J-S12002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.W.
No. 1544 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-1966
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 08, 2017
Appellant, D.W., appeals from the trial court order denying his petition
for review of the mental health review officer’s certification committing him
to involuntary psychiatric treatment for a period of ninety-days pursuant to
the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). See 50 P.S. § 7304. We affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows.
Appellant is an inmate at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)
Rockview. The psychiatric staff at the prison has followed Appellant
beginning, at the latest, in the summer of 2015. Dr. Kevin Burke, an SCI
Rockview psychiatrist, diagnosed Appellant as suffering from unspecified
psychosis and prescribed medication for his condition. Appellant has
consistently refused to take the prescribed medication and has participated
very minimally in therapy. J-S12002-17
In early August 2016, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant received bad
news about his court proceedings and began to tell prison staff members
that he wanted to take his own life. Dr. Burke opined that Appellant’s
suicidal threats were credible and believed that, without treatment,
Appellant would act on the threat within thirty days. Additionally, Dr. Burke
opined that Appellant was a threat to others because he suffered from a
certain type of paranoid delusions. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that
Appellant believed that certain people within the prison had been surveilling
him and taking his possessions. Due to his incorporation of specific
individuals into his delusions, Dr. Burke noted that the prison had to
sequester Appellant to prevent him from lashing out at these people based
upon his delusional beliefs.
On August 17, 2016, SCI Rockview filed a petition seeking involuntary
psychiatric treatment for Appellant under § 7304 of the MHPA. Finding the
prison established a “serious mental disability” pursuant to the MHPA, the
mental health officer granted the petition following a hearing on August 18,
2016. Appellant filed a petition for review of the mental health officer’s
determination. Following review of the record, the trial court denied
Appellant’s petition, see 50 P.S. § 7109(b), on August 25, 2016. This timely
appeal follows.
On appeal, Appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court erred by
allowing the prison to involuntarily treat him without sufficient evidence to
establish a reasonable probability of death, serious physical debilitation, or
-2- J-S12002-17
serious bodily injury in the imminent future, as required for involuntary
treatment under § 7301(b)(2)(i) of the MHPA. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
We review a trial court’s order for involuntary treatment “not to find
the facts but to determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify
the hearing court’s findings.” Com. ex rel Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d
105, 107 (Pa. 1981). Accordingly, we must accept the factual findings of the
trial court that are supported by the record, but we are not bound by the
legal conclusions a trial court draws from those facts. See id.
A trial court derives its authority to order involuntary psychiatric
treatment from the MHPA. Pursuant to § 7304(a), a trial court may order
involuntary treatment, for a period not exceeding ninety days, if the court
finds that a person is “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.”
A person is considered to be severely mentally disabled under the MHPA
when,
as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
50 P.S. § 7301(a).
To establish that a person is a “clear and present danger” to himself,
evidence must be presented that, within the past thirty days, that
the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
-3- J-S12002-17
and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act;
50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i).
“Recognizing the substantial curtailment of liberty inherent to an
involuntary commitment, our Supreme Court has cautioned that the courts
must strictly interpret and adhere to the statutory requirements for
commitment.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hubert, 430 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Pa. 1981)). This high
standard is not relaxed when applying the MHPA standards to incarcerated
individuals. See Hubert, 430 A.2d at 1162-63. Significantly,
[i]n Gibson . . . our Supreme Court reversed an order for involuntary commitment of a prisoner, finding insufficient evidence that he posed a clear and present danger to himself or others. A psychiatrist had testified that the inmate was schizophrenic with paranoid delusions and opined that he posed a clear and present danger to himself and others. Testimony was also heard that the inmate had been found extinguishing a burning newspaper in his cell, did not regularly take the psychoactive drug prescribed for him, and had a twisted coathanger in his cell. In spite of his testimony, the Court found involuntary commitment improper, citing no evidence of attempted suicide or self-mutilation; no evidence that the newspaper fire was deliberately set; no evidence that the failure to take medication threatened the inmate’s life or well-being; and no evidence that the twisted coathanger was used to threaten or injure anyone. On this record, the Court found that the Commonwealth had not shown “such inability of [the inmate] to attend to his needs as to threaten death, serious bodily injury, or serious physical debilitation.”
In re T.T., 875 A.2d at 1127 (citing Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107) (internal
citations omitted; brackets in original).
-4- J-S12002-17
Here, Appellant argues that, as was the case in Gibson, the prison
officials failed to present evidence to show that he was a clear and present
danger to himself or others. We recognize that there was no evidence
presented to indicate that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of
a threat to commit suicide or self-mutilation. Additionally, no evidence was
offered that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of a threat to
harm others. Therefore, the only basis for involuntary treatment was if the
prison proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant was unable
to care for himself and that there was a reasonable probability of his death,
serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation within thirty days unless
commitment was ordered.
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J-S12002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: D.W.
No. 1544 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-1966
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED MARCH 08, 2017
Appellant, D.W., appeals from the trial court order denying his petition
for review of the mental health review officer’s certification committing him
to involuntary psychiatric treatment for a period of ninety-days pursuant to
the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”). See 50 P.S. § 7304. We affirm.
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows.
Appellant is an inmate at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)
Rockview. The psychiatric staff at the prison has followed Appellant
beginning, at the latest, in the summer of 2015. Dr. Kevin Burke, an SCI
Rockview psychiatrist, diagnosed Appellant as suffering from unspecified
psychosis and prescribed medication for his condition. Appellant has
consistently refused to take the prescribed medication and has participated
very minimally in therapy. J-S12002-17
In early August 2016, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant received bad
news about his court proceedings and began to tell prison staff members
that he wanted to take his own life. Dr. Burke opined that Appellant’s
suicidal threats were credible and believed that, without treatment,
Appellant would act on the threat within thirty days. Additionally, Dr. Burke
opined that Appellant was a threat to others because he suffered from a
certain type of paranoid delusions. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that
Appellant believed that certain people within the prison had been surveilling
him and taking his possessions. Due to his incorporation of specific
individuals into his delusions, Dr. Burke noted that the prison had to
sequester Appellant to prevent him from lashing out at these people based
upon his delusional beliefs.
On August 17, 2016, SCI Rockview filed a petition seeking involuntary
psychiatric treatment for Appellant under § 7304 of the MHPA. Finding the
prison established a “serious mental disability” pursuant to the MHPA, the
mental health officer granted the petition following a hearing on August 18,
2016. Appellant filed a petition for review of the mental health officer’s
determination. Following review of the record, the trial court denied
Appellant’s petition, see 50 P.S. § 7109(b), on August 25, 2016. This timely
appeal follows.
On appeal, Appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court erred by
allowing the prison to involuntarily treat him without sufficient evidence to
establish a reasonable probability of death, serious physical debilitation, or
-2- J-S12002-17
serious bodily injury in the imminent future, as required for involuntary
treatment under § 7301(b)(2)(i) of the MHPA. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
We review a trial court’s order for involuntary treatment “not to find
the facts but to determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify
the hearing court’s findings.” Com. ex rel Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d
105, 107 (Pa. 1981). Accordingly, we must accept the factual findings of the
trial court that are supported by the record, but we are not bound by the
legal conclusions a trial court draws from those facts. See id.
A trial court derives its authority to order involuntary psychiatric
treatment from the MHPA. Pursuant to § 7304(a), a trial court may order
involuntary treatment, for a period not exceeding ninety days, if the court
finds that a person is “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.”
A person is considered to be severely mentally disabled under the MHPA
when,
as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
50 P.S. § 7301(a).
To establish that a person is a “clear and present danger” to himself,
evidence must be presented that, within the past thirty days, that
the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
-3- J-S12002-17
and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act;
50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i).
“Recognizing the substantial curtailment of liberty inherent to an
involuntary commitment, our Supreme Court has cautioned that the courts
must strictly interpret and adhere to the statutory requirements for
commitment.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hubert, 430 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Pa. 1981)). This high
standard is not relaxed when applying the MHPA standards to incarcerated
individuals. See Hubert, 430 A.2d at 1162-63. Significantly,
[i]n Gibson . . . our Supreme Court reversed an order for involuntary commitment of a prisoner, finding insufficient evidence that he posed a clear and present danger to himself or others. A psychiatrist had testified that the inmate was schizophrenic with paranoid delusions and opined that he posed a clear and present danger to himself and others. Testimony was also heard that the inmate had been found extinguishing a burning newspaper in his cell, did not regularly take the psychoactive drug prescribed for him, and had a twisted coathanger in his cell. In spite of his testimony, the Court found involuntary commitment improper, citing no evidence of attempted suicide or self-mutilation; no evidence that the newspaper fire was deliberately set; no evidence that the failure to take medication threatened the inmate’s life or well-being; and no evidence that the twisted coathanger was used to threaten or injure anyone. On this record, the Court found that the Commonwealth had not shown “such inability of [the inmate] to attend to his needs as to threaten death, serious bodily injury, or serious physical debilitation.”
In re T.T., 875 A.2d at 1127 (citing Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107) (internal
citations omitted; brackets in original).
-4- J-S12002-17
Here, Appellant argues that, as was the case in Gibson, the prison
officials failed to present evidence to show that he was a clear and present
danger to himself or others. We recognize that there was no evidence
presented to indicate that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of
a threat to commit suicide or self-mutilation. Additionally, no evidence was
offered that Appellant committed an overt act in furtherance of a threat to
harm others. Therefore, the only basis for involuntary treatment was if the
prison proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant was unable
to care for himself and that there was a reasonable probability of his death,
serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation within thirty days unless
commitment was ordered. See 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). See also In re
Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 1998) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence as the standard of proof for involuntary treatment).
Instantly, the trial court found that
[e]vidence was presented that Appellant will not satisfy his own needs for medical care. Appellant suffers from unspecified psychosis, suicidal ideation, and has a paranoid set of beliefs reaching delusional proportions. As explained above, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant’s condition is likely to continue without treatment. Appellant testified that he is stressed out from receiving bad news regarding his court case, and that he needs to work on his coping skills. Despite this acknowledgement, Appellant refuses to take his prescribed medication or fully participate in therapy. Such refusal supports Dr. Burke’s testimony that Appellant is unable to provide for his own basic needs. Specifically, Dr. Burke testified that Appellant is prescribed Narvane, to address his paranoia and delusions, and Cogentin. Dr. Burke testified that Appellant had also exhibited minimal, when any, cooperation in therapy. He explained at times Appellant will not respond, will only use one word answers,
-5- J-S12002-17
or wave therapy completely at times. Dr. Burke testified that without such care and support there is a reasonable probability Appellant’s behavior would lead to death, disability, or serious physical debilitation. Dr. Burke is aware of Appellant’s ongoing mental health diagnosis and history, suicidal ideation, threats [of] harm to others, and refusal to seek and accept medical care to address his issues. As such, the requirements of 7301(b)(2)(i) have also been met.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/12/16, at 3-4.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
prison presented clear and convincing evidence that there was “a reasonable
probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation
would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under
the act.” 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). Unlike the evidence presented in Gibson,
there was evidence presented here that the failure to take his medication
and participate in therapy threated Appellant’s life. Dr. Burke opined that
Appellant’s credible threats of suicide could not be curtailed without
Appellant’s participation in therapy and/or medication. Further, because the
uncontroverted evidence established that Appellant’s suicidal ideations had
only emerged a week prior to the prison seeking involuntary treatment, we
find that the trial court’s conclusion that “death, serious bodily injury or
serious physical debilitation would ensure within 30 days” is sound. Thus,
presented with these facts, we find that the trial court did not err in
determining that the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment had
been met.
-6- J-S12002-17
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 3/8/2017
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