In the Interest of D.A.M.III, a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 29, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00327-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00327-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.A.M. III, A CHILD

On Appeal from the 455th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court No. D-1-FM-23-004172, Honorable Laurie Eiserloh, Presiding

August 29, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Desmond Fields, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s order granting

Appellee, Maya Corio, sole managing conservatorship of their son, D.A.M.1 By a single

issue, Fields contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Texas

was not the child’s home state. We affirm.

1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. BACKGROUND

Corio filed her original petition on June 1, 2023, identifying the child’s county of

residence as Travis County and alleging that no other court possessed continuing

exclusive jurisdiction. Fields responded with a special appearance and plea to the

jurisdiction, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Texas Family Code

§ 152.203. He also filed a counterpetition alleging the child resided in Lake County,

Indiana.

By an amended petition, Corio additionally alleged that the trial court possessed

emergency jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 152.204. Although the record

contains no transcript or order, the parties acknowledged at trial that the court had held a

prior hearing on Fields’s plea to the jurisdiction and overruled it. The trial court allowed

Fields to re-urge his plea.

Fields argued his child was in Texas for only twenty-nine days before Corio’s

original petition and that the child’s “home state” was Indiana because that is where he

was born. He claimed the child never spent six consecutive months in Texas. Fields

read from Corio’s affidavit, which stated she moved to Texas in September 2021 but flew

periodically to Indiana to allow Fields to visit the child. Importantly, the affidavit stated

that the child had not been physically present in either state for six consecutive months.

Fields conceded that the State of Indiana did decline jurisdiction, but contends it

was only for a month “because [he] had the dismissal attorney, and they closed the case

down.” Fields said he had refiled. He reiterated that the child was never in Texas for six

consecutive months because the child would return to Indiana for visits. Fields also

2 pointed to a 2023 trip where he, Corio, and the child were in California from April 27 to

May 3.

The trial court overruled Fields’s renewed plea to the jurisdiction, heard evidence

regarding custody and the child’s best interest, and entered a final judgment. This appeal

followed.

ANALYSIS

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), adopted

by the Texas legislature as Chapter 152 of the Family Code, provides four scenarios

under which a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction for an initial custody determination.

See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 152.201(a). Among those scenarios is that Texas was the

child’s home state within six months before the custody proceeding commenced. Id.

§ 152.201(a)(1).

“Home state” is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at

least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody

proceeding.” Id. § 152.102(7). The child’s physical presence within the state is a primary

consideration when determining the home state. Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 328

(Tex. 2005). However, temporary absences are considered part of the consecutive

period. In re Lewin, 149 S.W.3d 727, 739 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Time spent

away from a state during a temporary absence is counted as time in the state for the

purposes of determining a child’s ‘home state.’”).

Fields misinterprets how the UCCJEA applies to temporary absences. He argues

that visits to Indiana and a brief trip to California disrupted the consecutive six-month 3 period required to establish Texas as the child’s home state. Fields further contends that

because the child was born in Indiana, that state remains his home state. Both arguments

fail.

The record establishes that Corio moved to Texas with the child in September

2021, a fact Fields does not dispute. From that point forward, Texas became the child’s

established residence. Fields acknowledges this timeline but argues that the child’s visits

to Indiana and California broke the consecutive period required under § 152.102(7).

This argument is in conflict with settled law. In Lewin, the court explained that

“time spent away from a state during a temporary absence is counted as time in the state

for the purposes of determining a child’s ‘home state.’” 149 S.W.3d at 739. The visits to

Indiana here were exactly what Lewin contemplated: visits by a child to see the non-

custodial parent while maintaining an established residence elsewhere.

Fields misapplies Powell. In that case, a mother had lived in Tennessee for ten

months but argued it should not be the home state because she subjectively intended to

return to Texas. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that ten

months of physical presence made Tennessee the home state regardless of the mother’s

claimed intentions. 165 S.W.3d at 326–28.

Here, Fields does not dispute that the child lived in Texas with Corio for nearly two

years. He makes no argument suggesting that Corio was “trying out” Texas or intended

to return to Indiana. Instead, he argues that brief visits to Indiana somehow broke the

consecutive period required under the UCCJEA. But Powell said nothing about whether

4 brief absences interrupt consecutive time. That question is more directly answered by

Lewin, which holds they do not.

The trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction to enter an initial custody

determination. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss Justice