In the Interest of: D.N.W., Appeal of: S.O.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 21, 2018
Docket298 MDA 2018
StatusUnpublished

This text of In the Interest of: D.N.W., Appeal of: S.O. (In the Interest of: D.N.W., Appeal of: S.O.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of: D.N.W., Appeal of: S.O., (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

J-S65005-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.N.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.O., NATURAL MOTHER : : : : : No. 298 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 11, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s): A-8511

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.M.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.O., NATURAL MOTHER : : : : : No. 299 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree January 11, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s): A-8512

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2018

S.O. (“Mother”) appeals the decrees1 terminating her parental rights to

her minor daughters, D.N.W. (born in August of 2013) and N.M.W. (born in

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of D.M.L.W. (“Father”) on January 11, 2018. Father filed separate appeals at 316 MDA 2018 and 317 MDA 2018. J-S65005-18

July of 2014) (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(a)(2) and (b). We affirm.2

The orphans’ court fully set forth the facts of this case in its Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) opinion, and we summarize the procedural background as follows:

The record reveals that CYS assumed care of the Children on January 27,

2015, pursuant to a shelter care order. Reasons for the placement were the

hospitalization of the natural parents, domestic violence, parental mental

health and substance abuse issues, and unstable housing. Subsequently, the

Children were placed in foster care on September 21, 2015. On November

28, 2016, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed a petition

for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The

orphans’ court conducted a termination hearing over several days, beginning

on May 8, 2017, and ending on July 26, 2017.3

In support of its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

termination was warranted, CYS called the following witnesses: Alicia Singer,

senior clinician at Community Counseling Services; Grace Tavaris, case

manager in the Intensive Family Reunification parenting program of Family

2 We note with displeasure that neither CYS nor the Children’s guardian ad litem has filed a responsive brief.

3 The Children were represented by legal counsel and an attorney-guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Legal counsel was permitted to withdraw after the GAL advised the orphans’ court that there was no conflict between the Children’s legal and best interests and that no party objected to counsel’s withdrawal. N.T., 5/8/17, at 3.

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Services Association; Marisue Sack, employed by Family Services Association

in the Intensive Family Reunification parenting program; Deborah Ficco,

representative payee of Fitzmaurice Community Services; and Sherri

Hartman, caseworker for CYS. In response, Mother testified on her own behalf

and called Donald Grahm, a therapist at Haven House and navigator of its

wellness recovery team.

On January 11, 2018, the orphans’ court filed decrees terminating

Mother’s parental rights to the Children. On February 9, 2018, Mother filed

timely notices of appeal. Both Mother and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother presents two questions for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit an error of law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support in terminating the parental rights of the natural mother of N.M.W. and D.N.W., as the grounds pursuant to 23 PA. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) were not established by clear and convincing evidence, and such granting of a petition to terminate parental rights was against the weight of the evidence presented by the parties.

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit an error of law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support for the court’s decision that the best needs and welfare of the minor child N.M.W. and D.N.W. would be served by terminating natural mother’s parental rights as required by 23 PA. C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Mother’s Brief at 3 (full capitalization omitted).

We consider Mother’s issues according to the following standards:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and

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credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Moreover:

there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re I.E.P., 87 A.3d 340, 343–344 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012)) (internal citations

omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 25101–2938, governs

termination of parental rights, and it requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

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the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). See

also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc) (explaining that the focus in terminating parental rights under Section

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