IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0539 Filed July 23, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF D.A., Minor Child,
K.G., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Mark Schlenker,
Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child.
AFFIRMED.
Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Magdalena B. Reese, Assistant Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for appellee minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to D.A., born in
2022, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2024).1 The mother
appeals, asserting (1) she should have been given additional time to work toward
reunification; (2) the juvenile court should have denied the termination petition and
instead reinstated the bridge order that was entered to close the family’s previous
child-welfare case; (3) the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child; and (4) the State did
not prove the statutory ground for termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h).
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495,
500 (Iowa 2014). “We review the facts and law, and [we] adjudicate [anew] those
issues properly preserved and presented.” In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995).
We take the issues raised by the mother out of order. First, we note that
while the juvenile court relied on two statutory grounds for termination—
paragraphs (g) and (h) of section 232.116(1)2—the mother challenges only the
1 The State did not seek to terminate the father’s parental rights. D.A. was in the father’s custody at the time of the termination trial. 2 The court may terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(g) when it finds
all of the following: (1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has entered an order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect to another child who is a member of the same family. (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation. 3
court’s ruling under paragraph (h).3 As we need only one ground to affirm, see In
re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012), and because the mother’s failure to
make an argument challenging termination under paragraph (g) constitutes waiver
of that issue, see, e.g., In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010), we conclude
there is clear and convincing evidence for termination under section 232.116(1)(g)
without further consideration.
Second, the mother argues HHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
her with the child because she was given few opportunities to drug test late in the
case. See In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“The core
of the reasonable efforts mandate is that [HHS] must make reasonable efforts
to . . . reunify families in each case.”). As we understand it, the mother suggests
she could have proved her sobriety to HHS and the court if she was able to test
more often, which would have prompted the court to return D.A. to her custody
rather than grant the termination petition. Our error-preservation rules require a
parent “to demand other, different or additional services” from the juvenile court.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation. The court may terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) when it finds all of the following: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time. 3 While the heading of the mother’s fourth argument mentions section 232.116(1)(g), she does not address any of the elements. 4
In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). “In general, if a parent fails to
request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not
later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Iowa 2002). Here, the mother’s petition on appeal suggests she may have orally
raised the issue of reasonable efforts at the September 2024 permanency hearing.
That may be accurate, but we do not have a transcript of those proceedings to
review, and the permanency order only mentions that reasonable efforts have
been made and nothing about any requests for services by the mother. See Iowa
R. App. P. 6.803(1) (“It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the transcripts
of any district court proceeding needed for resolution of the appeal are included in
the record. If the appellant intends to argue on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the record on appeal
must include a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.”).
And the mother did not raise the issue of reasonable efforts at the termination trial
(of which we do have a record) or in a written motion. On the record we have
before us, it is not clear the mother ever raised the reasonable-efforts challenge
she makes on appeal to the juvenile court. So we must conclude the mother failed
to preserve error; we do not consider the merits of this claim. See Olson v. BNSF
Ry. Co., 999 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 2023) (recognizing one of the purposes of
error preservation is to ensure the appellate court has “an adequate record for
review”).
Next, we consider the mother’s argument she should have been given
additional time to work toward reunification. The court can grant the request for
more time if the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the six-month 5
extension, see Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5), and the delay in
permanency is not contrary to the child’s best interests. See In re W.T., 967
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0539 Filed July 23, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF D.A., Minor Child,
K.G., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Mark Schlenker,
Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child.
AFFIRMED.
Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Magdalena B. Reese, Assistant Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for appellee minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and
Chicchelly, JJ. 2
GREER, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to D.A., born in
2022, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2024).1 The mother
appeals, asserting (1) she should have been given additional time to work toward
reunification; (2) the juvenile court should have denied the termination petition and
instead reinstated the bridge order that was entered to close the family’s previous
child-welfare case; (3) the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child; and (4) the State did
not prove the statutory ground for termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h).
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495,
500 (Iowa 2014). “We review the facts and law, and [we] adjudicate [anew] those
issues properly preserved and presented.” In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995).
We take the issues raised by the mother out of order. First, we note that
while the juvenile court relied on two statutory grounds for termination—
paragraphs (g) and (h) of section 232.116(1)2—the mother challenges only the
1 The State did not seek to terminate the father’s parental rights. D.A. was in the father’s custody at the time of the termination trial. 2 The court may terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(g) when it finds
all of the following: (1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section 232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has entered an order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect to another child who is a member of the same family. (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation. 3
court’s ruling under paragraph (h).3 As we need only one ground to affirm, see In
re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012), and because the mother’s failure to
make an argument challenging termination under paragraph (g) constitutes waiver
of that issue, see, e.g., In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010), we conclude
there is clear and convincing evidence for termination under section 232.116(1)(g)
without further consideration.
Second, the mother argues HHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
her with the child because she was given few opportunities to drug test late in the
case. See In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“The core
of the reasonable efforts mandate is that [HHS] must make reasonable efforts
to . . . reunify families in each case.”). As we understand it, the mother suggests
she could have proved her sobriety to HHS and the court if she was able to test
more often, which would have prompted the court to return D.A. to her custody
rather than grant the termination petition. Our error-preservation rules require a
parent “to demand other, different or additional services” from the juvenile court.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation. The court may terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) when it finds all of the following: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time. 3 While the heading of the mother’s fourth argument mentions section 232.116(1)(g), she does not address any of the elements. 4
In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). “In general, if a parent fails to
request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not
later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Iowa 2002). Here, the mother’s petition on appeal suggests she may have orally
raised the issue of reasonable efforts at the September 2024 permanency hearing.
That may be accurate, but we do not have a transcript of those proceedings to
review, and the permanency order only mentions that reasonable efforts have
been made and nothing about any requests for services by the mother. See Iowa
R. App. P. 6.803(1) (“It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the transcripts
of any district court proceeding needed for resolution of the appeal are included in
the record. If the appellant intends to argue on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the record on appeal
must include a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.”).
And the mother did not raise the issue of reasonable efforts at the termination trial
(of which we do have a record) or in a written motion. On the record we have
before us, it is not clear the mother ever raised the reasonable-efforts challenge
she makes on appeal to the juvenile court. So we must conclude the mother failed
to preserve error; we do not consider the merits of this claim. See Olson v. BNSF
Ry. Co., 999 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 2023) (recognizing one of the purposes of
error preservation is to ensure the appellate court has “an adequate record for
review”).
Next, we consider the mother’s argument she should have been given
additional time to work toward reunification. The court can grant the request for
more time if the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the six-month 5
extension, see Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5), and the delay in
permanency is not contrary to the child’s best interests. See In re W.T., 967
N.W.2d 315, 323–24 (Iowa 2021). To decide these issues, we review the facts
surrounding the family’s involvement with the juvenile court.4
D.A. was born in March 2022 and tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines at birth. He was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA).
The parents agreed to comply with a safety plan that allowed them to keep D.A. in
their custody, and both parents participated in substance-use treatment. The CINA
case closed with a bridge order in January 2023, which gave the mother and father
joint legal custody and shared physical care of the child. The order required each
parent to comply with recommendations from their respective therapist or
treatment counselor, refrain from criminal acts, and abstain from alcohol and illegal
substances. It also allowed each parent to request the other complete a drug test.
In July, HHS received allegations the mother was again using
methamphetamine. HHS met with the mother and asked her to drug test; she
refused to comply. Because of the mother’s history of drug use and her refusal to
submit to random drug testing, the State filed a CINA petition in September. After
the petition was filed, the mother agreed to wear a sweat patch. When she went
to have it removed a few weeks later, there was a report that the patch appeared
to have been tampered with according to a worker from the drug testing agency.
4 The mother’s parental rights to at least three other children have been terminated;
each case involved the mother’s use of methamphetamine. We limit our recitation of facts to those involving D.A. specifically. 6
Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition and removed
D.A. from the mother’s custody, ruling:
The patch overlay had a torn edge, its numbers did not look right[,] and “pharmchem” did not look right. The photos [admitted at the hearing] clearly don’t look like the patch that was put on. . . . The Court finds the testimony of mother was not credible on the issue of the patch. Mother, despite her long experience with [HHS] elected to ignore the request to provide specimen and relied on not doing random test and expect it to suffice. The Court considers her [HHS] history and that she is not a babe in the woods.
The mother appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed both the adjudication and
removal. See generally In re D.A., No. 24-0094, 2024 WL 3290377 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 3, 2024).
Meanwhile, from January 2024 through the first day of the termination trial
on December 18, the mother was asked to drug test eighteen times. She missed
or did not complete thirteen of those drug tests. Of the five she did complete, three
were negative for illegal substances. And two of the tests—one sweat patch worn
in January and February and another worn in October and November—were
positive for methamphetamine. During this same period, the mother also generally
failed to engage in substance-use treatment and mental-health therapy, although
both were part of the case permanency plan the court adopted.
At the three-day termination trial,5 the mother maintained she had not used
methamphetamine since the date of D.A.’s birth in March 2022; she argued the
positive drug tests were not reliable. Still, she was beginning to attend mental-
health therapy and had a substance-use evaluation scheduled for early February.
5 The trial took place on December 18, 2024, and January 8 and 29, 2025. 7
Like the juvenile court, we conclude the positive drug tests are credible
evidence of the mother’s continued use of methamphetamine despite her claims
to the contrary. And we consider those test results in conjunction with the mother’s
numerous missed tests, several of which occurred after the mother rejected offered
transportation from HHS or refused to comply with testing when it was scheduled
to take place in her own home. Without persuasive excuses for these missed tests,
we can presume they would be positive for illegal substances. See, e.g., In re
A.T., No. 25-0119, 2025 WL 1085210, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025)
(presuming all missed tests would be positive for illegal substances when the
parent had “no persuasive excuse” for the missed tests and collecting cases where
missed tests were presumed positive). We conclude the mother continued to use
methamphetamine throughout the child-welfare case. Yet as of the termination
trial, the mother had yet to admit her use and had not engaged in any treatment.
With this backdrop, we cannot say the need for removal would be remedied if she
was given an additional six months to work toward reunification. We agree with
the juvenile court that additional time is not warranted.
Finally, the mother argues the juvenile court should have re-implemented
the bridge order that was entered to close the 2022 CINA rather than granting the
termination petition; she asserts the bridge order has sufficient safeguards to keep
D.A. safe—even in the face of questions about her sobriety. The juvenile court
denied her request, concluding it was not a “viable option” because it “would
merely expose the child to more unsupervised visitation and more years of
uncertainty regarding the child’s future. In addition, it would prolong the issue of
drug testing and open the child to more uncertainties and vulnerabilities in custody 8
of the mother.” We agree. While we hope the mother is able to achieve and
maintain sobriety, we look to her years of drug use and the absence of consistent,
safe parenting when attempting to forecast what the future may entail. See In re
N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] good prediction of the future
conduct of a parent is to look at the past conduct. Thus, in considering the impact
of a drug addiction, we must consider the treatment history of the parent to gauge
the likelihood the parent will be in a position to parent the child in the foreseeable
future.” (internal citation omitted)). With that in mind, we agree with the juvenile
court that termination of the mother’s rights is in D.A.’s best interests. See In re
J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) (“A child’s
safety and the need for a permanent home are now the primary concerns when
determining a child's best interests.”).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.