in the Interest of C.T.S., a Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 8, 2006
• Docket: 10-05-00293-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-05-00293-CV

In the Interest of C.T.S., a Child

From the 361st District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 04-000690-CV-361

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

          Following a bench trial, the court rendered judgment terminating the parent-child relationship between Deanna Robbins and her son C.T.S.  Robbins contends in her sole point that there is no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to prove any of the acts or omissions found to be a basis for termination of her parental rights.  We will affirm.

Background

          In response to a child abuse report, Child Protective Services investigator Anthony Rosso and a sheriff’s deputy went to the trailer house where Robbins lived with her two-year-old son C.T.S. and her boyfriend Aaron Black.  Black’s stepmother told Rosso that Robbins had moved out two weeks before.  However, the deputy found Robbins and C.T.S. hiding in a closet.  Rosso observed that C.T.S. “had three knots on his forehead, dried up blood on his lips, a busted lip, and swollen nose.”  On further examination, Rosso observed bruises and other abrasions on virtually every part of C.T.S.’s body.  Robbins told Rosso that she spanked C.T.S. but that he received most of his bruises from various accidents around the home.  Rosso took C.T.S. to a local hospital for further treatment and evaluation.

          John Pollock, an investigator with the sheriff’s department, was summoned to the scene.  Pollock photographed the numerous bruises and abrasions on C.T.S.’s body.  He interviewed Black.  Black stated that he had “backhanded” C.T.S. in the mouth and “whipped him with a belt.”  Pollock arrested Black the next day for injury to a child.  Pollock also talked with Robbins, who told him that C.T.S. was a difficult child.  Robbins told Pollock that she would put C.T.S. in a corner and leave the room while Black disciplined him.  She said that she had done this the day before and that she noticed swelling and redness on C.T.S.’s face when she came back inside.  Robbins said that she did not like to spank C.T.S. and that she generally allowed Black to handle discipline as they had done on the previous day.  In a second interview later that day, Robbins admitted that she had seen Black “backhand [C.T.S.] in the mouth or face” the day before.  Robbins also admitted that Black and she smoked marihuana in C.T.S.’s presence.

          Pollock later obtained an arrest warrant and arrested Robbins for injury to a child.  After being given her statutory warnings, Robbins agreed to talk with Pollock about the charges.  She admitted that C.T.S. was not injured in household accidents as she had said before.  Robbins stated that she had spanked C.T.S. on two occasions with a belt with raised metal triangles, which Pollock recovered during a search of her home.  Pollock also found a mini blind rod and a dog collar with raised metal dots.  Robbins stated that Black had hit C.T.S. with these objects.  Pollock testified that some of the bruises and abrasions he observed on C.T.S. appeared to have been caused by these objects.  Robbins told Pollock that C.T.S. “was very difficult” and Black “had been disciplining” him “quite a bit.”

          A jury convicted Robbins of injury to a child, and the court sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment.  At the time of the trial for termination of Robbins’s parental rights, an appeal of that conviction was pending.[1]

          When Robbins testified, she asserted her Fifth Amendment rights in response to many of the State’s questions.  She did concede, however, that Black’s discipline of C.T.S. was “excessive.”  She testified that at some point she had tried to leave this environment by calling her sister and asking for a ride to an abuse shelter.  For reasons which Robbins did not elaborate on however, her sister never came and got them.

          The court found that Robbins engaged in the following acts and omissions to support the termination decree:

·                    knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child;

·                    engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and

·                    was convicted for being criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child under section 22.04 of the Penal Code for conduct that caused the death or serious injury of a child.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (L) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

Standard of Review

          A no-evidence issue in a termination appeal will be sustained if, after “look[ing] at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the [verdict],” an appellate “court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true.”  In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).

          When an appellate court evaluates a factual insufficiency complaint in a termination case, the court must consider the evidence supporting the verdict and the evidence contrary to the verdict and determine whether the “disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its [verdict].”  See id.

Application

          Robbins contends in her sole point that there is no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to prove any of the three acts and omissions found to be a basis for termination of her parental rights.[2]  We will affirm if there is sufficient evidence to support any one of these three grounds for termination.  See In re K.N.R., 137 S.W.3d 675, 676 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 128 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Green v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.).

          Robbins herself characterized Black’s “discipline” of C.T.S. as “excessive.”  Nevertheless, she relied on Black to discipline C.T.S. because C.T.S. “was very difficult,” and Black “had been disciplining” him “quite a bit.”  Robbins did not remove C.T.S. from this abusive environment.  The photographs offered by the State clearly depict the extent and severity of the injuries suffered by C.T.S.

          From this evidence, we hold that a “reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction” that Robbins knowingly placed or allowed C.T.S. to remain in dangerous conditions or surroundings and that Robbins engaged in conduct or knowingly placed C.T.S. with someone who engaged in conduct which endangered C.T.S.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E); In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d 232, 242-42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); In re J.M.C.A., 31 S.W.3d 692, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

          The only controverting evidence Robbins offered was her testimony that she called her sister and asked for a ride to an abuse shelter.  Notwithstanding this testimony however, we cannot say that the “disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of” terminating Robbins’s parental rights.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E); J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d at 242-42; J.M.C.A., 31 S.W.3d at 698-99.  Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient.  See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

          Because we have concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support two of the three grounds found by the trial court to support termination of Robbins’s parental rights, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the remaining ground for termination.  See K.N.R., 137 S.W.3d at 676; J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 128; Green, 25 S.W.3d at 219-20.

          Accordingly, we overrule Robbins’s sole point and affirm the judgment.

FELIPE REYNA

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the result without a separate opinion.)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 8, 2006

[CV06]

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[1]           Robbins’s conviction and sentence have been affirmed by this Court in an opinion issued on the same date as this opinion.  See Robbins v. State, No. 10-04-357-CR (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 8, 2006, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).

[2]           Robbins does not challenge the court’s finding that termination is in C.T.S.’s best interest.