In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00172-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF D.W., D.B., AND J.B., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-746781-24
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Mother1 attempts to appeal the trial court’s “Final Order in Suit
Affecting the Parent–Child Relationship.” Mother filed her notice of appeal pro se,
but it appears that she is represented by court-appointed counsel.2
The trial court signed its order on June 24, 2025; therefore, Mother’s notice of
appeal was due July 14, 2025. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (providing that “in an
accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days after the
judgment or order is signed”), 28.1(b) (stating that accelerated appeal is perfected by
filing notice of appeal within time allowed by Rule 26.1(b)). However, Mother did not
file her notice of appeal until March 17, 2026, making it untimely. See Tex. R. App. P.
26.1(b), 28.1(b).
Without a timely filed notice of appeal or extension request, we do not have
jurisdiction over the appeal, and we must dismiss it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b),
26.1(b), 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997); Howlett v. Tarrant
County, 301 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (op. on
reh’g); see also Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (“[P]ro se litigants are
In suits affecting the parent–child relationship (SAPCR), we use aliases for the 1
names of the children and their parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 In the SAPCR order, the trial court orders that Mother’s appointed counsel “shall continue in that capacity until all appeals of a final order . . . are exhausted or waived.” Mother’s appointed counsel has not filed a motion to withdraw in the trial court or in this court.
2 not exempt from the rules of procedure.”). On March 19, 2026, we notified Mother
and her appointed counsel of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal
because her notice of appeal was untimely. We warned her that we could dismiss this
appeal for want of jurisdiction unless she filed a response by March 30, 2026, showing
grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. We have not
received a response.
Because Mother’s notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss this appeal for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
Per Curiam
Delivered: April 23, 2026
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