in the Interest of E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 25, 2020·No. 04-20-00081-CV·Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-20-00081-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G., Children

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018PA01841 Honorable John D. Gabriel, Judge Presiding 1

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 25, 2020 AFFIRMED D.T. 2 appeals the trial court’s order, rendered after a bench trial, that terminated the parent-

child relationship between D.T. and six children. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest, and we affirm the trial court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition in August 2018, seeking emergency orders, conservatorship, and termination of parental rights. The trial court rendered an emergency order for the protection of six children, who were then between

1 Senior Judge, sitting by assignment 2 To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the parents and the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

the ages of one month and five years: E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G. The Department was made the children’s temporary managing conservator. The trial court extended the mandatory dismissal date, and the case remained on the court’s docket for over seventeen months before it proceeded to a three-day trial to the court in January 2020. The trial included testimony from eighteen witnesses, including the parents and mother’s new boyfriend, the children’s therapists (Manuel Davis and Donna Carrasco), D.T.’s therapists (Carlos Nunez, Suzanne Martinez Campos, and Christina Gracia), Department witnesses (caseworkers Briana Lane, Rebecca Salinas, and Kristen Torres, and investigation supervisor Marvin Ferris), two parents who fostered the children while the case was pending (K.T. and L.K.), the CASA volunteer, an SAPD detective, and two visitation monitors.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that D.T.

knowingly placed the children in or allowed the children to remain in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children, and failed to comply with court- ordered provisions of the family service plan. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), & (O). The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The trial court rendered judgment terminating the children’s relationship with both their parents and appointed the Department to be their permanent managing conservator.

D.T. timely appealed the termination order. She does not contest the trial court’s findings of grounds to terminate her parental rights. She argues only that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interest.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW To terminate parental rights under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1) and that termination is in the best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(b). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings, we employ a heightened standard of review to determine whether the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266– 67 (Tex. 2002). We review for legal sufficiency by examining the entire record in the light most favorable to the findings, assuming any disputed facts were resolved in favor of the findings if a reasonable factfinder could do so and disregarding any evidence the factfinder reasonably could have disbelieved. See id. at 256. We review for factual sufficiency by evaluating the disputed evidence to determine if it is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief of or conviction on the challenged finding. Id. In our review, we remain mindful that the factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we may not substitute the trial court’s judgment with our own. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

Under Texas law, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). However, a court must also presume that “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a). In making a best-interest determination, the factfinder looks at the entire record and considers all relevant circumstances. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). In determining what is in the child’s best interest, the court may consider evidence about the desires of the child; the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; the emotional and physical danger to the child

now and in the future; the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; the stability of the home or proposed placement; the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. These factors are not exhaustive, and not every factor must be proved to find that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence of only one factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when undisputed evidence shows that the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety. Id. at 28. And, although the mere fact that an act or omission occurred in the past does not establish that termination is currently in the child’s best interest, a parent’s past conduct is probative of her future conduct when evaluating the child’s best interest. See In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).

III. THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS A. The history of abuse and neglect At the time of trial, D.T. was twenty-four years old, with six children aged seven and under.

D.T. and her children had been continuously involved with the Department for almost two and one-half years, and the children had been in foster care for over seventeen months.

The Department received a referral in August 2017, after D.T. called the police to report the children’s father, C.G., had struck her in the face, chased her around the apartment with a machete, and hit one of the children’s head against the tile floor. No criminal charges were filed, but a Department case was opened. A Department investigation supervisor and caseworker Briana Lane testified the Department was concerned about domestic violence, parenting, stability of the

living situation, drug use, and the children’s hygiene. D.T. signed a safety plan agreeing not to allow C.G. to have any contact with the children, and the Department began providing family- based services.

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in the Interest of E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G., (Tex. Ct. App. 2020).

in the Interest of E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G. (in the Interest of E.C.G., J.C.G., J.J.G., J.A.G., J.Z.G., and E.R.G.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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In the interest of C.H.
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