In the Interest of: D.D.G., a Minor

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 8, 2017
Docket2496 EDA 2016
StatusUnpublished

This text of In the Interest of: D.D.G., a Minor (In the Interest of: D.D.G., a Minor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of: D.D.G., a Minor, (Pa. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

J-S95003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D.G., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.G., FATHER

No. 2496 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree Dated July 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos: CP-51-DP-0002035-2014; and CP-51-AP-0000378-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 08, 2017

Appellant D.G. (“Father”) appeals from the July 27, 2016 decree of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“trial court”), which

involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his male child, D.D.G.

(“Child”), born on November 17, 2005, under Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and

(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b), and

changed the permanency goal to adoption under Section 6351 of the

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history underlying this case are uncontested

and thoroughly recited by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Briefly, on August 19, 2014, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”)

received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report, alleging that in June

of 2014, Child’s mother (“Mother”), S.S., left him with his maternal aunt for J-S95003-16

the weekend and failed to return for him. The report also alleged that

Father physically had abused Child and that Father forced Child to vomit as a

form of punishment. Additionally, the report alleged that Child had

witnessed his parents use drugs and that he did not wish to return to his

Mother’s care. On December 2, 2014, Child was adjudicated dependent.

DHS received legal custody of Child who continued to be placed with

maternal aunt. Parents were provided with opportunities to rectify their

conduct for purposes of regaining custody of Child, but failed to complete

the objectives of their respective single case plan (“SCP”). Specifically,

Father’s objectives included attending MENERGY, where he was to

participate in a domestic violence and spousal abuse program, which he

never completed. Father’s other objectives were to complete a parenting

class, receive drug and alcohol treatment, and obtain employment. He failed

to satisfy these objectives. Also, Father tested positive for cocaine use on

December 2, 2014.

On April 20, 2016, DHS filed petitions for involuntary termination of

the parental rights of parents, and for a change in the permanency goal for

Child to adoption. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated the

parents’ parental rights to Child and changed the permanency goal to

adoption. Father timely appealed.1 Father filed a concise statement of

____________________________________________

1 Mother does not contest the termination of her parental rights to Child.

-2- J-S95003-16

errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In

response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding that

it did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to Child

under Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.

On appeal,2 Father raises three issues for our review, reproduced here

verbatim:

I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) where Father presented evidence that he tried to perform his parental duties but was denied access to his son.

II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) where Father presented evidence that he has remedied his situation by taking parenting classes, attending drug and alcohol treatment attended Menergy to address his goal domestic violence counselling [sic] and obtaining adequate housing for his family. Father has the present capacity to care for his child.

2 Our standard of review for orders terminating parental rights is as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent evidence. In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc)), appeal denied, 982 A.2d 824 (Pa. 2005).

-3- J-S95003-16

III. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of Father, D.G. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) where the evidence was presented that established [Child] had lived with his Father for the first part of his life. Additionally, Father was denied visitation with his child while his child was in placement.

Father’s Brief at 7.3

After careful review of the record and the relevant case law, we

conclude that the trial court accurately and thoroughly addressed the merits

of the Father’s claims.4 See Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 10/13/16, at

10-19. As the evidence of record reveals, Father’s repeated and continued

3 Insofar as Father argues that he was denied access to Child, we decline to address this argument because Father failed to preserve it in his Rule 1925 statement. Established law makes clear any issues not raised in a Rule 1925 statement will be deemed waived. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 420, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). The concise statement must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, the waiver standards apply in the family law context. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509–10 (Pa. Super. 2007) (applying Lord standard to appeal from order terminating parental rights); In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding mother waived claim challenging termination of her parental rights because it was not included in her concise statement, among other reasons); In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 515 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding father waived issues regarding goal change when he failed to specify argument in his concise statement). Even if this argument was not waived, Father still would not be entitled to relief. As the trial court noted, since November 2015, Father has failed to contact the case manager to inquire about Child. Father similarly has failed to meet the required SCP objectives to be reunified with Child, who continues to feel uncomfortable being around his Father.

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