in the Interest of Donald Michael Ackel, II, Haley Denah Ackel, and Kye Taylor Ackel, Minor Children

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 22, 2000
Docket13-98-00560-CV
StatusPublished

This text of in the Interest of Donald Michael Ackel, II, Haley Denah Ackel, and Kye Taylor Ackel, Minor Children (in the Interest of Donald Michael Ackel, II, Haley Denah Ackel, and Kye Taylor Ackel, Minor Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
in the Interest of Donald Michael Ackel, II, Haley Denah Ackel, and Kye Taylor Ackel, Minor Children, (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

NUMBER 13-98-560-CV


COURT OF APPEALS


THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI

___________________________________________________________________

DONALD ACKEL

, Appellant,

v.


JEANNINE GOETZ

, Appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 28th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________________

O P I N I O N


Before Justices Dorsey, Chavez, and Rodriguez
Opinion by Justice Rodriguez


Appellant, Donald Ackel, brings this appeal contesting the modification of his child support obligation. Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the modification, and prays for a reversal and remand for a determination of the appropriate child support. We reverse and remand.

In 1994, appellant and appellee, Jeannine Goetz a/k/a Jeannine Ackel, were divorced in Louisiana. Following the divorce, appellant made child support payments of approximately $500 per month. When appellee and the children moved to Texas, appellant filed a suit affecting parent/child relationship in the 28th District Court in Nueces County, Texas, requesting, among other things, validation of the divorce judgment from Louisiana and modification of the child support payment. In November 1995, the district court validated and adopted the Louisiana judgment and orders. Further, in response to appellant's request for modification of his support payment, the district court signed a temporary order ordering appellee to apply for social security benefits for the minor children.(1) Appellee apparently complied with the order. It further appears from the record that appellant stopped making his direct support payment of $500 after the children began receiving their monthly social security benefits of approximately $700.

In June 1997, appellee filed a motion to modify appellant's child support payment asserting that an increase in the payment would be in the best interest of the children and that the circumstances of the children had materially and substantially changed since the rendition of the order of divorce. Following a trial on the motion, appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1200 per month, with the payment offset by the children's monthly social security benefits of $708. Appellant therefore was required to actually pay $492 per month in child support.

Appellant requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to section 154.130 of the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.130 (Vernon 1996). In response, the district court made numerous findings regarding appellant's lifestyle, ownership of assets, possession of large sums of cash and jewelry, and travel. The court also found, based on appellee's testimony, that the present needs of the children were at least $2598 per month. The court's conclusions of law included the following: (1) "[t]he evidence . . . and logical inferences drawn from said evidence, demonstrates . . . [appellant] has the ability to pay the . . . child support assessed against him directly, or in the alternative, [appellant] did not demonstrate that the . . . child support assessed directly against him, after off set . . . is beyond his ability to pay;" and (2) "[t]he amount of child support awarded . . . is in the best interest of the children, and is less than one hundred percent (100%) of the proven needs of the children." In the absence of a record, the trial court's findings are binding on the parties and are accepted as justified by the evidence. See Ybarra v. Newton, 714 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (citation omitted). However, when, as in this case, the reporter's record appears in the appellate record, findings of fact are not conclusive on appeal. See id. (citations omitted). Findings of fact are binding in the appellate court only if supported by evidence of probative force. See id. (citations omitted).

By his first and second issues, appellant contends the child support order was an abuse of discretion, and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the award.

A court's child support order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party shows that the order constituted a clear abuse of the court's discretion. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990); Panozzo v. Panozzo, 904 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See id. Errors premised on evidence insufficiency are not segregable from an abuse of discretion point of error. See Scott v. Younts, 926 S.W.2d 415, 420-21 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (citations omitted). Whether there is any evidence to support the court's support order is a relevant consideration in determining if the district court abused its discretion. See id. at 421 (citation omitted).

Various guidelines used in regulating the court's discretion appear in chapter 154 of the Texas Family Code. Section 154.121 of chapter 154 provides that "[t]he child support guidelines in [subchapter c] are intended to guide the court in determining an equitable amount of child support." Tex. Fam. Code § 154.121 (Vernon 1996). An amount of child support that complies with the child support guidelines, when the obligor's monthly net resources are $6000 or less, is reasonable and in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.122 (Vernon 1996); Panozzo, 904 S.W.2d at 784. The percentage guideline for three children is thirty percent of the obligor's net resources. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.125 (Vernon 1996). The family code provides that the court shall calculate net resources by considering all personal service income, interest, dividends, royalty income, self-employment income, net rental income, and "all other income actually being received." See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.062 (Vernon 1996).

Appellant asserts that the only evidence introduced by appellee regarding appellant's income or earning capacity for the purpose of calculating child support and regarding the expenses of the appellee and the children was no more than surmise, speculation, and hypothetical conjecture. He contends that the evidence shows that his social security payment of $716 constitutes his sole income.

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Related

Panozzo v. Weili Zheng Panozzo
904 S.W.2d 780 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Worford v. Stamper
801 S.W.2d 108 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Ybarra v. Newton
714 S.W.2d 353 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1986)
Scott v. Younts
926 S.W.2d 415 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
S.A.B.S. v. H.B.
767 S.W.2d 860 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1989)

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