In the Interest of: D.A., Appeal of: A.A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 1, 2023
• Docket: 60 WDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S17001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.A., MOTHER : : : : : No. 60 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000030-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.A., MOTHER : : : : : No. 61 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000029-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: J. C. A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: A.A., MOTHER : : : : : No. 62 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000089-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J. J-S17001-23

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: JUNE 1, 2023

A.A. (Mother) appeals from the orders,1 entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Blair County, changing the permanency goal for her three minor

children, D.A. (born Oct. 2018), G.A. (born Jan. 2020), and J.A. (Oct. 2021)

(collectively, Children), from reunification to adoption and suspending

Mother’s visits with Children.2 After careful review, we affirm.

D.A. and G.A. were removed from Mother’s care on April 27, 2021,

pursuant to an emergency protective custody order, as a result of Mother’s

homelessness.3 The court held a shelter care hearing on April 28, 2021, after

which D.A. and G.A. were placed in a foster care home and, subsequently,

declared dependent on May 7, 2021. J.A. was later declared dependent on

December 21, 2021. Both Mother and biological Father, B.P., 4 struggle with

____________________________________________

1Mother has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), by filing a separate notice of appeal for each trial court docket number. See In re: M.P., 204 A.3d 976 (Pa. Super. 2019) (applying Walker holding in goal change and termination of parental rights matters).

2On February 7, 2023, this Court sua sponte consolidated these three appeals at Nos. 60, 61 and 62 EDA 2023. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

3 On April 27, 2021, at approximately 12:08 AM, Blair County Children, Youth and Families (CYF) received a call from Mother stating that she was outside of the Sheetz on Plank Road, was homeless, could not get a hotel room, and was concerned for her Children’s safety. See N.T. Shelter Care Hearing, 4/27/21, at 2.

4 Children’s Father is not involved in this appeal.

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housing instability and mental health issues.5 On May 19, 2022, Children were

placed in the same foster home, where they continue to reside.

The court held permanency hearings in November 2021, February 2022,

June 2022, September 2022, October 2022. Mother’s plan objectives

throughout the life of the case included: (1) obtain appropriate and stable

housing; (2) undergo a psychological evaluation; (3) obtain mental health

counseling and follow through with recommended treatment; (3) continue

with medication management; and (4) participate in domestic violence

counseling. Mother was granted two-hour supervised visits twice a week. At

each permanency hearing, the primary goal was reunification, with a

concurrent goal of adoption. At the permanency hearings, the court found

Mother’s progress toward alleviating the circumstances necessitating

Children’s placement was either none or minimal.

On September 6, 2022, CYF filed a “Motion for 11[-]Month

Permanency/Dispositional Review Hearing/Goal Change” based on the claim

that “return to parent” was no longer a feasible goal, as parents “ha[ve] not

made substantial progress towards reunification, [] have not followed through

with [psychiatric consultation] recommendations, and their visitation has

actually been decreased or suspended as a result of lack of

5 Mother has been diagnosed with depression, bipolar one depression, manic depression, post-partum depression, adjustment disorder, offensive defiant disorder, borderline personality disorder, and psychosis. Id. at 71.

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progress/cooperation.” Motion, 9/6/22, at [4.] On November 8, 2022, the

court held a goal change hearing, at which Mother and Father testified. At the

conclusion of the hearing,6 the court held the record open for seven days so

that Mother could supplement the record with “further documentation

regarding [Mother’s] lease [and] . . . review everything that has occurred and

make a decision in the case.” N.T. Goal Change Hearing, 11/8/21, at 113-14.

By order, on November 21, 2022, the court changed the permanency

goal from reunification to adoption and suspended Mother’s visitation with

Children, concluding that Mother had been “minimally” compliant with her

permanency plan and had “minimal” progress toward alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.” Permanency

Order, 11/21/22, at ¶ 4(a); ¶ 7(a). The court also ordered an alternate goal,

of placement with a fit and proper relative, to be explored by CYF. 7 Children

had been in placement for 15 of the last 22 months at the time of the final

permanency hearing.

6 Mary Ann Probst, Esquire, acted as guardian ad litem and represented Children’s legal interests at the permanency and goal change hearings.

7 Interestingly, the court recognized that filing a termination petition at that time would not serve Children’s needs and welfare “in light of the bond that existed between [C]hildren and parents.” See Permanency Order, 11/21/22, at ¶ 21(f)(iii). Thus, the court found “that a reasonable delay exists in not filing a termination petition” and that Children’s placement with a “fit and proper” relative shall be ruled out as not appropriate before a petition to terminate parental rights is filed and not before a scheduled January 2023 status conference. Id.

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Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. In lieu of a

Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court relied upon its detailed November 21,

2022 permanency order to support its decision to change the goal to adoption

and to suspend Mother’s visits. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 1/9/23, at 1-2. On

appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the [d]ependency [c]ourt erred/abused its discretion by changing the goal to adoption when the record showed that Mother was making progress toward the goals set by [CYF.]

(2) Whether the [d]ependency [c]ourt erred/abused its discretion by failing to reinstate visitation between [M]other and [C]hildren, as the evidence did not show that Mother was a grave threat to [C]hildren[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Mother contends that the trial court improperly changed the

permanency goal from reunification to adoption “in light of the strong mutual

bond she has with [C]hildren []and her apparent parenting skills.” Id. at 10.

Our standard of review of a goal change is as follows:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is [an] abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, as shown by the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings

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are supported by competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record could also support an opposite result.

In the Interest of S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946-47 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations

and quotations omitted). See also In the Interest of R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,

1190 (Pa. 2010) (appellate court not required to accept trial court’s inferences

or conclusions of law). We also recognize that in matters of placement for a

dependent child, the trial court must be guided by the best interests of the

child—not those of his or her parents. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.

Super. 2006).

Mother contends that because she completed a parenting program, the

court’s concerns with Mother’s ability to parent “are overblown” and that

“[a]ny and all ChildLine reports [regarding her supervision at] the visits were

similarly unfounded.” Id. at 11. Mother also claims that the day before the

November 2022 hearing, she entered into a one-year lease for an apartment,

“demonstrating the requested stability [she was required to have with regard

to] housing,” and that she had “worked diligently [] to pay off a back rent debt

that would have prevented her from obtaining housing assistance.”8

Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12.

As we have stated, in matters of placement for a dependent child, the

trial court must be guided by the best interests of the child—not those of his

or her parents. In re N.C., supra. Instantly, Children were initially removed

from Mother due to her homelessness, significant mental health issues, and ____________________________________________

8 Mother testified that Community Action agreed to pay her $900/month rent for one year. See N.T. Goal Change Hearing, 11/8/22, at 92.

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violence towards others. See Permanency Order, 11/21/22, at 6. Since J.A.’s

placement, Mother has not had any income. The guardian ad litem testified

that Mother’s “mental health also is just as equal [an issue as her housing

instability] in this case” and Mother’s failure to obtain the psychiatric and

psychological counseling she desperately needs to care for Children creates

an “impediment[] to permanency for th[e C]hildren.” N.T. Goal Change

Hearing, 11/8/22, at 104.

Moreover, Mother has had ongoing criminal issues, including allegedly

harassing and threatening a caseworker, as well as existing protection from

abuse orders between Mother and Father due to their “on-again-off-again”

relationship.9 Id. In addition, CYF caseworkers expressed their concern about

Mother’s ability to parent at visits, noting that she is unable to control

Children’s negative behaviors due in part to her inability to read Children’s

social cues. Caseworkers have also observed Mother frequently lose her

temper with Children when they have outbursts. Id. at 7. In August 2022,

Mother allegedly assaulted a security officer10 at a medical facility where she

9 Mother testified at the goal change hearing that there is a pending petition to withdraw Father’s and Mother’s PFA orders. See N.T. Goal Change Hearing, 11/8/22, at 97.

10At the time of the adjudicatory/dispositional hearing, held on May 7, 2021, two charges of simple assault, and one count of summary harassment were pending against Mother; Father, B.P., was the alleged victim in the matter. Simple assault, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct[,] and harassment charges were pending against Mother at the time of the November 2022 hearing as a result of Mother’s actions toward the security officer.

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was being treated for a wrist sprain she sustained during an altercation with

a woman Mother believed was Children’s foster mother.

The court also determined as not credible Mother’s report to law

enforcement that a casework supervisor was stalking and harassing Mother.

In fact, when Mother found out she would no longer have visits with Children,

Mother, who had to be escorted out of the courthouse because of her behavior,

stated that she would be taking matters into her own hands and would be

back to “jump” the supervisor. Id.

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that “[t]here appears to be no

significant progress toward either parent addressing their mental health

needs,” id. at 8, and “that return to parents should no longer be the primary

goal as neither [parent] has made substantial progress toward reunification.”

Id. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(f)(3), (5.1), (6), (9). The court did not find

Mother’s testimony that she had completed Women Aware mental health

training was credible where a KidsFirst employee reported Mother still had two

remaining classes left in the program. The court also concluded that Mother’s

belief that any type of trauma therapy was “unnecessary” was just a veiled

attempt to “avoid addressing past trauma [that ultimately] is not serving her

mental health well.” Permanency Order, 11/21/22, at 7.

The court’s findings that Mother downplayed her mental health issues,

and is unable to address the stress in her life, as well as her general mindset

toward receiving mental health treatment, supports its decision to change the

permanency goal to adoption. See In Interest of R.J.T., supra at 1190

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(appellate court must defer to trial judges who see and hear parties and can

determine credibility to be placed on each witness and gauge likelihood of

success of current permanency plan, even if appellate court would have made

different conclusion based on cold record). See also In re A.P., 728 A.2d

375, 379 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding where, despite willingness, parent cannot

meet “irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the child

must prevail over the rights of the parent”); In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901

A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (even where parent makes earnest efforts,

“court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for

permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the

future”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in changing the goal from reunification to adoption where the

decision is in Children’s best interests. In the Interest of S.G., supra.

Next, Mother contends that the court’s decision to suspend visitation is

not supported in the record where she does not pose a “grave threat” to

Children. Mother misapprehends the appropriate standard regarding

visitation and, thus, her claim is meritless.

In a dependency case,

[t]he standard against which visitation is measured . . . depends upon the goal mandated in the family service plan. Where . . . reunification still remains the goal of the family service plan, visitation will not be denied or reduced unless it poses a grave threat. If . . . the goal is no longer reunification of the family, then visitation may be limited or denied if it is in the best interests of the child or children.

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In re B.G., 774 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting In Re C.J., 729

A.2d 89, 95 (Pa. Super. 1999)) (emphasis added).

With regard to suspending Mother’s visits with Children, the court found

that “Mother has significant mental health issues that have been unaddressed

throughout this dependency proceeding. Unless [] Mother immediate[ly]

pursues trauma therapy[,] visitation is not in the children’s best interest.”

Permanency Order, 11/21/23, at 6; id. at 7 (Children continue to act out at

visits and “[Mother does not] appear able to control their behaviors”); id.

(Mother lacks ability to read Children’s cues at visits “to address their needs

in an appropriate manner, which appears to compound the behavioral

outbursts [C]hildren experience during their visits”); id. (ChildLine reported

Mother for losing temper with Children at visits). Because the court changed

the goal to adoption, its decision to suspend visits due to the fact that visits

with Mother, who still exhibited significant mental health issues, were not in

Children’s best interest is legally proper. In re B.G., supra. Moreover,

having determined that record evidence supports the court’s conclusion that

Mother still suffers from anger issues, mental health issues, and is unable to

adequately address Children’s needs in an appropriate manner during visits,

we find that it was in Children’s best interests to suspend Mother’s visits with

Children.

Orders affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/1/2023

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