in the Interest of E.F., a Child

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 9, 2021
Docket02-21-00075-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of E.F., a Child (in the Interest of E.F., a Child) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of E.F., a Child, (Tex. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-21-00075-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF E.F., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 30th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. DC30-FM2019-0259

Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

The sole complaint in this termination-of-parental-rights appeal is that the State

failed to sufficiently prove that appellant Father endangered his child Eric according

to Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), after Eric suffered near-fatal

injuries while in Father’s care. After reviewing the entire record and determining that

the Department proved sufficiently that Father endangered Eric, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

Applicable Law and Evidentiary-Sufficiency Standards of Review

Because our appellate review turns solely on applying the Family Code and

evidentiary standards of review to the facts adduced at trial, we dispense with an

introductory recitation of the background facts and begin with the applicable law and

standards of review.

To terminate Father’s parental rights, the Department needed to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that Father’s actions satisfied at least one conduct ground in

Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) and that Eric’s best interest warranted termination.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In

re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). “Clear and convincing” evidence “will produce

in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the

allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C.,

384 S.W.3d at 802. Due process demands this heightened burden of proof because

“[a] parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far more precious than

2 any property right.’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see also E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

Here, the Department alleged two conduct grounds because of Eric’s injuries:

that Father had “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed [Eric] to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed Eric’s] physical or emotional well-

being . . . [and had] (E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [Eric] with persons

who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed Eric’s] physical or emotional well-being.”

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E). “‘[E]ndanger’ means more than a threat

of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,

but . . . endangering conduct need not [even] be directed at the child.” E.N.C.,

384 S.W.3d at 803 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531,

533 (Tex. 1987)).

A single act or omission can support termination under subsection (D), which

focuses on either the parent’s conduct or the conduct of a person with whom the

parent placed the child. In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2003,

pet. denied). Subsection (D) requires us to examine evidence related to a child’s

environment to determine if it was the source of endangerment. In re A.S., No. 02-19-

00429-CV, 2020 WL 2071944, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2020, pet.

denied) (mem. op.).

3 Under section 161.001(1)(E), the parent’s conduct––acts or failures to act––

must directly cause the endangerment. In re R.H., No. 02-20-00396-CV,

2021 WL 2006038, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 20, 2021, no pet.); J.F. v. Tex.

Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-16-00593-CV, 2016 WL 7584309, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Absence of self control and

propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment. J.F.,

2016 WL 7584309, at *7; In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.––Houston

[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

When a party challenges whether the Department produced legally sufficient

evidence to prove a conduct ground, we look at all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the challenged finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder

could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We assume the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in

favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved; we consider undisputed

evidence even if contrary to the challenged finding. Id.

When a party challenges whether the Department’s conduct-ground evidence is

factually sufficient, we must perform “an exacting review of the entire record.” In re

A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). But in doing so, we still give due deference to

the factfinder’s finding; we may not supplant the verdict with our own. In re H.R.M.,

209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We must decide whether a factfinder could

4 reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved the alleged

conduct ground. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17,

28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or

belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.

Under either review, we must remember that only the factfinder may judge the

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

Applicable Facts

Eric’s Injuries

Eric was 28 days old on July 5, 2019, the day he was so severely injured.

Mother had left Eric in Father’s care while she ran errands. Great-grandmother, who

was over 60 years old, had arrived at the house only a short time before Eric was

injured. Only Father and Great-grandmother stayed in the house with Eric.

After Mother had been gone for about 45 minutes to an hour, Father called her

to tell her Eric was “breathing weird.” She went home immediately to find Eric’s face

swollen, his lips turning blue, and his breathing shallow.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Santosky v. Kramer
455 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1982)
In Re J.O.A.
283 S.W.3d 336 (Texas Supreme Court, 2009)
In the Interest of E.N.C., J.A.C., S.A.L., N.A.G. and C.G.L.
384 S.W.3d 796 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd
727 S.W.2d 531 (Texas Supreme Court, 1987)
in the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children
437 S.W.3d 498 (Texas Supreme Court, 2014)
in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child
180 S.W.3d 570 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
in the Interest of A.B., R.B., T.B., C.R. and D.M., Children
125 S.W.3d 769 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
In the Interest of J.I.T.P.
99 S.W.3d 841 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
In the interest of C.H.
89 S.W.3d 17 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.F.C.
96 S.W.3d 256 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
In the Interest of J.L.
163 S.W.3d 79 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
In the Interest of H.R.M.
209 S.W.3d 105 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
In the Interest of E.R.
385 S.W.3d 552 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
in the Interest of E.F., a Child, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-ef-a-child-texapp-2021.