In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-21-00283-CV ________________
IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.
_______________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F-238,543 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her
daughters, Casey and Mary.1 In her appeal, Mother argues that the evidence
presented to the trial court was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s findings terminating her parental relationship with Casey and Mary,
including the trial court’s best-interest finding. 2 Based on our review of Mother’s
1 We use pseudonyms for the names of the minors and those of their family members to protect the minors’ identities. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (allowing courts to protect the identities of minors in parental-rights termination cases). 2 The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on three predicate grounds, including condition endangerment and conduct endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code 1 arguments, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s findings as to endangerment and the children’s best interest; for those
reasons, we will affirm.
I. Background
A. Pre-Removal Events and Initiation of Suit
Prior to filing suit Casey, then two and one-half years old, was found alone,
outside, at Mother’s apartment complex. This event triggered an investigation into
Mother’s apparent neglectful supervision of Casey, and Mother consequently agreed
to Casey’s voluntary placement with M.A., Mother’s cousin. The following month,
four-month-old Mary was determined to have been exposed to both marijuana and
cocaine, and she, also, was placed with a maternal relative. 3
Mother eventually took a drug test and tested positive for both marijuana and
methamphetamines; although Mother acknowledged her marijuana use, she denied
Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The trial court further found that Mother had and continues to have a mental or emotional illness or a mental deficiency rendering her unable to provide for the needs of the children; this illness or deficiency was found likely to continue to prevent Mother from providing for the children’s needs until the children reached adulthood. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.003(a)(1), (2). The parental rights of Casey’s father and Mary’s father were also terminated, but neither of them appealed the termination order. 3 Evidence also revealed that Mary had tested positive for marijuana when she was born, indicating that Mother used and/or was exposed to marijuana while she was pregnant with Mary. 2 using either methamphetamines or cocaine, and therefore could not comprehend or
explain the positive results for these substances in her and Mary’s drug tests.
Despite having agreed to permit the children to remain in their then current
placement locations, three and one-half weeks later, Mother took the children,
ostensibly because she inaccurately believed that the case was closed and that she
was permitted to do so. This event resulted in the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (“the Department”) initiating this suit on December 29, 2020,
with the goal of reuniting the family, or in the alternative, of terminating Mother’s
parental rights. As a result, the trial court issued a Writ of Attachment to regain
physical custody of the children. The removal affidavit attached to the Department’s
petition referenced these previous incidents and others that reflected poorly on
Mother’s fitness as a parent, and therefore sought Temporary Managing
Conservatorship of both children.
In March of 2021, after the Department learned that Mother’s parental rights
to another child, David, had been previously terminated, it sought and was granted
a determination of aggravated circumstances. 4 This determination enabled the
4 The appellate record contains extensive information about David and the circumstances of his removal from Mother’s care, but that information appears to have only minimal relevance to the matter currently before us, and therefore will not be discussed further. 3 Department to accelerate the pace of the suit while discontinuing payment for
services that Mother otherwise would have received pursuant to her service plan.
After several continuances and changes of Mother’s legal representation, the
trial court remotely conducted a trial on September 7, 2021. As a result of the
evidence at that trial, the trial court issued an Interlocutory Order of Termination,
and signed an Order of Termination on December 10, 2021.
B. Evidence at Trial
1. Testimony of Caseworker Kenya Holder-McCurley
Kenya Holder-McCurley, Child Protective Caseworker, described the reasons
that Casey and Mary were removed from Mother’s care, as set forth above.
Following the children’s removal, the matter was transferred to Family Based Safety
Services, and Mother was directed to follow all recommendations, including
completing a twelve-week parenting class and a substance-abuse assessment,
maintaining her mental health, and submitting to random drug screens. Despite the
requirement that she remain drug free, Mother continued to test positive for
marijuana. In Holder-McCurley’s opinion, Mother was making only a token effort
to comply with her service plan, and it was in the children’s best interest that
Mother’s parental rights be terminated.
4 2. Testimony of M.A.
M.A., Mother’s cousin and Casey’s caregiver, testified that Casey had thrived
during the seventeen months that Casey had resided with her, and she planned to
adopt Casey if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.
Having known Mother since childhood, M.A. was familiar with Mother’s
mental health struggles, specifically depression, and with Mother’s misuse of her
prescription psychotropic medication, which interfered with Mother’s ability to
optimally parent her children.
M.A. also described her interactions with Mother regarding the particular
events giving rise to this case and recalled that at the time of Casey’s venture outside
the apartment, Mother stated that she (Mother) had gone to the store and had left
Casey with a person who did not watch Casey closely, resulting in the child leaving
the apartment on her own. As for the events of late December of 2020, when Mother
took the children from their grandfather’s residence, M.A. stated that Mother “sped
off” with the children. M.A. followed Mother’s vehicle, but Mother drove “very,
very fast,” and was “weaving in and out of traffic[,]” in a clear attempt to prevent
M.A. from following her and learning where Mother was taking the children. M.A.
considered this situation dangerous for the children, noting that Mother’s erratic
driving nearly resulted in an accident.
5 3. Testimony of Mother
Contrary to M.A.’s testimony, Mother testified that Casey got out of the
apartment while she (Mother) was taking a nap. She further testified that she took
the children in late December of 2020 because she erroneously believed that the case
was closed and that she was authorized to do so. She acknowledged her evasive
driving maneuvers but testified that her actions were justified because M.A. had no
reason to keep the children from their own mother. She denied having been under
the influence of marijuana at the time Casey got out of the apartment but did not
specify whether she had or had not been using illicit drugs at the time she took the
children in violation of their agreed placements.
As for the requirement that she complete a parenting class, an element of her
service plan, Mother testified that the teacher stopped teaching her initial twelve-
week class after only six weeks. Mother, herself, made the decision to discontinue
attending her subsequently assigned parenting class because she disagreed with the
teacher’s approach to the subject. Mother testified that she has faithfully attended
AA/NA meetings, as required, and has obtained the necessary evidence of
attendance, but it appears that that evidence was never provided to either the
Department or the trial court. Mother has not, however, obtained a sponsor because
she does not consider herself an addict. Mother also pointed to her two negative drug
tests from February and March of 2021 and explained that her previous tests were
6 positive because the marijuana she had used was working its way out of her system.
Mother attempted to explain her inconsistent medication use by stating that she was
working with her doctor to identify the medication that worked best for her but did
not explain why she sometimes took too much of her prescribed medication, as M.A.
testified.
She further testified that she loved her children and did not want the court to
terminate her parental rights.
II. Standard of Review
The decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). Under the Family Code,
“‘[c]lear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79,
84 (Tex. 2005). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more
predicate acts or omissions and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental rights
termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Tex.
7 2009) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). We assume the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to
evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and
convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must determine “‘whether the
evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. 2002)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the
evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.
III. Analysis
A. Statutory Grounds D and E
In her first two issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support termination of her parental rights under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).
As to these subsections, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient because the evidence did not show that the children were harmed or
endangered by either their living conditions or by Mother’s course of conduct. In her
8 fourth point of error, Mother contends that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that it was in the children’s best
interest to terminate her parental rights.
We are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to
Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if challenged. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230,
235-36 (Tex. 2019). If the evidence is sufficient as to one of these, it will not be
necessary to address the other predicate grounds because sufficient evidence as to
only one ground in addition to the best interest finding is all that is necessary to
affirm a termination judgment. See id. at 232-33. Because the evidence of statutory
grounds D and E is often interrelated, we may consolidate our review of the evidence
supporting these grounds. See In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 2020 WL
1161098, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Endangerment arises when a parent’s conduct jeopardizes the child’s emotional or
physical health or to expose a child to loss or injury. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351,
360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing
evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the
physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection E allows for termination of parental rights if clear and
9 convincing evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers
the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated based on a single act
or omission by the parent. In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2015, no pet.) (citing In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003,
pet. denied)). Under that subsection, we examine the time before the children’s
removal to determine whether the environment of the home posed a danger to the
children’s physical or emotional well-being. Id. at 925 (citing In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d
790, 795 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2004, no pet.)). “A finding of endangerment under
subsection E, however, may be based on conduct both before and after removal.” In
re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)
(citing In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360). “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or
injury[.]’” In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)
(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).
Under subsection E, it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized or
exposed to loss or injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367.
“‘A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the
parent is aware of, but disregards.’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 925 (quoting In re
N.B., No. 06-12-00007- CV, 2012 WL 1605457, at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May
10 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Generally, subjecting a child to a life of uncertainty
and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re
R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
In addition, a pattern of drug abuse will support a finding of conduct
endangering a child even if there is no evidence that such drug use caused a physical
or actual injury to the child. Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
190 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). A history
of illegal drug use is conduct that subjects a child to a life that is uncertain and
unstable, endangering the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re S.D.,
980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Dupree v. Tex.
Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1995, no writ). A parent’s drug use, criminal history, and employment and housing
instability prior to and during the case create a course of conduct from which the
factfinder could determine the parent endangered the child’s emotional and physical
well-being. See In re M.C., No. 09-18-00436-CV, 2019 WL 1561824, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d
at 361-62 (parent’s drug use may qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious
course of conduct endangering the child’s well-being); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, pet. denied) (illegal drug use may support termination under subsection E
11 because “it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or
imprisoned[ ]”). A parent’s continued drug use when the custody of her child is in
jeopardy supports a finding of endangerment. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 361-62
(citing Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d
244, 253-54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).
The trial court, sitting without a jury, heard evidence of Mother’s relatively
recent illicit drug use, both before and after the children were removed. Additional
evidence before the trial court indicated that Casey had tested positive for marijuana
exposure, and Mary had tested positive for marijuana shortly after her birth; also,
Mary later tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine. Mother admitted to
marijuana use only and stated that she did not use cocaine. Even assuming, for the
purposes of this case, that this statement is accurate, Mother’s testimony that she
used marijuana is evidence that both Casey and Mary were exposed to marijuana, an
illegal drug, while they were in Mother’s care. Because the applicable case law
referenced above supports the proposition that Mother’s ongoing drug use
endangered her children, regardless of whether the children sustained actual harm,
and because the record contains clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s drug use
while her children’s custody was in jeopardy, we will not disturb the trial court’s
well-supported conclusion that the children were endangered by their living
12 environment that exposed them to marijuana and by Mother’s voluntary, deliberate,
conscious course of conduct in her use of marijuana.
Although Mother testified that she was drug free at the time of trial, a
statement that finds some support in the two negative drug tests performed earlier
that year, such recent improvements in Mother’s lifestyle do not “‘conclusively
negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.’”
In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 316-17 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 at 346.
Mother’s attempt to characterize her drug use as having occurred in the “distant
past,” and to invoke the logic of our sister court in Wetzel v. Wetzel, to urge reversal
of the trial court’s decision misapplies Wetzel to the facts before us. 715 S.W.2d 387
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). The Wetzel court observed that the parental
misconduct in question took place four years prior to the termination proceeding and
appeared unlikely to recur. Id. at 390. Under those unique circumstances, the court
considered the evidence insufficient to warrant termination. In this matter, however,
Mother repeatedly tested positive for illicit drugs during the pendency of the CPS
investigation and did not test negative until seven months before her trial date. We
therefore consider this case to be analogous not to Wetzel, but to In re A.M.M., No.
04-20-00511-CV, 2021 WL 1394308 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 14, 2021, no
pet.) (mem op.). In that case, the court affirmed the termination decision on the basis
13 of evidence establishing that the mother had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse,
as well as numerous presumptively positive tests. Id. at *4-5.
Mother’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to show endangerment
because of the alleged lack of evidence causally connecting that behavior with
conduct endangering a child misstates the law; endangering conduct, including drug
abuse, need not be directed at the children in question, nor need the children sustain
any injury, for the evidence to warrant the conclusion that the children have been
endangered, as that term is used in the context of a parental rights termination. In re
J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). Mother’s reliance on
In re L.C.L. likely is misplaced, because even though the Texas Supreme Court
denied the petition for review, Justice Lehrmann’s concurrence implies that if
presented with a “proper case,” the court probably would decide that no causal nexus
between the drug use and the alleged endangerment would be necessary to find clear
and convincing evidence of endangerment. 599 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet denied; 629 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2021).
Mother has correctly noted that In re A.H., stands for the proposition that
conclusory testimony does not “amount[] to more than a scintilla of evidence[,]” and
therefore is insufficient to support a termination decision. 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). Mother also is correct in her observation that
some of the witness testimony in this case was conclusory. The rationale of In re
14 A.H. does not, however, justify a reversal of the trial court’s decision in the case at
bar, because the evidence in each case is appreciably different. In In re A.H., the
only evidence of the best interest element of the case consisted of the caseworker’s
testimony that “termination of all parental rights was in the children’s best interest
‘because the children need a loving family that will care for them and take care of
their needs[.]’” Id. In the instant case, conversely, the record contains ample
evidence that Mother used marijuana on an ongoing basis both before her children’s
removal from her care and during the time that the Department was investigating the
situation and working to reunite the family. Mother admitted to her marijuana use,
and it is difficult to imagine evidence more clear and convincing than that admission.
Because the evidence of Mother’s ongoing marijuana use constitutes clear and
convincing evidence of both condition endangerment and conduct endangerment,
we will uphold the trial court’s findings as to sections (D) and (E) of § 161.001(b)(1).
We overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
1. Best Interest of the Children
In her last issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the factfinder’s determination that terminating her parental
rights was in the children’s best interest. Specifically, Mother argues the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children because
15 the record is either silent as to the factors set forth in Holley v. Adams, or because
the evidence on these factors favors Mother. 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976).
As Mother has argued, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a
child is served by keeping the child with his parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116
(Tex. 2006); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b). However, prompt and
permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the
child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). The trial court is given
“wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.” Gillespie v.
Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) (citing Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d
698 (Tex. 1967)).
The Family Code outlines nonexclusive factors to be considered in
determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide a safe environment for a
child including: the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; whether
there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who
have access to the child’s home; the willingness and ability of the child’s family to
seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and
facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; the willingness and ability of
the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a
reasonable period of time; whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate
16 parenting skills, including providing the child with minimally adequate health and
nutritional care, a safe physical home environment, and an understanding of the
child’s needs and capabilities; and whether an adequate social support system
consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 263.307(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116. The Texas Supreme Court
has articulated several additional factors that may be considered when determining
whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, including:
the desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the
parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, the programs available to assist
these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, the plans for the child by
these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, the stability of the home or
proposed placement, the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and any excuse for the acts or
omissions of the parent. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 (setting forth the “Holley
factors” and noting “[t]his listing is by no means exhaustive[ ]”). No specific Holley
factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be enough to support a finding
that termination is in the child’s best interest. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied)
(“Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that
17 termination is in the best interest of a child.”). Because stability and permanence are
important in a child’s emotional and physical development, termination of parental
rights may be in the child’s best interest when a parent is unable to provide a stable
environment or a reliable source for food, clothing, shelter, and emotional support.
See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 119-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.); In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no
pet.). A parent’s past conduct is relevant to determining the parent’s present and
future ability to care for a child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (parent’s past
performance as parent is relevant to determination of present and future ability to
provide for child); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. denied) (factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by past conduct). The
best-interest determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective
factors, and the totality of the evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). If, in light of the entire record, no reasonable
factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s
best interest, then we must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support termination. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
As for the children’s wishes, Mother’s brief contains only the bare,
unsupported assertion that the children “want to be with their mother.” Other
evidence indicated that the children were doing well in their respective placements.
18 Also, because Casey and Mary were only four years old and twenty months old,
respectively, at the time of trial, there was no evidence presented as to the children’s
subjective desires. This factor does not weigh heavily in favor of or against
terminating parental rights.
Regarding the children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future,
and the possible emotional and physical danger to them now and in the future, the
record includes reports that the children were removed because of Mother’s drug use
and her inadequate supervision of the children. Even if we were to accept Mother’s
assertion that despite evidence to the contrary, she did not use either
methamphetamine or cocaine, we are left with Mother’s acknowledgement of
marijuana use during the pendency of this case. This evidence supports the trial
court’s conclusion on the best interest element of the case.
As to Mother’s parental abilities, the evidence showed that Mother has been
diagnosed with depression and anxiety, and that she has not appropriately used her
prescribed medication to manage these diagnoses. Not only has she sometimes taken
too much of her medication, as M.A. testified, Mother’s own words reveal that she
sometimes did not take her medication as directed. Although some of the evidence
in the record indicates that Mother’s mental health symptoms were treatable, this
evidence does not show, as in Wetzel, that Mother’s illness had been successfully
treated, rendering it appropriate to relegate it to the realm of ancient history. Given
19 the ongoing nature of Mother’s mental health issues and the lack of any indication
that these issues can be prevented from recurring, the trial court correctly determined
that Mother’s mental illness adversely affected Mother’s parenting abilities and
prevented her from properly providing for her children’s physical, emotional, and
mental needs. Because of Mother’s substantially diminished parenting abilities, the
children’s best interest is served by terminating Mother’s parental relationship with
them.
Further addressing Mother’s parenting abilities, we observe that Mother’s
service plan required her to complete a twelve-week parenting class. Her failure to
complete her initial class may be excused by the teacher’s decision to discontinue
the class. Her failure to complete her second class, on the other hand, cannot be
excused by Mother’s disagreement with the teacher’s instruction methods. In fact,
Mother’s decision to stop attending this second parenting class indicates that she was
not even “checking [the] boxes[,]” to try to show compliance with her service plan.
Mother’s failure to present evidence of her AA/NA attendance further
underscores the impression that she was not complying with her service plan. In In
re D.R.A., as in this case, the evidence indicated that the parent did not have an AA
sponsor, and that the Department was unable to confirm the parent’s AA attendance.
374 S.W.3d at 535. The court stated that such evidence did “not weigh in [the
parent’s] favor[,]” and affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights. Id. In
20 In re N.A., the mother presented no evidence that she was “attending her services,”
and provided apparently falsified evidence of her AA attendance. Nos. 02-13-00345-
CV, 02-13-00346-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2377, at *28-29 (Tex. App.— Fort
Worth 2014, no pet.) (mem op.). Although the In re N.A. court did not discuss the
legal ramifications of this evidence, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
terminate the mother’s parental rights, thus indicating that it took a dim view of the
mother’s failure to provide any confirmation that she was complying with her service
plan. Id. at 63. Here, as in In re N.A., Mother has failed to document compliance
with her plan of service, and we share the In re N.A. court’s apparent perspective on
this type of omission.
Another Holley factor particularly applicable to this case is the current and
future physical and emotional danger to the children. 544 S.W.2d 367 at 372.
Mother’s ill-advised decision to take the children in late December of 2020, and her
admitted evasive driving maneuvers during that event, placed the children in
physical danger. There is no indication that Mother would not repeat her actions if
she were permitted to retain her parental status, and the physical danger posed by
the improper operation of a motor vehicle cannot be overstated. See e.g., In re J.F.-
G., 627 S.W.3d at 308. Although Mother has offered an excuse for her driving, and
although Holley requires that this excuse be considered, the trial court apparently did
not consider that excuse persuasive, and we agree with that assessment of it. In
21 response to a question asking why Mother was “speeding away down the highway
when [she] saw [M.A.][,]” Mother testified that M.A. was “trying to pull me over to
get [the children] back[.]” Although Mother’s view of M.A.’s motives is accurate,
as shown by M.A.’s testimony, it does not excuse the arguably reckless driving that
put Casey, Mary, and others at risk of being injured in a collision.
The combination of Mother’s drug use, her ongoing mental health challenges,
and her decision to drive dangerously while absconding with Casey and Mary,
support the proposition that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s
parental rights, lest Mother’s continued poor decisions place the children in further
danger. We have weighed the evidence relevant to the best interest component of the
case, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the children’s
best interest would be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights. We overrule
Mother’s last issue.
IV. Conclusion
Given our conclusion that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings
made pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and the trial
court’s best-interest finding, we need not address Mother’s additional contention that
the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that her mental illness had
prevented and would continue to prevent her from adequately caring for her children
22 until the children reach adulthood. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.003; Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1.
For this reason, the Order of Termination in trial court cause number F-
238,543 is
AFFIRMED.
________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice
Submitted on March 29, 2022 Opinion Delivered May 12, 2022
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.