In the Interest of D.Y., D.K., D.K., and D.Y., Minor Children, D.K., Mother
This text of In the Interest of D.Y., D.K., D.K., and D.Y., Minor Children, D.K., Mother (In the Interest of D.Y., D.K., D.K., and D.Y., Minor Children, D.K., Mother) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0255 Filed April 16, 2014
IN THE INTEREST OF D.Y., D.K., D.K., and D.Y., Minor Children,
D.K., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
D.M.K. appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Bryan J. Tingle, Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Katherine Spencer Sargent, Des Moines, for father L.P.
Nathan Mundy, Des Moines, for father D.K.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michelle Chenoweth
and Amanda Johnson, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Charles Fuson, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ. 2
BOWER, J.
D.M.K. appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights.
She claims there is insufficient evidence to support termination, termination is not
in the best interests of the children, and the juvenile court did not need to
terminate her parental rights because the children are currently in the custody of
a relative. Finding sufficient evidence for termination and termination is in the
best interests of the children, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
D.M.K. is the mother of four children. A February 3, 2014 juvenile court
order terminated her parental rights to all four children.1
The children came to the attention of the department of human services
(DHS) in March 2012, when one of the children tested positive for marijuana at
birth. DHS investigated D.M.K. and learned she had a history of drug abuse and
lacked stable housing. Soon thereafter, D.M.K. and the children were unable to
be located by DHS for several months; D.M.K. claimed she was attempting to
avoid a domestic violence situation.
In September 2012, D.M.K. appeared at a DHS office requesting the
children be placed in foster care due to her inability to care for them. At the time
D.M.K. was homeless, was living with relatives who posed a danger to the
children, and a warrant had been issued for her arrest.2 D.M.K. was incarcerated
for much of September and October 2012. Following her release, D.M.K.
claimed to be looking for work and not using drugs, but she refused to provide
1 The rights of the fathers of the children are not a part of this appeal. 2 It was later discovered D.M.K. had, just before requesting foster placement for her children, stabbed her mother’s boyfriend. 3
drug screens. D.M.K. started visits with the children. The DHS caseworker
reported the visits were inconsistent depending upon D.M.K.’s mood. After
initially attending most scheduled visits, D.M.K.’s attendance became erratic.
She often cancelled visits or arrived late. When D.M.K. attended visits, the
children acted out. She remained unemployed and without stable housing.
In April 2013, D.M.K continued to miss drug screens and again was
incarcerated. She failed to provide a substance abuse evaluation and missed
two family team meetings. The children, meanwhile, were doing well in foster
care and appeared to be less upset about missed visits with their mother. D.M.K.
spent a significant portion of 2013 in jail. After her release she attempted to
reestablish contact with the children but continued to miss or arrive late to
scheduled visits.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815, N.W.2d
764, 773 (Iowa 2012). We give weight to the factual findings of the juvenile
court, particularly on matters of credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id.
III. Discussion
D.M.K. claims there is insufficient evidence to terminate her parental
rights, termination is not in the best interests of the children, and the children’s
current placement with relatives makes termination unnecessary.
Termination of parental rights requires a three-step analysis. See In re
P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). If we find grounds for termination under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2013), we proceed to a best interests of the child
analysis under section 232.116(2). Then, we must consider whether any of the 4
exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply. The juvenile court terminated D.M.K.’s
parental rights under section 232.116(b), (f), and (h). Termination requires proof
of only one of the statutory grounds. See In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Iowa
1992).
Section 232.116(1)(b) allows for termination where clear and convincing
evidence establishes the child has been abandoned or deserted. Abandonment
means the rights, duties, or privileges of parenthood have been surrendered with
an intention to abandon with acts establishing the same. Iowa Code § 232.2(1).
There are no minimum time requirements. Id. There must be proof the parent
has given up the responsibilities of being a parent. In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888,
891 (Iowa 1994). Maintaining parental responsibilities requires more than
subjective interests and must rise to the extent of affirmatively engaging as a
parent. Id. Our supreme court has approved of termination on this basis where
the parent continues to engage in sporadic visits. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398,
400–01 (Iowa 1994). We find D.M.K. has abandoned the children. She
requested the children be placed in foster care due to her own problems and has
done nothing to actively parent the children since that time. Her visits have been
inconsistent and often have not occurred at all. There is no evidence of any
attempt to regain the responsibilities of parenthood, and her delivery of the
children to foster care was proof of her intention to relinquish her responsibilities
as a parent.
Turning to the best interests analysis in section 232.116(2), we find
termination to be in the best interests of the children. The condition of the
children has improved in foster care, and the children have shown an increasing 5
lack of interest in maintaining a relationship with D.M.K. The ongoing legal and
substance abuse issues surrounding D.M.K. would place the children in danger
of continued abandonment and would not aid in their long-term growth. The
interests of the children will be best served by termination.
Finally, we consider the statutory exceptions found in section 232.116(3).
D.M.K. claims termination is unnecessary because a relative has custody of the
children. The exceptions are permissive, not mandatory. See P.L. 778 N.W.2d
at 40. We find no reason to decline termination due to the current placement of
the children. D.M.K.’s legal and substance abuse problems remain an on-going
threat to the long-term safety and growth of the children, and termination of her
rights places a wall between her, her problems, and the children.
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