In the Interest of D. L. T.

747 S.E.2d 880, 323 Ga. App. 719
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedAugust 19, 2013
DocketA13A0883
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 747 S.E.2d 880 (In the Interest of D. L. T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In the Interest of D. L. T., 747 S.E.2d 880, 323 Ga. App. 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Ray, Judge.

Tim and Tammy Blankenship appeal from the juvenile court’s dispositional order placing two minor children, D. L. T. and H. S. B., in the permanent custody of the Paulding County Department of Family and Children Services (“DFACS”) preparatory to their adoption by their foster parents. The Blankenships are the paternal [720]*720grandparents of H. S. B., but have no biological relationship with D. L. T., who is H. S. B.’s half-brother. On appeal, the Blankenships argue that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to place the children with them after DFACS allegedly promised to do so if they completed certain requirements. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On October 21, 2010, the juvenile court ordered shelter care for D. L. T. and for H. S. B. The children’s mother had been arrested four days earlier after attacking the Blankenships’ son, Justin Blankenship, who is the putative father of H. S. B. The mother also had threatened to kill herself and the children.

In a December 17,2010 order, the juvenile court found that while in the mother’s care, D. L. T. had been locked in a room and left to play with his own feces, and that Tammy Blankenship knew about this incident. The juvenile court found that the children were deprived, and they were placed with Tim and Tammy Blankenship for five or six weeks. During that time, Tammy Blankenship contacted DFACS three times within a week to say she was having a hard time handling the children and was exhausted. She asked if only D. L. T. could be removed. DFACS informed her that they believed it was in the children’s best interest to keep the siblings together. Before DFACS had time to arrange for daycare services or other help, Tammy Blankenship asked that both children be removed. They were removed in November 2010, and since then have lived with the foster parents who wish to adopt them. During part of the time the children have been in foster care, Tim and Tammy Blankenship had visitation.

On July 12, 2012, DFACS petitioned to terminate the rights of D. L. T.’s and H. S. B.’s biological parents, and Tim and Tammy Blankenship intervened, seeking to have both children placed in their custody. After the children’s biological parents voluntarily surrendered all parental rights, the children were placed in DFACS’ custody over the objection of Tim and Tammy Blankenship. The Blankenships appeal.

OCGA § 15-11-103 (a) provides:

Upon the entering of an order terminating the parental rights of a parent, a placement may be made only if the court finds that such placement is in the best interest of the child and in accordance with the child’s court approved permanency plan created pursuant to Code Section 15-11-58. In determining which placement is in the child’s best interest, the court shall enter findings of fact reflecting its consideration of the following: (1) The child’s need for a placement that offers the greatest degree of legal permanence and [721]*721security; (2) The least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (3) The child’s sense of attachment and need for continuity of relationships; and (4) Any other factors the court deems relevant to its determination.1

Following the termination of parental rights, juvenile courts are not obligated to attempt to place a child with relatives, but need only consider the best interests of the child. In the Interest of S.R.C.J., 317 Ga. App. 699, 705 (3) (b) (732 SE2d 547) (2012). “Because there is no conclusive preference given to relatives, the juvenile court is afforded wide discretion to determine whether a child should be placed with a relative or kept in a stable foster home.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of J. J., 299 Ga. App. 271, 277 (3) (682 SE2d 349) (2009). See also In the Interest of S. N., 291 Ga. App. 628, 633 (2) (662 SE2d 381) (2008) (no abuse of discretion found where juvenile court declined to place children with parents of mother’s ex-husband, with whom children had no relationship, biological or otherwise).

In their sole enumeration of error, the Blankenships argue that although DFACS promised to place the grandchildren with them, it never had a genuine intention of doing so, and thus “jsjimilar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, DFACS should not be permitted to make promises to parties and create the expectation of placement and then withdraw their commitment. .. [and] the trial court... should not adopt such an effort.”

As an initial matter, the Blankenships cite no authority for this proposition. Also, they do not point us to anything in the record, nor do we find any such evidence, showing that DFACS promised to place the children with them. It is clear that DFACS considered but ultimately rejected them for placement.

At the dispositional hearing, a DFACS supervisor testified that Tammy Blankenship asked for the children to be removed before a home evaluation could be completed. The supervisor also testified that Tammy Blankenship appeared to have trouble bonding with D. L. T. and showed favoritism to H. S. B., and stated that she believed Tammy Blankenship asked for custody of D. L. T. only when DFACS made it clear that the children would not be separated. She testified that DFACS was concerned about placement with Tim and Tammy Blankenship because the latter knew that D. L. T. was being neglected but did not inform DFACS or attempt to protect him. The supervisor cited an occasion where Tammy Blankenship visited a hotel where the mother was living and found D. L. T. locked in a bedroom and [722]*722screaming, but did not call DFACS or explain why she took no action. The supervisor also expressed concern over whether Tim and Tammy Blankenship could protect the children given that while the children were living with them, Justin Blankenship had been at their home, drunk and disruptive, and they had not asked him to leave, and because Tim and Tammy Blankenship had asked if he could move back into their home.

A licensed professional counselor testified as an expert for DFACS after observing six hour-long visitations between D. L. T. and Tim and Tammy Blankenship, and after doing individual counseling with D. L. T. The counselor testified that D. L. T. was aggressive toward or withdrawn from Tammy Blankenship during these visits, kicking her at one point and at another retreating into the fetal position. D. L. T. also displayed disturbing behaviors in his foster home following visits with Tammy Blankenship, including urinating on himself and the floor, soiling himself and spreading it on the couch, and screaming that he would have to leave his foster home and that he “had to” visit with Tammy Blankenship. The counselor observed that D. L. T. was affectionate and bonded with his foster parents, but generally was not affectionate with Tammy Blankenship, would turn his head when she tried to kiss him, and had not bonded to her. Because of the aforementioned behaviors, the therapist recommended that his visits with Tim and Tammy Blankenship be stopped and that D. L. T. not be placed with them. She also recommended that D. L. T. and H. S. B. be placed in a home together because of their sibling bond and that it was in their best interest to remain with their foster family.

A licensed psychologist who meets with D. L. T. on a weekly basis also testified on behalf of DFACS. She testified that when she first started seeing D. L. T.

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747 S.E.2d 880, 323 Ga. App. 719, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-d-l-t-gactapp-2013.