In the Interest of D.M., S.M., and F.M., Minor Children
This text of In the Interest of D.M., S.M., and F.M., Minor Children (In the Interest of D.M., S.M., and F.M., Minor Children) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1778 Filed March 5, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF D.M., S.M., and F.M., Minor Children,
D.M., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Paul G. Crawford,
Judge.
The father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Merrill C. Swartz of Swartz Law Firm, Marshalltown, for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mary Cowdrey of Public Defender’s Office, Marshalltown, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., Schumacher, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025). 2
POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to F.M., born in
2016; D.M., born in 2018; and S.M., born in 2018, pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f) (2024). On appeal, the father concedes the statutory ground
for termination was proved. He argues it is in the children’s best interests to give
him six more months to work toward reunification with the children, who had been
returned to the mother’s custody. Alternatively, he asks us to apply the permissive
factor in section 232.116(3)(a) to save the parent-child relationships.
We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings
of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of
witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
The juvenile court may “give the parent an additional six months for
reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the
additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021)
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). It is up to the parent to show “the
impediments to placing” the children with them “will not exist in six months.” Id.
And, to give the parent more time, we must also conclude the delay in permanency
is in the children’s best interests. Id. In making our best-interests determination,
we rely on section 232.116(2). See id. It requires us to “give primary consideration
to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). 3
Here, more than twenty months elapsed between the time the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services became involved with the family and
the final day of the termination trial in September 2024.1 Department involvement
began in December 2022 after the father strangled the mother while the children
were present in the home. There were also concerns the father was using
methamphetamine and had unaddressed mental-health needs.
The father was in and out of jail during the department’s involvement with
the family. Despite juvenile court orders, he never obtained mental-health and
substance-use evaluations or participated in drug testing. He also never
addressed his perpetration of domestic violence.2 During his testimony at the
termination trial, the father admitted he was an alcoholic and stated he recently
began attending monthly Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. He denied using
methamphetamine in the last ten years even though he was charged with
possessing drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine in June 2024 and admitted
the drug was found in his vehicle (the father suggested it was planted). While there
was evidence he engaged in some unapproved interactions with the children while
they were at the home of the paternal great grandmother, the father failed to attend
any supervised visits from February 2024 up to the close of the termination trial.
During that window, he was generally disengaged—the case manager and family
1 The termination trial took place over three dates: July 9, August 13, and September 4, 2024. 2 During his testimony, the father maintained he “never hurt [the mother] to begin
with.” He agreed he has criminal convictions for domestic violence with the mother as the named victim, but he claimed that, in reality, he was the victim of the mother’s violent actions and only took the blame to ensure the mother did not go to prison. In the written termination order, the juvenile court specifically found these statements lacked credibility. 4
support specialist struggled to contact him, and he did not take any steps to comply
with the case plan. The father was in no better a position to resume custody in
September 2024 than he was at the time of the children’s formal removal in May
2023; he had pending criminal charges, was being held in jail, and could not say
when (or if) he would be released.
The father testified that he was “owning up to [his] mistake and trying to get
[him]self together and fixed and work towards a better—to better [him]self not only
for [him] but also for [his] kids.” And the children’s great grandmother—a mother
figure to the father—recognized the father’s new mindset; she asked the court to
give the father more time, testifying, “Just in the last few weeks he has tried, two
weeks maybe, or three. . . . [Since being jailed] he made a choice that he wanted
to get his life back.” We hope the father can sustain positive changes in his life.
But he made no progress during the nearly sixteen months the children were
formally removed from his care and—because of his disengagement—it was
unclear what services or help he would need before he would be in the position to
resume custody. We cannot conclude the need for removal would no longer exist
if the father was given six more months to work toward reunification.
While the children were formally removed from both parents’ custody in May
2023, they were returned to the mother with juvenile court approval about five
months later. Pointing to section 232.116(3)(a), which allows the court to forgo
termination when “[a] relative has legal custody of the child[ren],” the father argues
there is no need to terminate his rights; he asks us to save the parent-child
relationships. As the father recognizes, after the State proves a ground for
termination, the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish a 5
permissive factor in section 232.116(3). In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa
2018). The factors in section 232.116(3) “are permissive, not mandatory,” and we
may use our discretion, “based on the unique circumstances of each case and the
best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this section to save the
parent-child relationship.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct. App.
2011). The juvenile court refused to apply a permissive factor, reasoning: “The
fact that the children are in mother’s custody is based on father’s history of
domestic violence towards her. That does not score him points towards applying
an exception to termination of his parental right.” We agree.
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