother admitted that, a couple of months before their removal, the children

told her that Doug had tased Ned on his leg and that Doug had “whooped all the kids

with [a] belt.” Mother claimed that she had contacted the police about the incidents

and told Grandmother not to allow Doug around the children. But she acknowledged

that Grandmother continued to allow Doug in the home. The evidence also showed

that, after the children’s removal, Doug was seen with Mother at the family

visitations and that Mother drove Doug’s car to the visitations.

Ned and Angela also made outcries of physical abuse against Grandmother.

Ned told Foster Mom that Grandmother became angry with Angela and slammed

Angela’s face into a closet door, causing her nose to bleed. Foster Mom said that

Angela had confirmed that the incident occurred. Angela also reported that

Grandmother “had a gun and she would use the gun to shoot rats and that she would

hold the gun to their heads and pull the trigger.” Mother did not acknowledge that

she knew about Grandmother’s abuse, but Angela and Ned also disclosed to Foster

Mom that Mother engaged in abusive conduct. They told Foster Mom that Mother

forced them to put cigarettes in their mouths and smoke. Ned and Angela also

disclosed that Mother and Grandmother forced them to drink alcohol, including beer

44 and mixed drinks with liquor. They told Foster Mom that the cigarettes and alcohol

made them feel sick.

Finally, a parent’s use of illegal drugs and the effect on her life and parenting

ability may establish endangering conduct and an endangering environment under

subsections (D) and (E). See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281. The Supreme Court of

Texas has confirmed that endangerment does not require a parent’s drug use to

directly harm the child. Id. at 278. “Instead, a pattern of parental behavior that

presents a substantial risk of harm to the child permits a factfinder to reasonably find

endangerment.” Id.

Here, there was a close temporal relationship between Mother’s pattern of

drug use and the conditions necessitating the children’s removal from her care.

Mother admitted that she began using cocaine and Ecstasy after Ned’s and Angela’s

births in 2017. In 2020 or 2021, the children began living with Grandmother, and

Mother admitted that she began using methamphetamine. As discussed, the evidence

showed that since 2017, the children have been subjected to neglect and abuse. Thus,

Mother’s drug use had a close temporal relationship with the children’s neglect and

abuse, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred that the children’s neglect

and abuse were related to Mother’s drug use. See id. at 278–79.

“[E]vidence that the parent continued to use illegal drugs even though the

parent knew her parental rights were in jeopardy is conduct showing a voluntary,

45 deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, which by its nature, endangers a child’s

well-being.” In re K.A.C., 594 S.W.3d 364, 373 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).

The evidence showed that Mother continued to use illegal drugs during the pendency

of the termination proceedings. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and

Xanax three days after the children’s removal. Over the course of the next 17

months, Mother tested positive for various drugs, including methamphetamine,

cocaine, tramadol, Xanax, hydrocodone, and nordazepam. And two of the ETG tests

showed that Mother had recently consumed high levels of alcohol. One week before

trial commenced, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and

tramadol.

Mother also missed many of the random drug tests required under her family

service plan. The service plan stated that missed drug tests would be deemed to show

positive results. See T. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d

901, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.) (“The factfinder may infer from a

parent’s missing Department-requested illegal-drug tests during a parental-rights-

termination suit that the tests missed would have come up positive.”).

Although she completed outpatient drug treatment, Mother failed to attend

inpatient drug treatment as required by the service plan. See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d

257, 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied) (upholding endangerment

finding, in part, because appellant did not finish service-plan mandated counseling

46 and continued to use drugs in violation of service plan). The trial court could have

reasonably inferred that Mother would continue to use illegal drugs and endanger

the children’s well-being in the future as she had in the past. See In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

and considering undisputed contrary evidence, we conclude that a reasonable

factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that (1) Mother knowingly

placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings

that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children and (2) she

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in

conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d. at 631. Further,

considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting

the finding, a factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that (1) Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in

conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of

the children and (2) she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-

being of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re A.C., 560

S.W.3d at 631. Thus, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient

47 to support the subsection (D) and (E) predicate endangerment findings, and we

overrule Mother’s second issue to the extent it challenges those findings. 5 See In re

A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31.

C. Best-Interest Findings

In her third issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

trial court’s best-interest findings.

The Texas Legislature has listed factors that courts should consider in

determining whether a child’s parent is willing and able to provide the child with a

safe environment, including: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental

vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the

magnitude and frequency of harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the

victim of repeated harm after the initial intervention by DFPS; (5) whether the child

is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) whether there is a history

of abusive or assaultive conduct or substance abuse by the child’s family or others

who have access to the child’s home; (7) the willingness of the child’s family to seek

out, accept, and complete counseling services; (8) the willingness and ability of the

5 Because Mother concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate subsection (O) finding, and we hold that the evidence supports termination of Mother’s parental rights under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we need not separately address Mother’s additional sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge in issue two to the trial court’s subsection (P) predicate finding. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019). 48 child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a

reasonable period of time; and (9) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate

parenting skills, including providing minimally adequate care for the child’s health

and nutritional needs, care consistent with the child’s physical and psychological

development, guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s safety, a safe

physical home environment, and an understanding of the child’s needs and

capabilities. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b).

In Holley v. Adams, the Supreme Court of Texas also identified several non-

exclusive factors that we should consider when determining whether the termination

of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest, including (1) the child’s desires;

(2) the child’s current and future physical and emotional needs; (3) the current and

future physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the person seeking

custody; (5) whether programs are available to assist the person seeking custody in

promoting the best interests of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the person

seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or

omissions of the parent that may indicate the parent-child relationship is not proper;

and (9) any excuse for acts or omissions of the parent. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72

(Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive, and it is not necessary that DFPS

prove all these factors as a condition precedent to parental termination. In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). The absence of evidence concerning some of the

49 factors does not preclude a factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that

termination is in the children’s best interest. In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

The best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective

factors, and the totality of the evidence as well direct evidence. In re B.R., 456

S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). “A trier of fact may

measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” Id.; see In re C.H., 89

S.W.3d at 28 (stating that past performance as parent “could certainly have a bearing

on [parent’s] fitness to provide for [the child]” and indicating courts should consider

prior history of child neglect in best-interest analysis).

2. Analysis

Here, multiple factors support the trial court’s findings that termination of

Mother’s parental rights to the children was in their best interests.

Regarding the first Holley factor—the children’s desires—Mother points out

that CASA volunteer Ferrell testified that Mother loves the children, and the children

love her. She also points out that the evidence showed that the oldest child, Aaron,

had expressed a desire to reunify with her early in the case. However, Ferrell testified

that Aaron’s current desire was not to return to Mother. CASA volunteer Schroeder

testified that the four youngest children expressed to her that they did not want to

50 see Mother, and she had observed the children being reluctant to attend the family

visits. At times, she had to hold the children’s hands and “lead them into the

visitation room just to get them in there.” Schroeder stated that, “whenever [the

children went] to use the restroom,” they did not want to return to the visitation

room, and she would “have to sometimes pull them away from the foster mother to

get them to go back into the room.”

Mother points out that therapist Florian-Lacy testified that she had observed

Ned and Angela climbing up on Mother’s lap during visits and showing more

affection to Mother than the other children. However, Foster Mom testified that Ned

and Angela did not want to attend visits with Mother. She also testified that, if

Mother told Ned and Angela during a visit that she was “fighting to get them back,”

Ned would experience night terrors and wet the bed. Foster Mom testified that,

during one visit, Ned and Angela came out of the visitation room panicked because

Mother had told them that she was “going to take [them] away” from Foster Mom.

They relayed that Mother said that she would get them a dog and take them to a hotel

so that they could live with her. The children told Foster Mom that they wanted to

stay with her and not go with Mother. Foster Mom testified that, after that visit, Ned

had night terrors for a week and wet the bed for a week or two. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b)(5) (providing that court may consider “whether the child is fearful of

living in or returning to the child’s home” in best-interest analysis).

51 The evidence supporting the predicate endangerment findings also supported

the trial court’s findings that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the

children’s best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding that same evidence

may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) and best-interest grounds). As

discussed, the evidence showed that, for several years preceding the children’s

removal, Mother used drugs, namely, methamphetamine, cocaine, and Ecstasy.

“Parental drug abuse reflects poor judgment and may be a factor to consider in

determining a child’s best interest.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(8) (stating

that courts may consider history of substance abuse by child’s family in best-interest

analysis). As the evidence here demonstrated, “drug use can destabilize the home

and expose children to physical and emotional harm if not resolved.” In re A.L.S.,

660 S.W.3d at 275–76.

After she began using drugs, Mother sent the children to live with

Grandmother, while Mother lived separately in an apartment. The evidence showed

that Mother knowingly allowed the children to live in the unsanitary conditions at

Grandmother’s home where their physical needs, such as proper hygiene and

adequate nutrition, were not being met. See In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 119 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“[E]vidence of unsanitary conditions

of a home may support the trial court’s best-interest finding.”). The evidence also

52 showed that, prior to their removal and while she was using drugs, Mother

knowingly allowed the children to be exposed to sexual, domestic, and physical

abuse. See In re K.K., No. 09-20-00300-CV, 2021 WL 2148857, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont May 27, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding that parent’s exposure of

child to domestic violence supported finding that termination was in child’s best

interest); In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d at 778 (stating that parent’s “failure to protect the

emotional well-being of the children following the allegations of sexual abuse”

supported trial court’s best-interest finding); see also TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b)(7) (identifying history of abusive or assaultive conduct by child’s

family as relevant to best-interest analysis). Mother’s drug abuse and her

concomitant failure to care for and protect her children are relevant to multiple

Holley factors, including her parenting abilities, the stability of the home, the

children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, the physical danger

in which the children could be placed now and later, and her acts or omissions

pertinent to determining whether the parent-child relationship is improper. See

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (recognizing pattern of drug abuse relevant to multiple

Holley factors).

The evidence also showed that, despite participating in outpatient substance-

abuse counseling and individual therapy, Mother did not refrain from illegal drug

53 use during the pendency of the termination proceedings. She tested positive for drugs

throughout the proceedings and missed numerous required drug tests, rendering

them presumptively positive. And, although she knew that her parental rights were

in jeopardy, Mother failed to attend inpatient treatment required by her service plan.

See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10), (11) (stating courts may consider willingness

and ability of child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services

and willingness and ability of child’s family to effect positive environmental and

personal changes within reasonable period of time); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372

(listing, as best-interest factor, programs available to assist individuals to promote

best interest of child); see also J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 270 (recognizing that parent’s

failure to refrain from illegal drug use and complete substance-abuse counseling

supported best-interest finding). Given Mother’s history of illegal drug use, her

positive drug tests, and her non-attendance of inpatient treatment, the trial court

could have reasonably inferred that Mother’s drug use would continue in the future,

placing the children at a continued risk for neglect and abuse. See id. The trial court

also could have reasonably inferred that the children remained at risk of physical

abuse by Grandmother and Doug because the evidence showed that Mother

continued to associate with them after removal. For instance, the evidence reflected

that Grandmother and Doug attended some family visits with Mother.

54 The evidence also showed that caseworker Johnson could not verify whether

Mother had safe and stable housing because Mother did not comply with the terms

of her family service plan. The plan required Mother to demonstrate appropriate

housing “by providing a copy of a lease agreement and through home visits by the

caseworker.” Johnson testified that Mother did not ask her to visit the home and had

not provided a lease to her. Mother had “only provided a letter from the person that

she is living with to say that . . . she currently live[d] with them.”

Mother also did not provide proof that she had obtained suitable employment.

Johnson testified that Mother had not provided her with pay stubs as required by the

service plan. Johnson stated that she did not know how Mother was supporting

herself. Mother testified that she earned some money by babysitting and working

security “as needed.” She stated that she was paid in cash.

In short, the evidence was such that the trial court could have reasonably

inferred that Mother did not have stable housing or income during the pendency of

the proceedings. This evidence was probative of the children’s best interest because

“[a] parent who lacks stability, income, and a home is unable to provide for a child’s

emotional and physical needs.” In re J.R.W., No. 14-12-00850-CV, 2013 WL

507325, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 12, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.

op.); see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (best-interest factors include stability of home

and child’s physical and emotional needs); see also In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821

55 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a

stable home, and failure to comply with a family service plan support a finding that

termination is in the best interest of the child.”).

In comparison, the evidence reflected that the three foster families, who cared

for the children and wanted to adopt them, have safe, stable homes, and could

provide the children with permanency. Mother acknowledges in her brief that the

“respective foster caregivers are taking wonderful care of all of the children” and

“are in the best position to care for the present and future physical and emotional

needs of the children.”

The evidence showed that the foster families provided structure, consistency,

and positive reinforcement for the children, all of which they lacked while in

Mother’s care. The families provide healthy environments and encourage healthy

habits in the children, such as personal hygiene. The evidence also showed that the

foster parents have sought services to help the children. For instance, the four oldest

children are in therapy. The foster families have integrated the children into their

respective families while demonstrating a willingness to allow the six siblings to

maintain a relationship.

The evidence demonstrated that, when they came into foster care, the children

were behind academically. Aaron—then age seven—and Norm—then age six—had

not been attending school and could not read. Mother claimed that the children were

56 not in school due to challenges related to the Covid pandemic. See Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 372 (listing any excuse for acts or omissions of parent as best-interest

factor).

While living with the foster families, the children have been attending school,

including the youngest children—Ethan and Gina—who attend preschool. The

foster parents provide a structured and consistent environment, which includes doing

homework, and the foster parents are actively engaged with the children’s education.

By the time of trial, all six children were succeeding academically.

In short, the evidence showed that the children are thriving in their foster

homes. In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470, 476 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied)

(stating that stability and permanence are important to upbringing of child and

affirming finding that termination was in child’s best interest when child was

thriving in foster care). The evidence regarding the foster homes supports the trial

court’s best-interest findings under the following factors: the emotional and physical

needs of the child now and in the future, parental abilities, and the stability of the

home. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372.

We acknowledge that some evidence exists in the record weighing against the

trial court’s best-interest findings. For instance, Mother points out that the evidence

showed that she finished her individual counseling and that she attended all of the

scheduled visits with her children where she appropriately interacted with them.

57 Mother also completed some of the other requirements of her service plan. And she

testified that she had been attending AA for two months and abstaining from drugs.

“Although there is some evidence weighing against the best-interest finding,

evidence cannot be read in isolation; it must be read in the context of the entire

record.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 271. As discussed, the evidence showed that

the children were removed from Mother’s care because they were living in

unsanitary conditions that posed a threat to their physical and emotional well-being.

Mother was also using illegal drugs and had allowed the children to be exposed to

sexual, domestic, and physical abuse. The evidence established that Mother

continued to use drugs throughout the termination proceedings and refused to attend

required inpatient treatment. She also continued to associate with family members

that the children had disclosed physically abused them. The evidence reflected that

Mother had not maintained suitable housing or employment during the proceedings.

On balance, an analysis of the evidence reveals that the applicable Holley and

statutory factors weigh in favor of the best-interest findings. The evidence

reasonably supported implied findings by the trial court that Mother was not willing

or able to address the concerns that had caused the children’s removal in the first

place, including her drug use, and that Mother was unable to provide a stable and

suitable home or the permanency that young children require.

58 Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s best-

interest findings, and considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we

conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See

§ 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Further, considering the entire

record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting the trial court’s

finding, we conclude that a factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best

interests. See § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Therefore, we hold

that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-

interest findings. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31.

We overrule Mother’s third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s decrees of termination.

Richard Hightower Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.